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CHINESE ARMY BUYS U.S. COMPUTERS THANKS TO BILL CLINTON

Chinese Army Buys U.S. Computers, Helping PLA Modernize Info-Warfare

Charles R. Smith
Wednesday, Apr. 28, 2004

The Chinese Army has just completed a series of Information Warfare combat exercises and the results do not bode well for America.The Info-warfare Group Army, attached to the Beijing Military Area Command, launched a series of “Red Force v. Blue Force” exercises during April that showed that China could indeed score a success against a superior western Army.

According to the PLA Daily, the official media outlet for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, “the group army joined hands with the research institutes to develop a simulated communication confrontation training system by using computer network, multimedia and virtual technology.”

“The “Red Army” launched several waves of attack by adopting different offensive tactics. “Electromagnetic killers” directed precision strikes at its adversary’s (the “Blue Army”) “soft” and “hard” targets, as a result, its adversary’s communication systems were soon paralyzed,” states the April 27th, 2004 issue of PLA Daily.

The Chinese Army has made it clear in its recent publications that western computer technology is critical for its modernization program.

“The symbol of the transformation will be a qualitative change of PLA’s fighting power. The level of IT (Information Technology) application in armaments is the key factor in the transformation. The transformation of armaments, from scale production at the stage of mechanization to conceptual research, small serial production and keeping in reserve the capability of production at the stage of IT application, must be based on modern technologies, particularly on information technology,” states a recent high level publication from the PLA Central Military Command.

Despite the growing clouds of war coming from Beijing, Washington appears to be unconcerned about the PLA use of American computer technology.

MADAM WU – QUEEN OF PLA SPY NETWORK

President Bush and Commerce Secretary Donald Evans met with Chinese Vice Premier Madam Wu Yi last week on trade issues such as advanced U.S. computer technology. Commerce Secretary Evans promised to ease curbs on exporting computers and other technology that could be used in Chinese weapons development.

Madam Wu later spoke at a dinner sponsored by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-China Business Council. Wu stated that Vice President Dick Cheney raised the possibility of helping China construct nuclear power stations, during his recent visit to Beijing.

According to Wu, America has very advanced nuclear technologies and China “absolutely welcomes” a U.S. role in helping with development in that sector so long as the United States sticks to its commitments.

Wu also stated that China suffered big losses years ago when the U.S. government terminated satellite launch contracts that had been reached between American companies and the Chinese government.

MADAM WU AND COMPUTERS FOR WAR

Madam Wu should know about “big losses” because her rise to power inside the communist government is based on espionage and lies. Madam Wu, in her former post as minister of MOFTEC – (Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation) oversaw the export of advanced U.S. computers directly to PLA weapons labs.

In December 1997, U.S. Commerce officials sought permission to inspect Xian Jiatong University prior to the export of a high performance computer made by Digital Corp. (DEC). Commerce inspectors wanted to verify the Chinese university was not in violation of U.S. export control laws but were denied access by MOFTEC.

In a letter written to Liu Hu, Director General for Science and Technology of MOFTEC, U.S. Commerce Department officials noted that they were not given permission to perform the license check.

“We were disappointed at MOFTEC’s decision not to allow an on-site end use check and refusal to permit an Embassy representative to travel to Xian Jiatong University at the university’s invitation…. Because we were unable to work through MOFTEC, we gathered information on the end-user through other sources and have approved the license.”

It remains undisclosed what the officials meant by “other sources,” but it appears the Department of Commerce is only too willing to help Beijing save face rather than comply with a congressionally mandated law requiring inspections be performed.

In addition, the December 1997 letter to MOFTEC’s Liu Hu reminded the Chinese government of the requirements that U.S. representatives do a “post” export follow-up inspection.

However, U.S. Commerce officials were reduced to seeking “help” from the Chinese communist government in performing the post export inspections and sought another meeting to discuss the issue.

U.S. intelligence sources confirmed that the computer exported to Xian is being used by the PLA to perform biological and chemical weapons research.

MADAM WU VIOLATED TRADE TREATIES

In January 1998 the Commerce Department again contacted the Chinese government, seeking approval for verification inspections. The Commerce Department arranged for Bureau of Export Administration Chief Counsel, Hoyt Zia, to meet with China’s MOFTEC to discuss the denied pre and post export checks on U.S. super-computers.

Commerce counsel Hoyt Zia’s meeting in January 1998 with China’s MOFTEC official, Zhou Ruojun, failed to obtain Chinese permission for the inspections. Commerce documentation of the meeting noted that the Chinese denied all end use inspection checks. Chinese MOFTEC officials argued that there “was no formal agreement between the two governments on conducting these checks.”

The Chinese delegation also claimed that a 1983 U.S. trade letter agreeing to the checks “was unsigned” in the Commerce December 1997 complaint letter. MOFTEC’s Zhou considered the matter “inappropriate” because the letter was unsigned.

Things have not changed since 1998. A Feb. 2004 report from the General Accounting Office (GAO) stated that China still does not adhere to treaties it has signed and continues to violate agreements it promised to uphold.

According to the GAO report, China is still refusing to allow inspections of exported “dual use” equipment to verify that they are not being used for military purposes. Dual use items require a license for export and verification inspections by U.S. law because they can be used for military purposes.

MADAM WU AND NUCLEAR ESPIONAGE

The Xian computer is not the only time the Madam Wu led MOFTEC in successfully acquiring advanced U.S. computers. In 1996, American computer maker SUN Computer Corp. exported a super-computer directly to a Chinese Army nuclear weapons lab with the help of MOFTEC and Madam Wu.

According to the Cox report, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) explained that the actual buyer of the computer was the “Yuanwang Corporation” and that Sun was aware of “this corporation’s PRC military ties.”

Sun would later pay a record fine for knowingly exporting the super-computer to a PLA nuclear weapons lab.

Madam Wu made sure that MOFTEC was directly in business with the Chinese military. A 1999 special congressional report states that MOFTEC assisted Chinese military espionage operations by erecting front companies owned by the People’s Liberation Army MID or Military Intelligence Department.

“China Resources Enterprise [CRE]… is the commercial arm of China’s Ministry of Trade and Economic Co-operation [MOFTEC],” note the Congressional report. “In its investigation into China’s attempts to influence the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign, the U.S. Senate Government Affairs Committee identified CRE as a conduit for ‘espionage – economic, political and military – for China.’ Committee Chairman, Senator Fred Thompson said that CRE has ‘geopolitical purposes. Kind of like a smiling tiger; it might look friendly, but it’s very dangerous.'”

MADAM WU PROMOTED

Madam Wu obtained a promotion for her success and the smiling tiger that is the Chinese Army continues to import U.S. made computers for war. Madam Wu is now Vice Premier and the PLA is hosting an arms trade show with U.S. companies in attendance.

The exhibition of “China Military Logistics 2004” recently opened in the Beijing Exhibition Center. The exhibition involves products of over 170 manufacturers from 25 countries and 140-plus domestic producers.

General Liao Xilong, member of the Central Military Commission, director of the General Logistics Department of the PLA attended the opening ceremony and visited the exhibition.

“The exhibits cover all kinds of logistics equipment and involve several technical fields. The logistics equipment exhibited by the domestic participants are mainly new backbone equipment of the PLA, reflecting the features of systematic, matching, high-tech and suitable for field war. Exhibits from the US, UK, Germany and Russia are also rather modern and systematic, and suitable for field war,” states the PLA Daily.

“For example, the visible logistics information technology equipment from the U.S. and the beach POL supply system represent the advanced level of the world’s military logistics equipment technology.”

CLINTON’S COMMERCE DEPT. FUMBLES EXPORTS TO CHINA

CHINESE ARMY BUYS U.S. COMPUTERS

MADAM WU – QUEEN OF SPIES

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 4/28/04 ARTICLE ON NEWSMAX.COM


ALL DOCUMENTS FORCED FROM THE U.S. COMMERCE DEPT.


PLA MAJOR GENERAL DENG’S BUSINESS CARD

CLICK HERE TO READ THE STORY AT NEWSMAX.COM


CLICK HERE TO READ ABOUT SUPERCOMPUTERS FOR THE CHINESE ARMY


MOFTEC MINISTER MADAM WU YI


CHINESE ARMY GENERALS AT DEPT. OF ENERGY






GENERAL DING INVITES U.S. BUSINESSES TO WORK WITH THE PLA



SUN SELLS A SUPER-COMPUTER TO THE CHINESE ARMY


GENERAL DING & SUPER-COMPUTERS FOR CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPON LABS

 

“As a matter of public policy, the Clinton administration is dedicated to defense conversion in China just as in Russia and in the United States. Indeed, Defense Secretary William Perry helped establish a joint Sino-American commission on defense conversion, and during his October 1994 visit to Peking, he promised his Chinese partners extensive U.S. aid — including a Cray supercomputer to be used directly by the Chinese nuclear weapons establishment to help design newer and safer nukes. Perry’s Chinese co-chair is none other than Lt. Gen. Ding”

 


GREAT WALL BANNED BECAUSE OF NUKE TRANSFER TO PAKISTAN


U.S. SELLS COMPUTERS TO GREAT WALL



MORE INFORMATION –

COMPUTER EXECS VISIT CLINTON ON SUPER-COMPUTER EXPORTS.


Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls Over Transfers of Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement. GAO-02-972, September 6 2002.
PDF FORMAT


 

John Podesta aboard 'Hill Force One', the nickname for Clinton's campaign plane

Dear John: Fake Facts from a Clinton Pro

Charles R. Smith
Wednesday, Oct. 19, 2005

Former Clinton Chief of Staff John Podesta recently wrote a scathing article about former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh. Freeh made some harsh comments about his life at the FBI during the Clinton scandal years, and Podesta simply could not resist the knee-jerk urge to defend his ex-boss.

Those who know me well also know that I have little love for the former FBI Director. His tenure at the helm of the bureau was a disaster. Freeh can best be described as a “Luddite” in terms of his understanding of modern technology. I am almost certain that his new book was hand-written with a sharp quill and a bottle of ink.

However, my opinion of John Podesta and his former boss sinks to depths well below that of the former FBI Director. Thus, when John Podesta accused Freeh of playing fast and loose with the facts, I simply could not resist the urge to test his skill with the truth.

Podesta’s article may be written on a modern word processor, but it is inaccurate on one critical issue. Podesta claims, “Freeh’s account of the unfolding of the Khobar Towers investigation is also riddled with distortions and inaccuracies. For example, Freeh writes as if no acknowledgment of Iranian involvement in the bombing was made until after George W. Bush came into office,” noted Podesta in his Washington Post op-ed.

“This is false: The Clinton administration publicly and unequivocally placed blame on senior Iranian officials. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder made this point at a press conference on October 4, 1999,” said Podesta.

Unfortunately for Podesta, his assertion that Eric Holder placed the blame on Iran on October 4, 1999, just does not hold water. According to the official release from the Department of Justice for October 4, 1999, Holder avoided any accusations directed at Tehran: “The U.S. investigation of the attack at Khobar is ongoing. We are investigating information concerning the involvement of Saudi nationals, Iranian government officials and others. And we have not reached a conclusion regarding whether the attack was directed by the government of Iran.”

Just to make sure that I was not the only one to pick up on this little point, Fox News reported on October 17, 1999, that “U.S. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder said earlier this month that his department was investigating a possible Iranian role, but had not reached a conclusion.”

And to cover the issue from the Saudi perspective, the Arabian-based Gulf Wire reported the same thing: “Meanwhile, the issue of Iranian involvement in the case was addressed by U.S. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder last week. ‘We are investigating information concerning the involvement of Saudi nationals, Iranian government officials and others.’ He added, ‘We have not reached a conclusion regarding whether the attack was directed by the government of Iran.'”

Brother John

Of course, this is not the first time I have written about Mr. Podesta and his fantastic ability to obscure reality. I have had dealings with Mr. Podesta before over his conflict of interest with his brother Tony Podesta.

While writing an article on supercomputer exports, I found that John had given a donation to the DNC that he said occurred while employed by his brother Tony, a powerful D.C. lobbyist. However, this donation took place when John was actually employed at the White House for Bill Clinton.

John took great pains to quickly change the donation record at the FEC to reflect the fact that he was indeed employed at the White House. It is the only such donation he made while working for Clinton.

Yet, the donation record opened a whole new world of documentation hidden inside the Clinton White House. John Podesta ran the Clinton policy for high-tech computer exports at the same time his brother – and former employer – ran the lobby effort for high-tech U.S. computer companies.

Supercomputers for China and Russia

In the early 1990s, several U.S. computer CEOs formed a joint lobby organization called the CSPP, or Computer Systems Policy Project. By 1994 Tony Podesta, the brother of John Podesta, ran the multimillion-dollar corporate lobby effort through his firm, Podesta Associates, using an employee, Ken Kay, as the CSPP executive director.

In 1994, the CSPP association with Tony Podesta quickly paid off. Several CSPP members won exclusive trade deals through Clinton and Ron Brown. CEO James Treybig of Tandem went with Ron Brown on a trade trip to China in August 1994. Treybig concluded an exclusive $150 million export of mission-control computers for the Chinese Army Long March space rocket.

In June 1995, Ken Kay led the delegation of CSPP CEOs into a closed meeting inside the White House. In this closed meeting, the CEOs from AT&T;, Apple, Compaq, Digital, HP, Unisys, Cray, Silicon Graphics, Tandem and others were sworn to secrecy. The CEOs could not talk under penalty of law.

The Clinton administration made top-secret designs and top-secret contracts available to the CSPP computer companies. In exchange for their cooperation and silence, the companies would be given lucrative export deals and access to even more advanced technology left over from the cold war.

Yet, while it is true that CSPP members thrived on high-tech exports authorized by the Clinton administration, it is also true that Clinton and Gore thrived on the millions of dollars in donations and soft money made available from CSPP members such as Apple, AT&T;, Digital and Silicon Graphics.

For example, once inside the White House the CSPP CEOs were given a detailed briefing by a State Department expert on supercomputers and nuclear weapons. Shortly after the meeting, CSPP member Silicon Graphics sold several supercomputers to a Russian nuclear weapons lab under the pretense of “civilian” uses.

Waiver or Pardon?

Nor is the Clinton cronyism hard to find. In response to a request for an interview, White House lawyers acknowledged that John Podesta did indeed have a conflict of interest problem with his brother Tony and the CSPP. According to White House counsel, in 1997 President Clinton solved the Podesta problem by signing a legal waiver absolving John Podesta of any conflict of interest. Clinton has to date refused to show the legal waiver obtained by John Podesta. Nor did Clinton’s attorneys explain why John Podesta felt it necessary to obtain a waiver in 1997 for actions he took in 1994 and 1995.

Of course, a legal waiver for possible criminal actions committed in the past is not a waiver but a pardon.

It is just this kind of activity that FBI Director Freeh missed inside the White House. Freeh had so many scandals coming at him on a daily basis, it was hard to decide which to investigate – so he elected to investigate none.

As a reward for his inept leadership, Clinton took space in his book to blame Freeh for the China-Gate scandal.

Of course, the Clinton pardon or waiver – whichever you prefer to call it – removed any fear of prosecution or investigation. Thus, John Podesta can rest easy with a fat bank account and a cushy job heading a fake think-tank inside Washington, D.C.

Dear John – I know you have no conscience but next time – check your facts.

President Bill Clinton Gave China The Military Technology To Destroy The United States

 

AIDS Bill Clinton / Terminally Bill | Know Your Meme

https://web.archive.org/web/20080115065552/http://www.softwar.net/comint8.html

I find it interesting that this information has been “scrubbed” from the world wide web…Google etc… Bill Clinton…besides being a rapist, murderer, drug dealer and pedophile…is also a traitor guilty of TREASON as proven and documented in the below information  (and my other blogs) showing what China is now capable of because of him!

DONG FENG/JULANG SERIES MISSILES


CHINA AT WAR WITH AMERICA
U.S. REPORTS CITE CHINA AS NO. 1 THREAT

CLICK HERE TO READ THE STORY ON NEWSMAX.COM


PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCES
SECOND ARTILLERY CORPS The Second Artillery Corps is comprised of approximately 120,000 personnel and maintains control of over 300 nuclear warheads. According to the Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) the Second Artillery Corps is given priority funding over all other PLA units. Although it only makes up about 4 percent of the PLA, it receives 12 to 15 percent of the defense budget and about 20 percent of the total procurement budget. When the PLA cut 1 million personnel in the 1980s, Second Artillery Corps ranks increased in total size.

The Second Artillery Corps is headquartered in Qinghe, a suburb of Beijing and maintains at least seven missile bases each with one to three missile brigades and regiment-level special departments responsible for chemical defense, communications, training, security and four launch battalions. Each base also has training and nuclear warhead maintenance units and reports directly to the Second Artillery Corps commander. Each missile brigade commands a number of permanent launch sites. For ease of maintenance, each missile brigade is responsible for only one type of missile.

80301 Unit. The 80301 Unit is headquartered in Shenyang, Liaoning Province. Its complement of DF-3A and DF-21 cover the Korean peninsula and Japan, including Okinawa.

80302 Unit. The 80302 Unit is headquartered in Huangshan, Anhui Province and is the Second Artillery’s most important unit for conducting strikes against Taiwan. The 815th brigade in Leping took part in the March 1996 missile exercises off the coast of Taiwan. During a wartime situation the 815th brigade would disperse to prearranged sites in Fujian Province in to order to be able to strike the entire island of Taiwan. Missiles are usually transported by rail for field deployments.

80303 Unit. The 80303 Unit is headquartered in Kunming, Yunnan province. Its complement of DF-3A and DF-21 can strike targets in India and Southeast Asia.

80304 Unit. The 80304 Unit is headquartered in Luoyang, Henan province. Its DF-5 missiles can strike targets throughout the United States and Europe.

80305 Unit. The 80305 Unit is headquartered in Huaihua, Hunan province. Its DF-4 missiles can strike Guam.

80306 Unit. The 80306 Unit is headquartered in Xining, Qinghai province. Its DF-4 missiles can strike targets in India and Russia. This unit may also have an experimental unit assigned to it.



DONG FENG 11 TACTICAL MISSILE

CLICK HERE TO READ THE ARTICLE “WAR WITH CHINA” AT NEWSMAX.COM

RANGE     -  186 MILES 1993 VERSION
             510 MILES 2002 ADVANCED VERSION
WARHEAD   -  50 or 350 KILOTON TACTICAL NUCLEAR
             (1000 KG) 2,200 POUND CONVENTIONAL
ENGINE    -  SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  STRAP DOWN INERTIAL
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 200 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 400
    PAKISTAN = 70






CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFO

DONG FENG 15 TACTICAL MISSILE

WARHEAD   -  1,100 LB. (500 KG) CHEMICAL, NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL
             20 KT. NEUTRON (ENHANCED RADIATION) WEAPON
             350 KT. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEAD
RANGE     -  370 MILES (600 KM)
DIAMETER  -  3.3 FEET (1 METER)
LENGTH    -  30 FEET (9.1 METERS)
WEIGHT    -  13,700 POUNDS (6,200 KG)
ENGINE    -  SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  STRAP DOWN INERTIAL
             GPS SUPPLIED BY ROCKWELL
             POSSIBLE FOLLOW ON SAR RADAR ACTIVE TARGETING
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 100 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 400 
    SYRIA    = 20


DONG FENG 21 IRBM

RANGE     -  1,200 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 300 KILOTON THERMONUCLEAR
             NEW X VERSION WITH 250 KILOTON NUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  TWO STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC/GPS
             NEW X VERSION ACTIVE RADAR IMAGING MARV
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 200 METERS
             NEW X VERSION ACCURACY RATED AT 10 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 90 


NEW DONG FENG 21 X WITH ACTIVE RADAR IMAGING GUIDED WARHEAD


JULANG 1 GREAT WAVE 1 SLBM

RANGE     -  1,200 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 300 KILOTON THERMONUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  TWO STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC/GPS
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 200 METERS
NUMBER DEPLOYED
    CHINA    = 16 




DONG FENG 25 IRBM

RANGE     -  1,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  THREE 250 KILOTON NUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  TWO STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 10 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED - 

    CHINA    = 10


CUT-AWAY VIEW OF THREE WARHEAD DONG FENG 25 POST BOOST VEHICLE



CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFO

JULANG 2 GREAT WAVE 2 SLBM

RANGE     -  7,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 2.5 MEGATON THERMONUCLEAR OR 
             THREE 90 KILOTON NUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  THREE STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 300 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = (DEVELOPMENT)

The Julang 2 missile was successfully tested by the PLA Navy in Jan. 2001 and a successful test of the undersea launch system was conducted in October 2001. This system is planned for installation on the Type 94 SLBM submarine at Huludao. Each PLA Navy “boomer” is designed to carry 12 JL-2 missiles in a sail like configuration similar to Russian designed Delta class boats. The first JL-2 armed Type 94 is expected to be operational in 2008.



DONG FENG 31 ICBM

RANGE     -  7,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 2.5 MEGATON THERMONUCLEAR OR
             THREE 90 KILOTON NUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  THREE STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 300 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 12


NEW CHINESE MISSILE THREATENS U.S.A.


CLICK HERE TO READ THE STORY ON NEWSMAX.COM


NOTE – Chinese test of DF-31 in 2002

The new Dong Feng 31 (DF-31) missiles are attached to the 80304 Unit of the Second Artillery Corps. The 80304 Unit is headquartered in Luoyang, Henan province. The new Dong Feng (EAST WIND) 31 missile performed flawlessly during its test flights. The DF-31 can reach any city in America and is armed with three nuclear warheads. The DF-31 has Clinton-supplied guidance, nuclear warhead, nose cone and solid rocket engine technologies.

During the visit to China of General Henry Shelton, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and just a few days prior to the American presidential election, Beijing successfully flight tested its new DF-31 inter-continental ballistic missile, reports Bill Gertz in the Washington Times. Defense analysts say the timing of the test was a deliberate political signal to the United States and its allies. During Shelton’s visit, Chinese officials repeated Beijing’s opposition to US defensive arms sales to Taiwan. The DF-31 test missile utilized several decoy warheads, intended to defeat US missile defenses.


DONG FENG 31 CAN STRIKE THREE TARGETS WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS


The DF-31 is equipped with many technologies stolen or bought from America during Clinton’s term. The DF-31 success was so spectacular that the the PLA 2nd Artillery will deploy 24 missiles by the end of 2004.

The Chinese DF-31 is a road mobile, nuclear tipped SCUD like missile, that is nearly impossible to find, much less destroy. It is intended to counter the USAF B-2 bomber in a “limited” nuclear war scenario where China and the U.S. would only kill a few million people on each side. If deployed in large numbers, the DF-31 could pose a significant first strike threat against stationary military targets inside the U.S. homeland, such as the MX missile fields and the single B-2 bomber base.



CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFO

DONG FENG 41 ICBM

RANGE     -  7,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 500 KILOTON MARV EVADER WARHEAD
ENGINE    -  THREE STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 100 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = (DEVELOPMENT) 


DONG FENG 5 (CSS-4) ICBM

RANGE     -  7,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 3 MEGATON THERMONUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  TWO STAGE LIQUID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  STRAP DOWN INERTIAL
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 300 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 20


DONG FENG 4 ICBM

RANGE     -  4,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 3 MEGATON THERMONUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  TWO STAGE LIQUID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  STRAP DOWN INERTIAL
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 300 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 20

 

USAF TRAINS THE CHINESE AIR FORCE FOR “COMBAT READINESS” PLAAF AT EDWARDS AFB MAY 1999

THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE HELPING THE CHINESE AIR FORCE

Newly declassified documents from the Clinton administration reveal that a civil airline modernization program for China was actually a program to train and equip the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

The new documents, forced from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), are official USAF, Commerce and FAA reports on Chinese military contacts.

According to the documents, PLAAF officers toured Edwards Air Force Base in May 1999 for military purposes.

Here is documentation of when and where and who! https://web.archive.org/web/20080115065752/http://www.softwar.net/edwards.html

The PLAAF officers were given training on USAF combat missions, including “bombing and strafing” and “combat readiness.”

In 1994, then Secretary of Defense William Perry began a “Joint Defense” conversion project with Chinese General Ding Henggao. General Ding was the commander of the Chinese Army Unit “COSTIND” (Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense). One part of the U.S./China project was to modernize the communist civil “Air Traffic Control” (ATC) system.

The documented meetings shows that the Clinton administration attempted to conceal the military background of the Chinese representatives from everyone, including FAA officials. In 1993, a Chinese military delegation visited America. Yet, according the FAA, which sponsored the visit, the entire delegation was civilian.

The 1993 FAA delegation list includes a “Mr. Kui Fulin” who toured FAA Headquarters in Washington, Andrews AFB in Maryland, and Boeing aircraft Corporation in Washington state. “Mr. Kui Fulin” was actually General Kui Fulin, Chinese Army Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

The 1993 FAA list states “Mr. Li Yongtai” was the Commissioner of the Air Traffic Control Commission of China. According to hand written notes taken by the FAA, Mr. Li Yongtai was actually “Lt. General” Li Yongtai of the Chinese Air Force.

In fact, FAA officials who attending the meeting wrote “military” next to the names of seven members of the 1993 “China Air Traffic Control” delegation in an apparent effort to track the Chinese Army officers. Another example shows that a “Mr. Li Zhongli” was part of a Chinese civilian delegation visit in 1997 to San Francisco that was sponsored by Stanford University. “Mr. Li Zhongli” was actually Colonel Li Zhongli of the PLAAF.

In 1997, the PLAAF was given a demonstration in Sunnyvale California by Ashtech, a maker of GPS (Global Positioning Satellite) receivers. The briefing for the PLAAF and Chinese Navy officers states, “Ashtech produces a receiver that uses both the U.S. GPS signals and the Russian GLONASS signals resulting in significantly greater availability and integrity.”

According to a 1997 Rand Corp. report on the Chinese Defense Industry, “More accurate GPS systems would enhance the PLA’s ability to carry out attacks against Taiwan’s military and industrial facilities, potentially reducing the ability of the Taiwanese military to defend itself against PRC coercive diplomacy. The use of GPS to enhance the accuracy of long-range Chinese cruise missiles, coupled with long-range sensors, would raise serious concerns for the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, and possibly circumscribe their ability to provide an effective deterrent in a crisis over Taiwan.”

In 1999, the Clinton administration offered the PLAAF the latest in advanced “mobile radars”, command and control systems, GPS navigation, and “Surveillance Avionics” such as “Air to Air”, “Air to Ground” and “surface Area Movement” surveillance radars.

According to a U.S. Air Force May 1999 report, the PLAAF was given details on USAF “Special Airspace” areas inside America used for military training, research and national security zones. The details include Edwards Air Force base and a mapped tour of the facility. Edwards AFB is a test center for USAF, and NASA research aircraft, including the space shuttle.

The newly released materials also include training manuals from the USAF 334th Training Squadron in both english and Chinese. The documents show Clinton administration officials proposed to train PLAAF military air controllers.

The USAF documents show PLAAF officers were given a “simulated” training mission. The training included a “two ship formation of F-16s from Luke AFB, Arizona” on a “bombing” and overflight mission in a training area, code-named “Baghdad”, northwest of Prescott Arizona. The simulated exercise also included “in-flight refueling” with a tanker aircraft under control of a USAF AWACs plane.

The USAF “AWACS” (airborne warning and control system) is a flying radar plane manned by Air Force radar controllers. The Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft provided cover and control for thousands of allied aircraft during the Gulf war and again during the operation in Kosovo. AWACs aircraft are expensive and only a few Boeing E-3 Sentry aircraft have been exported to Saudi Arabia and NATO.

The PLAAF is not currently equipped with an airborne radar control plane nor an airborne refueling tanker aircraft. The Chinese Air Force did recently purchase thirty Sukhoi twin seat SU-27 variant super-sonic bombers, which are equipped with a retractable air refueling probe, giving them virtually unlimited range. The Sukhoi bombers are nuclear-strike capable.

The Chinese Air Force has also paid Israel to supply the Phalcon airborne radar system. However, the PLAAF radar plane deal from Israel was delayed when it was revealed the aircraft was actually a former U.S. made Boeing 707 airliner refitted with the airborne electronics, violating U.S. export laws. The Israelis are reported to be working with Russian airframe maker Antonov to fit the Phalcon radar system into a large transport for the PLAAF sale.

One 1995 meeting document from the Commerce Dept. also includes several names familiar to China-Gate and found in the Cox Report. In 1995, FAA, Commerce and USAF officials met with officers from the Chinese Army Unit COSTIND (Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense). COSTIND was represented by an all star cast including Lt. General Huai Guomo, Maj. General Deng Yousheng, and Major General Wang Shouyun.

In 1999, Softwar obtained the full bio, in Chinese and English, of COSTIND Lt. General Huai after winning a Freedom of Information lawsuit against the Commerce Dept. The official White House spin is that COSTIND was not a Chinese military unit but a “civilian” agency. According to a November, 1997 report, written for the Commerce Dept. by “think-tank” company SAIC, COSTIND was neither civilian nor engaged in purely commercial activities:

  "COSTIND supervises virtually all of China's military
   research, development and production.  It is a military
   organization, staffed largely by active duty officers...
   COSTIND also coordinates certain activities with the China
   National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), which produces, stores,
   and controls all fissile material for civilian as well as
   military applications.  COSTIND approves licenses for the use
   of nuclear materials for military purposes."

The Commerce Dept. claimed in August 1999 that it had complied with the orders of Federal Judge Robert Payne and turned over all documents on the Chinese Army unit COSTIND.

However, the newly released Commerce Dept. documents dealing with COSTIND were found by the FAA, not the Commerce Dept. The documents were turned over by the FAA in response to a FOIA request for Chinese military contacts. None of the newly released Commerce documents were given to Judge Payne in response to his Court order. Thus, the new documents show the Commerce Dept. did not fully comply with Federal Judge Payne’s order.

The Chinese Army unit COSTIND and the Chinese Air Force control “civilian” assets inside China. According to the Clinton administration, the PLAAF controls all air traffic in China, civil and military. PLAAF officers and enlisted personnel man all air control (ATC) facilities in red China. The ATC system and the PLAAF controllers are directly connected to the Chinese integrated air defense network of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and fighter-interceptors.

The PLAAF also owns several businesses. According to a 1994 report by the U.S. Army defense attache in Beijing, “the major enterprise subordinate to the PLA Air Force is the China Lantian (Blue Sky) Industrial Corp. Also affiliated to Lantian is the Tian Ma (Sky Horse) Brand of vehicles and vehicle repair parts and facilities. China United Airlines (CUA) is a commercial entity of the PLA Air Force.”

According to the 1997 Rand report on the Chinese Defense Industry, “for those who oppose any subsidization of the PLA, there is thus ample evidence that profits from PLA-affiliated enterprises directly benefit the main-line forces of the Chinese military.” https://web.archive.org/web/20080208112323/http://www.softwar.net/plaafaa.html

Defector Confirms Chinese Army Spying on U.S.

Charles R. Smith
Tuesday, March 27, 2001

Armed with information from a high-ranking defector, President Bush is reported to be on the verge of shutting down Chinese military espionage in America. The defector, identified by the BBC as Lt. Col. Xu Junping, is said to be singing like a bird about Chinese army intelligence operations inside the United States.

According to Taiwanese news sources, Xu is a senior colonel in charge of North American affairs for the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department. Xu’s reported expertise is arms control and U.S. military-to-military contacts.

Xu’s information on Chinese army spy operation has led several high-ranking members of the Bush administration to press for the suspension of major military-to-military contacts with Beijing. Under the proposed ban, Chinese military officials will no longer be allowed the exclusive access to sensitive U.S. facilities that they previously enjoyed under the Clinton administration, which considered China a “strategic partner” in Asian military affairs.

Although not as dramatic as the expulsion of dozens of Russian spies, the move will cripple People’s Liberation Army intelligence operations inside America. The Bush-led effort is expected to allow high-level Chinese army officers to attend only official military functions.

Why Did Clinton Abet Chinese Spying on U.S.?

The information obtained from Xu has led U.S. intelligence officials to question the previous free access given to Chinese army officers during the 1990s. The Clinton strategic partnership with the People’s Liberation Army included military training, computers, encrypted communications equipment, satellites and exclusive access to U.S. military facilities inside America. Xu confirmed that Chinese army intelligence officers frequently abused civilian programs to mask their military and economic espionage.

According to documents previously obtained from the U.S. government using the Freedom of Information Act, China abused a civil air traffic control program to obtain important military information such as “Combat Readiness.” The documents also show that the Chinese attempted to conceal the military background of the representatives.

For example, in 1993 a Chinese military delegation visited America under the Federal Aviation Administration civil exchange program using civilian titles. One FAA official noted that many of the Chinese delegation actually held rank in the People’s Liberation Army.

The anonymous FAA official who attending the meeting wrote “military” next to the names of seven members of the 1993 “China Air Traffic Control” delegation in an apparent effort to track the Chinese army officers.

The 1993 FAA delegation list included “Mr. Kui Fulin,” who toured Federal Aviation Administration headquarters in Washington, Andrews AFB in Maryland, and Boeing Corp. in Washington state. Mr. Kui Fulin was actually Gen. Kui Fulin, Chinese army deputy chief of the general staff. Fulin is known as the man who planned the brutal 1989 army attack on unarmed student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

The Chinese army access to the America continued throughout the Clinton years under the so-called Federal Aviation Administration civilian air program with exclusive tours backed by U.S. industry giants such as United Airlines and Lockheed Martin.

In May 1999 Chinese air force and navy officers visited Edwards Air Force Base for the Federal Aviation Administration civil program under a tour sponsored by Lockheed Martin. Edwards AFB is a test center for American military and NASA research aircraft, including the F-22, Joint Strike Fighter and space shuttle.

U.S. Air Force documents show that Sr. Col. Li Zhongli, Sr. Col. Wang Changzheng and Maj. Wang Shouxing gained entry to Edwards Air Force Base. The documents noted that the Chinese officers were given detailed information on military operations at Edwards AFB.

The Chinese air force officers were also given details on U.S. Air Force “Special Airspace” areas inside America that are used for military training, research and national security zones. The Chinese military officers were given the latest information on advanced “mobile radars,” command and control systems, GPS navigation and “Surveillance Avionics” such as “Air to Air,” “Air to Ground” and “Surface Area Movement” surveillance radars.

Chinese military officers were also given training on U.S. Air Force combat missions, including “bombing and strafing” and “combat readiness.” The U.S. Air Force documents show Chinese Air Force officers were given a “simulated” F-16 training mission under the FAA civil program.

The training included a “two ship formation of F-16s from Luke AFB, Arizona” on a “bombing” and overflight mission in a training area, code-named “Baghdad,” northwest of Prescott, Ariz. The simulated exercise also included “in-flight refueling” with a tanker aircraft under control of a U.S. Air Force AWACs plane.

Defense and State Department officials, backed by the espionage details provided by Xu, have reportedly recommended the new freeze in military exchanges amid heightened security concerns. The new concern in Washington is reflected in the recent decision by President Bush to order air strikes against a Chinese-built air defense system outside Baghdad.

The U.S. and U.K. air attacks were timed to strike when Chinese engineers were not working on the Iraqi fiber-optic command network, NATO code-named “Tiger Song.” In the following war of words, Secretary of State Colin Powell reported conservations with Beijing clearly noted the U.N. embargo on weapons for Baghdad is still in effect. Powell stated that the public and private protests over Beijing’s illegal supply of weaponry to Iraq would continue.


 

 

Military Technology for Sale, Dangerous Exports to the Chinese Army Per Bill And Hillary Clinton

Information ‘links” off of my Operation Morning Star web page…back in the day. I interviewed Charles Smith many times on my radio program and this is the information he compiled and shared…brilliant American with guts!

Bill and Hillary Clinton represent Satan direct!
“We may soon discover the consequences of our decisions )WWW3 on this land…judgement from God) over the past decade with regard to advanced military exports to China. Those consequences are currently sitting on a runway or clustered in a dark hole, waiting like a giant serpent, coiled and ready to strike”
Military Technology for Sale, Dangerous Exports to the Chinese Army (USAF TRAINS THE CHINESE AIR FORCE FOR “COMBAT READINESS” PLAAF AT EDWARDS AFB MAY 1999…see link below)

Charles R. Smith
Thursday, May. 06, 2004

China is on a buying spree and the 2004 U.S. campaign season is going to be a bonus year for the People’s Liberation Army. Major U.S. companies, eager to sell military technology, are lobbying Congress and the White House to sell.. sell.. sell.

For example, Cincinnati Lamb is slated to deliver its first HyperMach ultra-high speed, 5-axis linear motor profiler to Brek Manufacturing of California. Brek plans to use the HyperMach to produce structural bulkhead sections of the U.S. military air lifter – the Boeing C-17.

Cincinnati Lamb plans to sell $20 million worth of the HyperMach machines with one slated to go to Lockheed to drill holes in the wings and fuselage of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and another scheduled to be delivered to Xian Aircraft Co. in China – maker of the PLA Navy FB-7 supersonic strike fighter.

China has obtained 5 axis machines before. In Nov. 2001, the Bush administration imposed one of the largest civil penalties ever in an export-control case over a 5-axis machine sent to China. The Commerce Department fined McDonnell Douglas Corp. $2.1 million for selling China aerospace equipment that wound up inside a military jet fighter manufacturing plant.

The fine ended a six-year investigation into McDonnell Douglas, which deceived the government and broke federal export-control laws when it sold an array of sophisticated machining tools to China in 1994.

The tools were diverted by the Chinese Army to military manufacturing plants at the Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation. The Generals of the PLA directly control Nanchang.

Confirmed Violation

U.S. spy satellite photos confirmed the machines sold to China for “civilian” use were diverted to the Nanchang facility for making jet fighters and missiles. A giant, 5 axis, stretch press for aircraft manufacture, was sold in 1994 to CATIC, a Chinese state owned corporation, controlled by Generals of the People’s Liberation Army.

The Clinton administration approved the sale of the press to CATIC through the Commerce Department then under Ron Brown. The approval came just before Mr. Brown left on his whirlwind tour of China in August 1994. Federal investigators charged the Chinese company never had any intention of purchasing the equipment for civilian use because the facility constructed to house the giant machine was put inside the Nanchang military aircraft plant.

The Nanchang Aircraft Corp. military site was being built even as Chinese officials told U.S. Commerce officials that the press was bound for a civilian airliner plant just outside of Beijing. In addition, Nanchang officials inspected some of the equipment just before McDonnell Douglas shipped it in late 1993.

Nanchang is China’s main producer of advanced warplanes and missiles capable of nuclear or chemical attack. For example, Nanchang has produced over 1,000 advanced Q-5/A-5 jet fighter bombers.

More Jets for China’s Air Force

The U.S. made 5-axis stretch press is reported to be making the J-11 – China’s copy of the Russian Sukhoi SU-27 (Nato Codename “FLANKER”) jet fighter. The PLAAF already flies 76 of the advanced Russian built Su-27s. The aircraft have been used repeatedly by the PLAAF to intimidate Taiwan and intercept U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.

As of Jan. 2004, Nanchang rolled out at least 50 more Chinese made J-11 Flanker jets using the U.S. 5-axis machines and is in the process of building a total of at least four hundred. Nanchang also produces the FL-1, FL-2, FL-3A and the popular C.802 anti-ship cruise missiles, exported to Iran.

The Cincinnati Lamb 5-axis machine is not the only U.S. technology to suddenly play a key role in Chinese life. Chinese space officials recently stated that they are adding anti-jam capability to their advanced Sinosat II satcom scheduled for launch in 2005. The Chinese acquired anti-jamming technology from the Clinton administration in the 1990s.

The Chinese said the anti-jam feature is not so much to thwart any scrambling of the spacecraft by other countries, but rather to counter the Falungong that opposes communist Chinese policies.

The Falungong stunned the Chinese government during the last two years by penetrating the communications links to PRC satellites. In at least one case, a Chinese spacecraft suddenly started transmitting Falungong programming, in another the signal was blocked totally.

U.S. satellite communications security experts doubt the Chinese pledge to use advanced American anti-jamming features to protect against Falungong attacks.

Despite the vicious crack down on the Falungong – the spiritual group hardly qualifies as a terrorist organization. The PRC has jailed thousands of Falungong members and killed hundreds inside its prison system. Falungong, however, has launched no bomb attacks, made no suicide hijackings nor killed any PRC citizen.

Clear Red Satellite Channel

The addition of special anti-jamming to Sinosat II is to ensure that the PLA has a clear channel of space communications during time of war.

The export of advanced satellite communications technology was de-controlled by President Clinton in 1996 when he removed the State and Defense Department oversight of high-tech “dual use” items. The CEO’s of Lockheed, Loral and Hughes supported the Clinton executive order, and it allowed China to purchase sophisticated anti-jamming and encryption for its military satellite systems.

According to a Hughes document sent in March 1995 to Clinton national security advisor Anthony Lake, satellite encryption “has no military significance.” The 1995 Hughes document concluded control over the export of a wide range of advanced U.S. satellite technology should be moved to the Commerce Department.

The U.S. technology sent by Clinton to China included the entire list of items sought by Hughes; anti-jam capability, advanced antennas, crosslinks, baseband processing, encryption devices, radiation hardening, and perigee kick motors.

In fact, the CEOs of Hughes, Loral and Lockheed, all co-wrote a letter to Bill Clinton in October 1995, expressing their desire that the President “transfer all responsibility for commercial satellite export licensing to the Commerce Department.”

The 1995 letter, signed by C. Michael Armstrong of Hughes, Bernard Schwartz of Loral and Daniel Tellep of Lockheed, states that “we understand you many soon be issuing an Executive Order intended to make further improvements to the process for reviewing export license applications.”

“During a recent meeting involving Vice President Gore and representatives of the satellite industry discussing national/global information infrastructure, this was one of several issues raised. We clearly appreciate your administration’s strong commitment to reforming the U.S. export control system, but we respectfully request your personal support for establishing the Commerce Department’s jurisdiction over the export of all commercial communications satellites,” states the letter from the three CEOs.

Military and Significant

Yet, in 1998 Hughes offered an advanced satellite, with all of the anti-jam features, previously sold to China to the U.S. military for wartime communications. C. Michael Armstrong, former CEO of Hughes, never explained how the satellite, which had “no military significance,” could suddenly become militarily significant.

Asiasat-3 was placed into an incorrect orbit by a Russian Proton booster rocket launched from Baikonur in 1997. In 1998, space insurance companies paid off the satellite loss and transferred ownership to Hughes.

AsiaSat-3, a commercial satellite sold to China was more than just a $220 million piece of orbiting junk. Hughes recovered Asiasat-3, using a special lunar orbit technique to bring it back into a useable position around the earth.

Hughes then offered the recovered satellite to the U.S. Navy for military purposes. Mark J. Schwene, Hughes Global Services Vice President, was quoted in Aviation Week and Space Technology making the offer.

“Possible markets for the satellite (AsiaSat-3) include providing capacity over ocean regions for the Navy as well as providing sufficient communications services in times of crisis to meet military communications surge requirements,” stated the Hughes VP.

The very same Hughes “commercial” satellite sold to China was offered to the U.S. Navy to serve in times of crisis to meet American military requirements. Of course, it never occurred to C. Michael Armstrong that the Chinese Army might use Hughes satellites for “military communications”.

The wholesale peddling of advanced U.S. military technology to China led the U.S. congress to transfer all satellite export controls back to the State Department and the Defense Department. The China-Gate scandal left Loral, Hughes and Lockheed in shambles and ended with prosecutions.

Hughes was charged with no less than 123 violations of national security and Loral paid a record fine for its violations. These violations played a major role in the upgrade of Chinese nuclear missile technology pointed at the U.S. The fact is that the Commerce Dept. failed to protect U.S. national security.

The move of satellite exports from Commerce to State was due to the massive national security violations made by U.S. aerospace companies such as Hughes and Loral. Today, the aerospace industry is pushing hard to end the ban on satellite sales to China. The pressure on Congress and the both presidential candidates is to move satellite export control back to the Commerce Department.

Chinese Flip-Flop

Despite the recent sales approved by the Bush administration, do not expect John Kerry to swiftly take a stand against advanced military trade with China.

John Kerry recently criticized the Bush administration’s decision not to pursue allegations of human rights abuses and trade with China. Kerry stated that when it comes to China “the administration is all talk and no action.”

Kerry pledged that if elected president, “I am going to fight to keep U.S. jobs in America and I’m not going to sit idly by when China or any other country pursues policies that hurt our economy.”

However, Kerry – true to form – is doing a flip-flop on China.

In a March 2000 speech on China at the Wilson Center, Kerry praised the Clinton administration for de-linking human rights and trade, claiming opponents of this policy were pushing America to war with China over trade, human rights and military issues.

“Proponents of containment see China only as an enemy, intent on expanding its power in Asia, repressing its people and amassing sufficient power to challenge the United States as a superpower. For them, engagement is a naive approach, driven principally by economic interests. They believe we should link trade to human rights and have less direct interaction with China – not more – by eliminating military and scientific contacts and further restricting technology sales,” stated Kerry.

“On some initiatives, the (Clinton) Administration has had success in dealing with China. It moved quickly to abandon the counterproductive MFN-human rights linkage,” noted Kerry in the March 2000 speech.

More importantly, Kerry also voted to kill a bill for trade sanctions if China sells weapons of mass destruction. Kerry voted to table an amendment that would require sanctions against China or other countries if they were found to be selling illicit weapons of mass destruction (Bill HR.4444 ; vote number 2000-242 on Sept. 13, 2000).

Red Fingers Crossed

The recent sales of advanced U.S. machine tools and computers are based on the promise from Beijing to adhere to trade agreements and inspection rights to ensure they are not being used for military purposes.

Today’s promises from Beijing are hollow words that will not be honored. Beijing has broken its trade and arms control treaties with the U.S. on an annual basis since 1990. Each year it promises again to adhere to the pledges made and each year we discover that China has flagrantly violated the same pledges.

We may soon discover the consequences of our decisions over the past decade with regard to advanced military exports to China. Those consequences are currently sitting on a runway or clustered in a dark hole, waiting like a giant serpent, coiled and ready to strike.

https://web.archive.org/web/20080115065450/http://www.softwar.net/caac.html

USAF TRAINS THE CHINESE AIR FORCE FOR “COMBAT READINESS” PLAAF AT EDWARDS AFB MAY 1999 https://web.archive.org/web/20080208112323/http://www.softwar.net/plaafaa.html

Bill Clinton And Treasonous Friends Sell U.S. Radars to China

U.S. Radars Sold to China

Charles R. Smith
Monday, July 11, 2005

PLA Air Force Operates New U.S.-Made Radars

New York-based Telephonics Corp. has supplied the Chinese air force (People’s Liberation Army Air Force, or PLAAF) with four sophisticated mobile radar systems. The mobile radar systems are currently mounted in vans and being operated by Chinese air force units assigned to back up aging radars used for air traffic control.

Telephonics supplied mobile monopulse secondary surveillance radars (MSSRs) to the civil arm of the Chinese air force – the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) at a cost of $1 million each.

The PLAAF currently operates all air traffic control inside China, both civilian and military.

The mobile radars have been mounted in vehicles with telescoping antennas. The new MSSR radars offer latest-generation advanced extraction and tracking technology, which provide extremely high target positioning accuracy.

There is no question that MSSR radars, which can interrogate aircraft to determine their exact location and whether they are friendly, are of military value. The Telephonics official press announcement noted that the radars sent to China are “backed by the same team that has delivered over 250 systems to multiple MSSR users worldwide including the [U.S. Air Force] AWACS fleet.”

The CEO of Telephonics, Joseph Battaglia, noted in a recent interview with Aviation Week and Space Technology that many of the new radar systems are installed in the eastern and coastal regions of China. However, Battaglia stated that he had recently visited the city of Qiqihar along the Russian border to discuss radar needs.

In addition, the unit of the Griffon Corporation recently signed deals worth over $3.25 million for Air Traffic Control Automation Systems for the cities of Zhanjiang and Zhengzhou, China.

Under this contract, Telephonics will supply its most advanced air traffic management systems to manage both international and domestic air traffic in the eastern and the northwestern regions of China.

Military Radars

Telephonics is a major supplier of radars used by the U.S. and European militaries, including the USAF radar control E-3 Sentry AWACs aircraft. Telephonics currently has military contracts for Maritime Surveillance Radars for the U.S. Army CH-47F Chinook Helicopter Modernization Program, and from the Italian navy for Aircraft Carrier Landing System.

The Griffon Unit also won contracts to provide radar systems for the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program and for the TruLink Wireless Intercom installed on armored security vehicles.

In fact, China is quite capable of deploying its own advanced mobile radar systems. The newly deployed KJ-2000 Chinese air force AWACs plane carries an electronically steered phased-array (ESA) radar developed by Nanjing Research Institute of Electronic Technology (14th Institute).

China United Airlines also operates a sophisticated spy aircraft for the PLAAF equipped with an advanced radar system. China United Airlines aircraft B-4138, a Russian-made TU-154M three-engine airliner, flies under an international civilian number as a passenger plane.

However, defense analysts confirmed that B-4138 is actually a PLAAF spy plane equipped with a ground-monitoring Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) radar and communications equipment. The heavily modified TU-154M airliner is equipped with an array of communications antennae on the rear and a huge radar dome on the bottom of the aircraft.

Chinese Army Espionage

The impression given by Telephonics officials is that the Chinese air traffic control system is controlled by a civilian agency called the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). Yet documents forced from the U.S. government show quite clearly the PLAAF also operated illegally through its “Civil Aviation Administration of China” (CAAC) for intelligence and military operations.

On May 21, 1997, Mr. John Hancock, civilian FAA deputy director on International Aviation, wrote a memo and summary report on “China ATC [air traffic control] discussions.”

Hancock wrote, “Attached is a summary of discussions held in Beijing on Wednesday, April 16, 1997, on future civil-military air traffic control cooperation between the United States and China.”

“As you know, following completion of U.S. Government (USG) policy coordination, a small delegation traveled to Beijing to present our options for FAA-led ATC civil-military programs under the reconfigured ATC initiative. This activity was previously conducted under the Joint Defense Conversion Commission which was dissolved by then-Defense Secretary Perry in July 1996,” wrote Hancock.

The FAA documents also show People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) officers used “civilian” cover names through the so-called “CAAC” civilian agency. According to an official CAAC memo sent to FAA representative Ms. Li Jie, one representative at the 1997 meeting was “Mr. Li Zhong Li.”

However, the civilian “Mr. Li” had a very unusual title, that of “Deputy Director of ATC Department of AirForce.” FAA officials, of course, knew “Mr. Li” had a different title.

“Sr. Col. Li spoke generally about good feelings among old friends,” states the 1997 summary report attached by Hancock.

“He stated an interest in pursuing additional cooperation. We understand informally from later discussions that Col. Li believes there would be a positive response in about 3 months.”

Other CAAC-PLAAF joint operations have been documented. The 1999 Cox report detailed the use of the CAAC as a cover in an intelligence operation that endangered an airliner full of civilian passengers.

In 1999, the Clinton administration offered the PLAAF the latest in advanced “mobile radars,” command and control systems, GPS navigation, and “Surveillance Avionics” such as “air to air,” “air to ground” and “surface area movement” surveillance radars.

According to a U.S. Air Force May 1999 report, the PLAAF was given details on USAF “Special Airspace” areas inside America used for military training, research and national security zones. The details include Edwards Air Force base and a mapped tour of the facility. Edwards AFB is a test center for USAF, and NASA research aircraft, including the space shuttle.

The government materials also include training manuals from the USAF 334th Training Squadron in both English and Chinese. The documents show Clinton administration officials proposed to train PLAAF military air controllers.

The USAF documents show PLAAF officers were given a “simulated” training mission. The training included a “two ship formation of F-16s from Luke AFB, Arizona” on a “bombing” and over flight mission in a training area, code-named “Baghdad”, northwest of Prescott Arizona. The simulated exercise also included “in-flight refueling” with a tanker aircraft under control of a USAF AWACS plane.

 

CHINESE SPACE ESPIONAGE…SAY TREASON…SAY CLINTON WHO ARMED THE CHINESE!

Note: Some links are broken. Newsmax for some reason is removing the stories connected to this information.

CHINESE SPACE ESPIONAGE

HUGHES FORMER CEO C. MICHAEL ARMSTRONG

Military Technology for Sale Dangerous Exports to the Chinese Army

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 5/6/03 ARTICLE ON U.S. HIGH-TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA


CHINESE FSW RECON SATELLITE

KERRY’S SECRET TIES TO BEIJING
SENATOR WON’T TALK ABOUT SPACE TECH TO CHINA

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 5/6/03 ARTICLE ON U.S. HIGH-TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA


HUGHES CEO C. MICHAEL ARMSTRONG

 

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 5/6/03 ARTICLE ON U.S. HIGH-TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA



LONG MARCH 2D PUTS PLA RECON SATELLITE INTO ORBIT

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 11/13/03 ARTICLE ON THE PLA MILITARY SPACE PROJECTS


HUGHES CEO C. MICHAEL ARMSTRONG

NUKES AND SATELLITES FOR CHINA

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 10/09/03 ARTICLE ON NEWSMAX.COM


DOCUMENTS OBTAINED USING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT




SENT BY: HUGHES A/C  3-14-95  ; 1:13PM ;WASHINGTON DC OFFICE   12026475713

WHITE PAPER ON COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITES:
ISSUES AND ANSWERS

Commercial communications satellites have been a powerful force
in promoting democratic change round the world. The sale of
US-manufactured communications satellites has contributed
positively to US balance of payments. The US continues to lead
the world in production and sale of commercial communications
satellites, but this lead is being threatened not only by
foreign competition, but also by unresponsive US export
procedures and practices.

Statement of the Problem

For more than 30 years, the US has led the world in building and
exporting commercial communications satellites. It enjoyed a
virtual monopoly for many years, and up to the late 1970's, all
operating commercial communications satellites were of US
manufacture. Competition was an entirely US affair.

This situation changed dramatically in the last decade.
Japanese, European, and Canadian firms began an aggressive
campaign to surpass the US in the sale and manufacture of
commercial communications satellites and supporting systems.
European firms competed head-to-head with the US satellite
industry, closely matching US companies in quality and often
bettering them in price. Throughout, European industry enjoyed
the aggressive support of their governments. This support was a
vital element, for example, in Aerospatiale's Turksat, Thaisat,
and Arabsat awards. In their marketing discussions with
potential foreign customers, the Europeans consistently promoted
the view that the US satellite manufacturers increasingly were
uncertain and unreliable suppliers because of the US
Government's restrictive export policies.

The US commercial communications satellite industry, the USG,
and the Congress must act now to reverse this situation and
ensure that it does not recur. An appropriate remedy is to
complete the transition of commercial (i.e. non-military)
communications satellites from the United States Munitions List
(USML) which is under State Department jurisdiction to the
Commerce Control List (CCL), which is under Commerce Department
jurisdiction. This jurisdictional change is appropriate since
the national security considerations that initially put
communications satellites on the USML are no longer valid; and
keeping commercial communications satellites on the USML puts US
industry at a competitive disadvantage in the international
telecommunications marketplace.

A Simple Solution

Under current law, many commercial communications satellites are
placed on the USML, rather than the CCL, because they have
characteristics that in the past were unique to military
satellites. Keeping commercial communications satellites on the
USML is no longer warranted. The characteristics, listed below,
now are routinely employed on commercial communications
satellites, many of which are of non-US manufacture:

- Anti-jam Capability (ie. antennas and/or antenna systems with
the ability to respond to incoming interference by adaptively
reducing antenna gain in the direction of the interference). In
today's exploding telecommunications environment, many
commercial customers wish to ensure the veracity and quality of
their signals and protect their systems from spurious commands
and interference. This capability meets a legitimate commercial
need, and is not unique to military use.

- Antennas: (with aperture greater than 30 feet; or with all
sidelobes less than or equal to -35dB; or designed. modified, or
configured to provide coverage area on the surface of the earth
less than 200nm). Commercial mobile services require large
aperture antennas with sensitive receivers. Hughes already is
employing designs for its geosynchronous mobile satellite
systems that include antennas exceeding 30 feet in diameter
commercial use. Control of sidelobe levels for today's
commercial applications is a major antenna design factor
resulting from requirements to control the antenna’s footprint
on the earth, satisfy constraints on orbital location, and meet
efficient communications payload design criteria. The current
and emerging market demand for frequency reuse, antenna spot
beams, and the commercial availability of inespensive ground
terminals are driving antenna footprints to sizes under 200 nm.
This characteristic is no longer a realistic discriminator
between military and commercial systems.

- Crosslinks (ie. intersatellite data relay communication links
that do not involve a ground relay terminal). The use of
crosslinks is another example of readily available technology
that has led to new commercial applications, such as Motorola's
IRIDIUM and Hughes' SPACEWAY. Similar systems are being
developed in Europe and Japan and will have wide spread
commercial applications.

- Baseband Processing (ie. spaceborne baseband processing that
uses any technique other than frequency translation and which
can be changed several times a day on a cbannel-by-channel basis
among previously assigned fixed frequencies). The uses of
on-board processing for commercial applicalions are many,
particularly for the rapidly-emerging mobile commercial
communications marketplace. Its applications range from routine
sorting and routing of incoming calls to maintaining compliance
with prescribed frequency spectrum management.

- Encryption deviecs. Satellites traditionally have been used
for the transmission of sensitive financial and business data
that require absolute integrity and privacy. The encryption
device is a relatively sophisticated equipment item, but is
manufactured for commercial use and, in the case of commercial
communications satellites, it generally is employed to
scramble/unscranibling video and audio programming in order to
protect this data. Once it is embedded in the satellite, the
enctyption device has no military significance.

- Radiation Hardening. Commercial communications satellites
daily operate in a natural radiation environment harmful to
electronic circuits. Hence, they need protection from the
environment in which they operate. This protection comes from
radiation hardened devices embedded in the satellite.

- Perigee Kick Motors. The perigee kick motor is of a type
routinely used to deliver commercial communications satellites
to their proper orbital slots. Using foreign manufactured
perigee kick motors on US-manufactured satellites might work and
alleviate problems associated with the USML, but it would
unnecessarily reduce US content and forfeit revenues to foreign
competition.

The above characteristics arc no longer unique to military
satellites. They are becoming increasingly common to fixed and
mobile communications systems. Hence, they should no longer
serve as the basis for keeping commercial communications
satellites on the USML and off the CCL.

In real terms, bureaucratic change simply has not kept abreast
with technological and economic realities. As a result, many
commercial communications satellites remain on the USML, and
their export is subject to the USML's many restrictions.
Removing commercial communications satellites from the USML and
placing them on the CCL largely would rectify this problem.
Commerce licenses do not require Congressional approval; they
are routinely issued in a more timely fashion; and, relative to
State Depanmcnt licenses, their issuance is less frequently
delayed by sanctions that may be imposed by the State Department
upon customer countries. Moreover, the Department of Commerce
sees promotion of exports as one of its prime roles.

US Export Policy Discriminates Against the Satellite Industry

Cunrent US export policy is applied to commercal communication
satellites in a manner inconsistent with other high-tech,
high-added-value US exports, such as the Boeing 747. The overall
technology content of a Boeing 747-400 is greater than that of
any contemporary commercial communications satellite.

The 747's inertial reference system and avionics exceed in cost,
complexity and sensitivity the satellite’s anti-jam capability,
crosslinks, and antennas. Its on-board computers provide
capability greater than the satellite's baseband processing. The
747's powerful turbofan engines are more sophisticated than any
existing perigee kick motor. Its radars surpass the technology
of the satellite's encryption and radiation hardening devices.

Nonetheless, the Boeing 747, with its state-of-the-art radar,
inertial reference system, fuel management systems, on-board
processors, and antennas, is on the CCL. With but few
exceptions, it can be exported worldwide on a pre-approved
general license.

Moreover, the 747 is delivered intact to customers. This is in
marked contrast to the delivery of a U.S. manufactured
commercial communications satellite which is delivered on orbit
and not examined or touched by the customer.

Like Boeing and other US aircraft manufacturers, the US
satellite industry believes that the new investment by emerging
nations in transportation, telecommunications, and power
generation could total $1 trillion by the end of the decade.
This will help the satellite industry boost exports and create
jobs but only if US policy allows it the freedom to effectively
compete in the global market.

Unnecessary controls adversely affect America's ability to
compete. Tight controls stifle our access to new markets. Tight
controls also serve to discourage customers from buying US, and
ultimately motivate them to accelerate the development of
indigenous capabilities, thus giving them the potential to
compete with US industry.

Conclusion

The global arena in which the US satellite industry once reigned
supreme has irrevocably changed. Foreign competition is keen and
it is abetted by a US export policy that not only discriminates
against satellite manufacturers, but also imposes delays that
call into question their reliability as suppliers. Moving US
manufactured satellites off the TJSML to the CCL will alleviate
this problem, .and should contribute directly to the
competitiveness and growth of the US satellite indusuy.

Recommendation

Remove commercial communications satellites and related data
from the USML and put them on the CCL!

8 March 1995



STATE DEPT. CHARGE LETTER TO HUGHES AND BOEING CONCERNING TRANSFER OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA

CHINESE LONG MARCH & CSS ICBM

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 1/14/3 ARTICLE ON NEWSMAX.COM


United States Department of State

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Office of Defense Trade Controls

Washington, D.C 20037

December 26, 2002

Larry D Hunter
General Counsel
Hughes Electronics Corporation
200 North Sepulveda Boulevard
El Segundo, California 90245-0956

Douglas G. Bain
Senior Vice President & General Counsel
The Boeing Company
100 North Riverside
Chicago, Illinois 60606


Re:      Investigation of Hughes Electronics Corporation and
Boeing satellite Systems (formerly Hughes Space and
Communications) Concerning the Long March 2E and Long March BE
failure investigations, and other satellite-related matters
involving the People's Republic of China

Dear Messrs. Hunter and Bain:

(1)      The Department of State ("Department") charges that
HUGHES ELECTRONICS CORPORATION (hereinafter "Respondent HE",
which includes Hughes Network Systems, Inc.) and BOEING
SATELLITE SYSTEMS (hereinafter "Respondent BSS") formerly HUGHES
SPACE AND COMMUNICATIONS ("HSC") (hereinafter, "Respondents"
when referred to jointly) violated the Arms Export Control Act
("Act") and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
("ITAR" or "Regulation" in connection with their misconduct
related to the January 1995 failed launch of the Long March 2E
rocket carrying the APSTAR II spacecraft1 the February 1996
failed launch of the Long March 3E rocket carrying the INTELSAT
708 spacecraft, and

----------------------------------------------------------------
1 The Boeing Company purchased Hughes Space and Communications
from Hughes Electronics on January 13, 2000

________________________________________________________________
                                                               2

other matters set forth herein concerning their business
activities with China.  One hundred twenty-three (123)
violations are alleged at this time.  The essential facts
constituting the alleged violations and the regulatory or other
provisions involved are described herein.  The Department
reserves the right to amend this charging letter (See 22 C.F.R.
S 128.3(a)), including through a revision to incorporate
additional charges stemming from the same misconduct of the
Respondents in these matters.  Please be advised that this is a
charging letter to impose debarment or civil penalties pursuant
to 22 C.F.R. S 128.3.

* * *

PART I - RELEVANT FACTS


Jurisdictional Requirements

(2)      Respondents HE and BSS are corporations organized under
the laws of the State of Delaware.

(3)      Respondents are -- and were during the period covered
by the offenses set forth herein - - engaged in the manufacture
and export of defense articles and defense services and so
registered with the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade
Controls ("ODTC") in accordance with Section 38 of the Act and S
122.1 of the Regulations.

(4)      Respondents are U.S. persons within the meaning of S
120.15 and, as such, are subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, in particular with regard to the Act and the
Regulations.

(5)      China Academy of Launch Technology ("CALT"), China
Great - Wall Industry Corporation ("CGWIC"), China Satellite
Launch and Tracking Control ("CLTV"), China Aerospace
Corporation ("CASC"), China International Trust & Investment
Company ("CITIC"), China United Telecommunications Satellite
Company, China Overseas Space Development & Investment Company,
Commission for Science, Technology & Industry for National
Defense ("COSTIND"), Sino-Canada Telecommunications and
Investment Management Company, Ltd, Asia Pacific Satellite
Telecommunications Company ("APT" formerly "APSAT"), Asia
Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Company ("APMT") Asian
Satellite Telecommunications Company, Ltd ("ASIASAT"), Societe
Europeene des Satellites ("SES") and

________________________________________________________________
                                                               3

other persons so identified below all are foreign persons within
the meaning of S 120.16 of the Regulations.


US-PRC International Agreements on Space Launch

(6)      on December 17, 1988, the United States and the
People's Republic of China ("PRC") signed an international
agreement in Washington, DC. entitled "Memorandum of Agreement
on Satellite Technology safeguards Between the Governments of
the United States and the People's Republic of China," which
entered into force upon signature. This agreement specifies the
security procedures to be followed for launch of
U.S.-manufactured satellites from the territory of the PRC and
also expressly prohibits U.S. persons from providing "any
assistance" to the PRC relating to the design, development,
operation, maintenance, modification, or repair of the launch
facility or launch vehicle.2


OPTUS B2

(7)      On December 21, 1992, a PRC Long March 2E space launch
vehicle ("SLV") carrying the OPTUS B2 satellite manufactured by
Respondents exploded shortly after liftoff from China’s space
launch facility (Xichanq Launch Center). The satellite was
exported to the PRC for launch pursuant to a State Department
munitions license issued by ODTC, which provided for U.S.
Government (i.e., through Department of Defense personnel)
monitoring of all phases of the launch

----------------------------------------------------------------
2 The 1988 Agreement was superceded upon entry into force by a
similar U.S.-PRC agreement done at Beijing on February 11, 1993,
containing the same prohibition.  The agreement also bars the
PRC from seeking such assistance and, together with the
prohibition on the provision by U.S. persons of such assistance,
provides the fundamental conditions sine qua non the United
States has licensed the export of commercial satellites to the
PRC for launch into outer space.  The requirement to comply with
these bilateral agreements has been routinely incorporated as a
condition of the export license authorizations provided by ODTC
to U.S. satellite manufacturers.  See para. (7) above.  In a
letter dated December 3, 2002, Respondent's stated their view
that the agreement (rather than reflecting a ban on the
provision of assistance by U.S. persons) is more accurately
described as reflecting a mutual understanding of the PRC and
the USC.

________________________________________________________________
                                                               4

and which required that all of Respondents' employees and agents
conform strictly to the aforesaid Satellite Technology
Safeguards Agreement, specifically by prohibiting "any  ..
technical assistance whatsoever to its (Respondents') Chinese
counterparts which might assist China to design, develop or
enhance the performance of any of its contemplated or existing
Long March launch vehicles or missiles."

(8)      Following the OPTUS B2 failed launch, the Respondents
concluded that the PRC's SLV nose cone (or fairing) was a
principal cause of the failure and sought advice from ODTC on
whether a license would be granted to hold discussions with the
PRC on this matter, following which consultation with ODIC the
Respondents concluded that "a license request would almost
certainly be denied (by ODTC) if even the slightest possibility
or inference, real or perceived, remained undispelled (sic)
that the technical data could directly or indirectly impact PRC
ballistic missile interests."3  In the event, the Respondents
decided not to seek a license from ODTC, but did proceed to
conduct a launch failure investigation into the causes of the
OPTUS B2 SLV failure, which would inform their approach in
subsequent matters, described below.4

----------------------------------------------------------------
3  April 9, 1993, memorandum from Majors (Hughes Washington
Director for International Affairs) to Leedle (Hughes Technology
Export Control Coordinator).

4  While there is information available to ODTC indicating that
violations of the Act and the Regulations occurred in the OPTUS
B2 matter, it has decided not to bring charges owing to the
passage of time and contradictory recollections of persons
involved in these matters, and the further opinion that the
charges detailed herein provide an adequate basis for addressing
the underlying patterns of misconduct.  The Respondents do not
deny their failure to obtain a license, but maintain they
obtained approval from a Department of Defense monitor prior to
making disclosures to the Chinese.  Respondents also assert that
the Department "well knows" that their decision not to seek a
license "coincided with a decision not to furnish any
information that could qualify as technical data or a defense
service."  However, the Department has no such understanding or
knowledge; quite the opposite is true: The Respondents have
repeatedly asserted throughout this investigation that none of
their conduct in any of the matters touched on in this

________________________________________________________________
                                                               5

APSTAR II


(9)      On January 26, 1995, a PRC Long March 2E space launch
vehicle ("SLV") carrying the APSTAR II satellite exploded
shortly after liftoff tram China's space launch facility. The
APSTAR IL satellite was also manufactured by the Respondents
pursuant to a contract with the Asia-Pacific satellite
Telecommunications company ("APT") located in Hong Kong, which
was then and remains today "owned or controlled" (as these terms
are understood in the Regulations at S 122) by various PRC
entities.  The APSTAR II satellite had been exported to the PRC
launch pursuant to an export license issued by the Department of
Commerce.  That export license, while not requiring U.S.
Government monitoring of the launch or other specific
prohibitions on assistance to China's SLV program (unlike the
earlier State Department licenses for OPTUS B2 and the first
APSTAR satellite), also did not --indeed, lawfully could not --
provide -authorization for Respondents to engage in the unlawful
conduct alleged below in violation of the Act and the
Regulations.5

----------------------------------------------------------------
charging letter qualifies as a "defense service" either because
it excluded technical data (in their opinion) or because it is
Constitutionally protected "speech", while ODTC has repeatedly
admonished Respondents and their attorneys that the AECA and
ITAR properly regulate on U.S. security and foreign policy
grounds the conduct of U.S. persons who aid and abet the space
launch and/or intercontinental ballistic missile programs of
foreign powers, that Respondents are improperly conflating the
laws and regulations governing the conduct of their corporations
abroad in respect to foreign space and missile programs with the
laws and regulations governing the exercise of "speech" (which
are in no manner at issue here) and that, because of security
and foreign policy considerations, the United States has long
held by the ITAR (with which regulations Respondents are fully
familiar) that a defense service requiring approval by ODTC of a
technical assistance agreement may occur even when all the
information relied on in furnishing the defense service to a
foreign power is in the public domain.

5 Hughes initially received approval from the State Department
in March 1993 17 or the APSAT (later termed APSTAR) program,
which was then defined to cover two series 376

________________________________________________________________
                                                               6

(10)     Following the APSTAR II launch failure, the
Respondents, APT, CGWIO and the insurance firm, Johnson &
Higgins, signed a memorandum of understanding in which they
agreed "to cooperate with each other in a Spirit of mutual
benefit and cooperation to prepare information concerning the
APSTAR-2 mission failure...  Each of the parties will use their
best efforts to prepare the necessary information as soon as
possible to assist APT’S business operations..- APT, Hughes and
OGWIC agree that they will each cooperate and coordinate all
investigations of the probable cause of

----------------------------------------------------------------
satellites for APT, Ltd. in Hong Kong. However, in August 1993
the State Department imposed missile sanctions (Category 2) and
determined that the export of communications satellites
containing Missile Technology Control Regime ("MTCR") Category 2
items to the sanctioned Chinese entities was prohibited and
suspended access to any MTCR related technology by PRC
nationals.  In January 1994 the State Department terminated the
suspension with respect to all PRC nationals, but continued to
prohibit access to any MTCR related technology by any PRC
national affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace
Industry or any Chinese government activity relating to missile
development or production, electronics, space systems or
equipment, and military aircraft.  Ten such Chinese activities
were enumerated as examples to Hughes, including CGWIO, CASC, et
alia.  Faced with these developments in USC policy, Hughes had
in the interim redefined the second APSTAR satellite based on
its 601 series and, in the interim (November 1993), sought and
received approval for the export of this satellite from the
Department of Commerce.  The Respondents have maintained (most
recently in a letter dated December 3, 2002, that no violation
occurred in this matter because the Department of Commerce was
"well within its authority" to approve release of the launch I
failure material that was given to the Chinese in the APSTAR II
failure investigation through a commodity classification (CCATS
#G000824, dated August 26, 1995).  However, the record indicates
Respondents knew chat the Apstar II launch failure investigation
was properly within the coverage of the ITAR and, hence,
required Department of State approval; in any case, the
Department of Commerce has said it erred in that matter.

________________________________________________________________
                                                               7

failure of the APSTAR-2 mission in a spirit of mutual benefit."6

(11)     By letter dated January 31, 1995, Respondents informed
PRC authorities that "Hughes is prepared to fully cooperate with
you in investigating this failure so that we may quickly resume
launches of the Long March. I have instructed our people to make
available whatever data and resources are required to understand
the cause and fix the problem.  Again, I want to make clear that
I strongly support our mutual cooperation, including meaningful
technology transfer, and I am prepared to bring the full
capability of Hughes to the partnership."7

(12)     Notwithstanding the established prohibitions and
restrictions contained in the US-PRC bilateral agreement, which
formed an essential basis for the launch of all U.S.
manufactured satellites from the PRC, and notwithstanding
Respondents’ careful understanding of these prohibitions and
restrictions (from prior discussions with and licenses approved
by ODTC), Respondents took numerous actions, some of which are
described herein, in violation of the Act and the Regulations.
Notably, Respondents decided to form and direct a launch failure
investigation beginning in January 1995 and continuing
throughout much of that year.  The investigation involved the
formation of several groups of leading technical experts from
China and the U.S., which throughout the investigation engaged
in an extensive exchange of technical data and analysis,
producing a wide range of unauthorized technology transfers and
the violations enumerated in PART II, below.8  Additionally,
both

----------------------------------------------------------------
6  Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Mission Failure,
dated January 26, 1995, between He Kerang, APT Satellite co,.,
Ltd., Yu Pusheng, China Great Wall Industry Corp., Donald
Cromer, Hughes Space and Communications and Paul B. O’Connor,
Johnson & Higgins Insurance Company.  

7  Letter dated January 31, 1995, from Steven Dorfman, Senior
Vice President, GM Hughes Electronics to Minister Liu Jiyuan.
China Aerospace Corporation.

8 An HSC facsimile message dated May 14, 1995, describes the
scope of technical interchange with APT officials; "(W)e of
course briefed APT about everything, including the fairing
concerns.  APT had been present in all of the failure meetings
to date, and has copies of everything from both sides."

________________________________________________________________
                                                               8

parties contracted an independent investigation team of private
consultants and aerospace industry experts.9

(13)     At no time did the Respondents seek or receive a
license or other written approval concerning the conduct of
their APSTAR II failure investigation with PRC authorities or
the experts who participated in that investigation as required
by Section 38 of the Act and relevant provisions of the
Regulations.  Such approval would not, of course, have been
forthcoming in view of the established legally binding
prohibition in the 1993 (and predecessor) US-PRC agreement and
as reflected in the prohibitions and limitations contained in
prior export authorizations related to China that ODTC had
furnished to Respondents.  This said, Respondents HE and BSS
have continued to maintain that the reason no written approval
was sought was because none was required.10

(14)     Instead, a March 21, 1995, internal memorandum of
Respondents summarized the corporate strategy for the APSTAR II
failure investigation:

----------------------------------------------------------------
9  Indeed, the scale and depth of technical assistance furnished
to Chinese authorities in this matter is indicated by the
organizational structure of the failure investigation: a Failure
Investigation Team was formed to examine all aspects of the
failure, including the satellite and rocket and "external
interfaces" with CALT, CGWIC, et al, and produced a 38 page
report based on the work of seven specialized sub-teams
(spacecraft debris, material properties, video analysis,
telemetry, coupled loads, structures and aerodynamics) drawing
on the experiences of members who also worked on the Optus
failure; & Spacecraft Focus Team reviewed the work of the
Failure Investigation Team and produced an 84-page report
assessing whether and how the satellite might have been a
contributing factor in the failure; an Independent Review Team
provided Respondents with an independent assessment of the work
of the other teams; an International Oversight Team reviewed the
work of both sides and included representatives of China and
Respondents, as well as third party foreign nationals.  The IQT
met on three separate occasions between April and June.

10 December 3, 2002, Letter to ODTC Director Lowell from HEC/BSS
Counsel Randall Turk, Esq (Baker Botts).

________________________________________________________________
                                                               9

     "(I)n the 82 (OPTUS 82) investigation, communication
     between companies was limited due to Government Monitor
     oversight from DOS (Department of State) and fear by the
     Chinese that Hughes was trying to prove that the fairing
     was at fault.... (K)eep communication open with the Chinese
     long enough to get the information needed to understand
     the fairing and the rocket - Without Government monitor
     (now under the Department of Commerce license) and without
     the appearance of pointing our finger, the Chinese have
     been much more open to giving data we need."11


(15)     This strategy was further influenced by Respondents'
business interests in securing future contracts with the PRC and
with Asian satellite companies in which PRC influence figured
prominently, and concern that U.S. Government policy constraints
on technology transfer as administered by ODTC were an
impediment to achieving these interests.  A May 2, .1995,
internal memorandum of Respondents regarding a meeting with APT,
summarizes this assessment:

     "ARSTAR 2 and APMT decisions (discussed further below) will
     be within a global context (technology transfer, launch
     vehicle commitments, long term manufacturing partnership
     with China).  Key to that global context is technology
     transfer.  This made it extremely clear that it is time for
     Hughes to either "put up or shut up" in regard to meeting
     their (sic) previously stated commitment of transferring
     technology to China.  If we want to win APT (APMT) Hughes
     must make real commitment to transferring technology to
     China.12

INTELSAT 708 and APSTAR lA

(16)     On June 23, 1995, the Department of Commerce approved
an export license for Respondents to export the APSTAR lA
satellite to China for launch on the Long March 3B 5EV and sale
to APT.  The Commerce license specifically

----------------------------------------------------------------
11  Hughes Space and Communications Company document dated March
21, 1995, Strategy for APSTAR Failure Investigation.

12  Hughes Space and Communications facsimile message dated May
2, 1995, from Steven Dorfman to John Konrad et al., Subject:
Status and Recommendations May 2 Meeting with APT.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              10

provided, in part, that “technical data or assistance related to
the design, development, operation1 maintenance, modification,
or repair of the Chinese launch vehicle is not authorized under
this license.13

(17)     On February 15, 1996, the PRC’s Long March 3B SLV
crashed during a tailed attempt to launch the INTELSAT 708
satellite manufactured by Space Systems/Lora]- ("SS/L") -

(18)     On February 22, 1996, Respondents' Chairman at the
Board wrote to Chinese General Shen Rongjun (then Deputy
Director of the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry
for National Defense "COSTIND") and asked "if there is anything
we at Hughes Space and Communications can do to support your
investigation into the cause of the loss (i.e., LM 3B and
INTELSAT 708)."14  The next day, February 23, 1996, Respondents'
Chairman wrote to Major General Hu Shixiang, Director of the
Xichang Satellite Launch Center, to assure him of his "personal
support and that of my company as you investigate the causes for
the loss."

(19)     On March 9, 1996, Respondents’ personnel met with
Xichang launch center authorities, toured the crash site,
conducted a site survey, and developed a list of twenty-five
items that required resolution before the launch of APSTAR lit
could take place later that year, which launch was slated to
rely on the LM 3 SLV.15

----------------------------------------------------------------
13  Department of Commerce export license no. D-219965.

14  Respondents maintain that the CEO Cromer letters were merely
an expression of condolence for the deaths of Chinese citizens.
It is true that the letter to Major General Hu Shixiang (but not
the letter to General Shen Rongjun) did offer condolences for
the loss of life in its introductory paragraph as follows:
"Please allow me to express my sincere condolences for the loss
of the Long March 3B carrying Intelsat 708.  I was particularly
saddened to learn there may have been a number of lives lost,
including some of your own personnel.  I was gratified to hear,
however that damage to your facilities was relatively light and
I know you will soon be fully operational once again."

15  Respondents suggest their motive for this activity, which
concerned chiefly repairs of the facility, was to ensure the
safety of their own personnel and have continued to assert that
"the site survey was perfectly lawful" (December 3 letter from
Turk to Lowell. However, this assertion also 

________________________________________________________________
                                                              11

(20)     On March 10, 1996, Respondents' personnel presented
CALT, CGWIC, and APT with the results of its survey.

(21)     On March 14, 1996, Respondents' personnel met in
Beijing with APT, CLTC, OMIT, CGWIC and representatives of the
international insurance industry in which Respondents and
Chinese authorities were informed that: (a) a final report on
the root causes of the INTELSAT 708 launch failure would be
required, as well as (b) a review of the report by an
independent oversight team.  These requirements were fully
consistent with the groundwork already laid by Respondents who
had already informed Chinese authorities on March 10, 1996, that
more information would be needed to convince the insurance
underwriters that an adequate investigation had been conducted
to isolate the cause of the LM-3B failure and that a detailed
presentation would be needed to convince the, underwriters that
the LM-3 launch vehicle (slated to launch Respondents' APSTAR lA
satellite) was substantially different from the LM-3B and thus
did not run the risk of experiencing the same failure.

(22)     Chinese authorities initially invited Respondents to
head up the oversight team for INTELSAT 708 (as it had done for
OPTUS B2 and APSTAR II), but in the event, Respondents declined
and opted to participate in an SS/L led investigation.16

----------------------------------------------------------------
ignores the fact that the prohibition on assistance to the PRC
launch program extends explicitly to the PRC launch "facility"
(See para. 6, above), as long stated in the US-PRC bilateral
agreement.  

16 Apparently in order "not to rock the boat" while an export
license application for yet another satellite export involving
China (ie, APMT) was undergoing review in the USG (April 8,
1996, memorandum from Herron to Cromer) and in light of
Respondents' assumption that SS/L's chairmanship would act as a
"buffer" for it (e.g... an April 9, 1996 response to Herron from
Steinhauer opines that "it is in HSC advantage to stay engaged.
An outside consultant may buffer HSC somewhat relative to the
technology transfer issue."  Also, a May 6, 1996, message to
SS/L from Steinhauer referring to "detailed suggestions for
specific testing in the controls laboratory, for specific fixes
to the IMU (inertial measurement unit) single point wire solder
joint

________________________________________________________________
                                                              12

(23)     Notwithstanding the Respondents' decision to opt for a
lower profile in the 1996 SS/L-led failure investigation by the
Independent Review Committee,17 they nevertheless participated
fully in the 1996 launch failure investigation both through the
assignment of two top technical personnel, often playing a
leadership role both within the IRC in troubleshooting problems,
and independent of the IRC, through separate, technical meetings
with Chinese authorities.  For example:

  (a)  On April 10, 1996, Respondents personnel faxed nine
  questions pertaining to the LM 3B failure to GW Aerospace
  Corporation, a U.S.-based consulting company owned by CGWIC,
  which were to be forwarded to the LM 3B program office in
  Beijing "in order to ensure that the anticipated.  Chinese
  failure report considered specific concerns related to the LM
  3B failure ... and impact the cause may have on Hughes
  decision to launch the ABSTAP. lA satellite."18

  (b)  On April 25, 1996, Respondents personnel met with GW
  Aerospace personnel to discuss questions drafted in
  preparation for the second IRC meeting, in which Respondents'
  personnel subsequently reported that they had "thoroughly
  discussed the possibility of any other control and guidance
  system failure causes, specifically including the eight-engine
  performance and structural issues.  We discussed the
  eight-engine (LM 3B) versus four-engine (LM

----------------------------------------------------------------
failure" notes that "the committee could be approaching the
border of technology transfer, i.e., how to improve the launch
vehicle" and asks "will SS/L be the filter for tech transfer
issues?"  (Respondents maintain that, despite appearances to the
contrary, there is no connection between any of the preceding
discussions and "the decision for Loral to take the lead with
respect to oversight of the investigation.")

17  Charges associated with SS/L's conduct related to the IRC
were resolved through a Consent Agreement entered into between
SS/L, Loral Space & Communications and the Department in January
2032.

19  Hughes Space and Communications facsimile transmission dated
April 10, 1996, from R. Steinhauer, Hughes Chief Scientist, to
Tian Guodang, GW Aerospace Corporation, Subject: Questions for
the APSTAR lA Insurance Meeting.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              13

  3A) lift off vibration and acoustic environment at the IMU.
  CALT will have to investigate this further."19

  (c) On April 30 and Pay 1, 1996, Respondents in a "splinter
  group" of IRC experts concerned with attitude control advised
  the Chinese of tests that could be done using equipment
  available at CALT's factory in order to replicate the launch
  failure and confirm the Chinese theory of the IMU in the LM-3B
  failure scenario, as well as differences between the LM 3B and
  LM 3 IMUs.20

APMT and Sino-Canada

(24)     On May 8, 1998, Respondents announced that they had
concluded a contract with Asia Pacific Mobile Telecommunications
Satellite (APMT), a company sponsored by Chinese and Singapore
partners, for a satellite based mobile phone system.  The turnkey
system was to include two satellites to be launched from China
on the Long March 3B SLV, five gateways, one network operations
center, one satellite operations center and an initial purchase
of 70,000 user terminals, with the ground network equipment and
handsets to be provided by HUGHES NETWORK SYSTEMS.21

(25)     APMT's Chinese shareholders and partners included
China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, China
United Telecommunications Satellite Company, China Overseas
Space Development & Investment Company.

(26)     In June 1995 Sino-Canada Telecommunications and
Investment Management Company, Ltd. was incorporated in
Macao, having its principal place of business at the Hotel
Fortuna, in order to explore telecommunications

----------------------------------------------------------------
19  Email message from R. Steinhauer to John Smay et al. dated
April 26, 1996, subject; Discussions with Huang Zuoyi

20  Letter from Wah Lim, Senior VP, SS/L, to Liu Zhixionq, VP
CGWIC regarding Second IRC Meeting in Beijing.

21  The U.S Government ultimately rejected the export license
application for this project when by letter dated February 24,
1999, the Department of Commerce informed Hughes of its
intention to deny several license applications for APMT in light
of concerns expressed by the Department of State regarding the
planned launch services.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              14

opportunities in the PRC related to APMT.22  Sino-Canada's
managing director, Suen Yan Kwong, was the founder of Chung Kiu
Telecommunications (CKT), which had invested in cellular
telecommunications for use under special network by China's
People's Liberation Army (PLA) in military districts along the
coastal provinces.

(27)     On January 2l, 1999, in the course of a meeting with
ODTC it Washington, D.C., Respondents' Vice President and
General Counsel advised that Respondents had become concerned
about a $5 million foreign sales agreement with Sino-Canada
related to APMT entered into by Respondents (which had not been
reported to ODTC at the time of Respondents' technical
assistance agreement submission for APMT on June 1, 1998 as
required by S 124.12(a)(6)), and that Respondents had retained
Kroll Associates to examine this matter ($500,000 had already
been paid to Sino-Canada and an additional $25 million was held
in escrow).  ODTC requested a statement as to whether any of the
payments concerned, in particular, political contributions,
which Respondents subsequently reported negatively, and whether
the Kroll report would be made available to ODIC, which
Respondents have declined to furnish on the grounds of
attorney-client privilege.23


APMT and Shen Jun

(28)     On July 9, 1996, Respondents submitted a munitions
export license application to ODTC seeking authorization for one
of its employees, Shen Jun, described as a dual Canadian Chinese
national, in order to provide Chinese-English language
translation and interpretation support for the

----------------------------------------------------------------
22  Respondents advise that opportunities related to APMT was
not the sole business activity of, or the sole purpose for,
Sino-Canada's incorporation.

23  Respondents now maintain that their prior General Counsel
erred in that meeting and that, while there were preliminary
discussions with Kroll about conducting a background
investigation of Sino-Canada, Respondents ultimately elected to
have the background investigation conducted by outside counsel
other than Kroll (which investigative report has similarly been
withheld from ODTC by Respondents).

________________________________________________________________
                                                              15

preliminary design phase of the APMT satellite project.24  In no
place in that submission nor otherwise did HUGHES SPACE AND
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY inform ODTC that this individual was, in
fact, the son of PLA General and COSTIND Deputy Director Shen
Rongjun, 25  which fact was material to the U.S. Government's
consideration of whether the license application should be
approved or denied.26


(29)     The record indicates that Shen Jun’s role for
Respondents went well beyond that of an interpreter/translator
and more closely resembled that of an intermediary with his
father, General Shen, and other PRC space authorities, in order
to cultivate their support in various matters of interest to
Hughes, including the handling of the APSTAR II launch failure
investigation and the APMT contract.27

----------------------------------------------------------------
24  This license application was initially approved, but
subsequently suspended by ODTC when it became known that Shen
Jun was the son of Shen Rongjun.

25  According to a September 20, 1995 memorandum, Hughes
regarded General Shen Rongjun as "the most important Chinese
space official."

26  Respondents have maintained as of December 3, 2002, that
this information was not material and that its omission was
proper because there is no place in the munitions license
application for them to disclose father-son relationships
between General officers at the People's Liberation Army who are
overseeing a project they are working on and their foreign
national employees working in U.S. facilities on the same
project.

27  An August 8, 1995, memorandum from Bruce Elbert reports on
APMT related activities by Shen Jun:  "in a telephone
conversation last night with Jun he provided the following
information after having talked to important people involved
with APMT ... Lockheed Martin has sweetened their bid with
technology transfers on launch vehicles and changed their
price...  These points were reiterated by the highest official
he interfaced with Jun has the worry that if it goes wrong in
Munich (an apparent reference to an APSTAR II launch failure
briefing to insurance providers) we open the door for Lockheed
Martin and their unique proposal for technology transfer on the
launch vehicle.  This could result in our not getting into the
final round of APMT negotiations."  The memo goes on to report
that Shen Jun has been asked "to make a proposal to CASC and
CGWIC that they describe their

________________________________________________________________
                                                              16

ASIASAT 3


(30)     By letter dated November 12, 1999, Respondent BSS
provided a pre1iminary notification to ODTC of an intended
voluntary disclosure of violations of the Regulations related to
its ASIASAT 3 program, a satellite manufactured for the Asia
Satellite Telecommunications Company in Hong Kong, whose
principal owners are China International Trust & Investment
Company (CITIC) and Societe Europeenne des Satellites (SES, a
company incorporated in Luxembourg).28  By letter dated February
9, 2000, Respondents advised ODTC that its internal audit (now
complete) had concluded its employees had provided ASIASAT
personnel with technical data that exceeded the scope of its
Department of Commerce license (and which was subject to State
Department jurisdiction).

(31)     The unauthorized disclosures concerned two categories
of information.  First, unit-level FECMA (failure modes and
criticality analysis) and worst case circuit analysis for the
ASIASAT 3 satellite, which constitutes detailed design
information subject to control under the Regulations and
generally not releasable to foreign persons, had been made
available to the ASIASAT organization in 1996 in five volumes of
technical data.  ODTC directed Respondent BSS to seek the return
of this data from ASIASAT following the submission of the
voluntary disclosure in February 2000, but Respondent was unable
to effect the return of all the information from ASIASAT.
Second, following abandonment of an ASIASAT field office at
Respondents El Segundo, California premises, Respondent Boeing
discovered additional technical data that had been
(presumptively) accessible to a PRC national employee of ASIASAT
assigned to the El Segundo field office.  This technical data
concerned production information for certain subsystems,
including the Xenon ion propulsion system, which information as
also generally not releasable to foreign persons.

----------------------------------------------------------------
redesign of the LM-2E fairing and that Hughes discuss what it
will do only if we use the LM-2E again."

28  ASIASAT 3 was launched on December 25, 1997, from the
Baikonur Cosmodrone in Kazakhstan, but did not reach its proper
orbit when the upper stage of the Proton rocket failed.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              17

ASTRA 1G/1H


(32)     By letter dated September 17, 2001, Respondent Boeing
voluntarily disclosed to ODTC that its personnel improperly
transferred controlled technical data to SES during a 1995
critical design review for the ASTRA lG satellite and a 1995
preliminary design review for the ASTRA 111 satellite, which
satellites were being exported and sold to SES pursuant to a
Department of Commerce license.  The technical data improperly
disclosed in this instance, as in the ASIASAT 3 matter, above,
exceeded the conditions of the Commerce license (and required a
State Department license, which was not sought) and concerned
electrical power subsystems that contained unit level FECMA and
worst case circuit analysis; such detailed design information is
generally not releasable to foreign persons.


License and Reporting Requirements

(33)     S 126.1(a) of the Regulations provides that it is the
policy of the United States to deny, among other things,
licenses and other approvals) destined for or originating in
certain countries, including china.

(34)     S 126.1(e) of the Regulations provides that no sale or
transfer and no proposal to sell or transfer any defense service
may be made to any country referred to in this section and that
any person who knows or has reason to know of any actual
transfer of such services must immediately inform ODTC.

(35)     S 127.1(a) (1) of the Regulations provides that it is
unlawful to export or attempt to export from the United States
any defense article or technical data or to furnish any defense
service for which a license or written approval is required
without first obtaining the required license or written approval
from the Office of Defense Trade Controls.

(36)     S 127il1a) (3) of the Regulations provides that it is
unlawful to conspire to export, import, reexport or cause to be
exported, imported or reexported, any defense article or to
furnish any defense service for which a license or written
approval is required without first obtaining the

________________________________________________________________
                                                              18

required license or written approval from the Office of Defense
Trade Controls.

(37)     S 127.1(a) (4) of the Regulations provides that it is
unlawful to violate any terms and conditions of licenses or
approvals.

(38)     S 127.1(b) of the Regulations provides that any person
who is granted a license or other approval is responsible for
the acts of employees, agents, and all authorized persons to
whom possession of the licensed defense article or technical
data has been entrusted regarding the operation, use,
possession, transportation, and handling of such defense article
or technical data abroad.

(39)     S 127.1(d) of the Regulations provides that no person
may willfully cause, or aid, abet, counsel, demand, induce,
procure or permit the commission of any act prohibited by, or
the omission of any act required by 22 U.S.C. S 2778, 22 U.S.C.
S 2779, or any regulation, license, approval, or order issued
thereunder.

(40)     S 127.2 of the Regulations provides that it is unlawful
to use any export document containing a false statement or
misrepresenting or omitting a material fact for the purpose of
exporting any defense article or technical data or the
furnishing of any defense service for which a license or
approval is required.

(41)     S 130.9(a) (1) of the Regulations requires that each
applicant must inform the Office of Defense Trade Controls as to
whether it or its vendors have paid, or offered or agreed to
pay, in respect of any sale for which a license or approval is
requested:  (i) political contributions in an aggregate amount
of $5,000 or more or (ii) fees or commissions in an aggregate
amount of $100,000 or more.  If so, an applicant must provide
the detailed information specified in SS 130.10 and 130.11

* * *

PART II - THE CHARGES

APSTAR II
________________________________________________________________
                                                              19

Charges 1-3

(42)     The Respondents violated 22 C.F.R. 5. 127.1(a) (3) when
on or about January 26, 1995, and continuing over the course of
the next eight months, they conspired with Chinese authorities
and other third party foreign nationals to furnish defense
services to China related to the failure and future functioning
of the Long March 2E space launch vehicle (SLV) following the
APSTAR II accident, for which a license or other written
approval was required; violated S 126.1(e) concerning prohibited
exports, when they offered defense services (i.e., "proposed")
in connection with the tailed launch of the Apstar II; and also
violated S 127.1(d) when they willfully caused or aided,
abetted, counseled, demanded, induced, procured or permitted the
commission of an act prohibited by a regulation issued pursuant
to 22 U.S.C. S 2778.

Charges 4-14

(43)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, without the required license or other approval
from ODTC, the Failure Investigation Team provided expert
analysis and advice in spacecraft debris, material properties,
video analysis, telemetry, coupled loads, structures and
aerodynamics1 summarized in a 38-page report; when the
spacecraft Team provided expert analysis and advice in assessing
the work of the Failure Team and whether or how the satellite
contributed to the failure, summarized in an 84-page report;
and, when the international oversight Team provided expert
analysis and advice in three meetings held between April and
June 1995 during which the results of the investigation were
discussed.

Charges 15-17

(44)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a)(1) of the Regulations
when, on or about February 10, 1995, without the required
license or other written approval from ODTC, it identified for
Chinese authorities the incorrect seating during flight of the
LV clamp band; diagnosed that LV clamp band slippage was
possibly caused by vibrations and the choice of lubricant on
the band; and recommended review of this area by Chinese
authorities prior to future flights.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              20

Charges 18-20

(45)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a)(l) at the
Regulations when, on or about February 10,1995, without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC, it
identified for Chinese authorities possible design flaws in the
venting system of the payload fairing (or nose cone at the
rocket); compared it to Western standards; and recommended that
Chinese authorities review this area prior to future
launches.

Charges 21-23

(46)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about February 10, 1995, without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC, it
provided for Chinese authorities expert identification of
possible design flaws in the nose dome of the fairing and of
similarities in the probable failure of the nose dome for both
Apstar II and Optus B2 detected by Respondents' analysis of
payload fairing debris recovered from the two accidents.

Charges 24-25

(47)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about February 9-10, 1995 and May 8,
1995, without the required license or other written approval
from ODTC, it provided for Chinese authorities expert
identification of inaccuracies, omissions and the like
associated with Chinese debris investigation and, further,
provided insights into U.S. analytical techniques concerning
recovered debris1 which Respondent supported with technical
drawings, photographs and modeling where expedient.

Charges 26-31

(48)     Respondent BSS violated S 1271(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about February 13, 1995 and April 12-13,
1995, without the required license or other written approval
from ODTC, it identified for Chinese authorities telemetry data
as an important - - if not that most important - - source of
information regarding the failure; it disclosed to China how
their (i.e., CALT and CGWIC) analysis of telemetry data revealed
deficiencies with respect to four

________________________________________________________________
                                                              21

areas -- trajectory corrections due to wind shear effects,
incorrect interpretations of accelerometer data, a probable
anomaly with the clamp band, and a probable fault with the
payload fairing venting process --; and it outlined for China
the history of the flight compiled from telemetry data,
including seventy-seven individual points that were critical to
the Respondents' analysis.

Charges 32-36

(49)     Respondent ESS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about February 13, 1995 and May 8, 1995,
without the required license or other written approval from
ODTC, it jointly conducted with Chinese authorities a
re-analysis of the coupled load analysis (CLA)29, in which
expert advice was shared by Respondent with respect to U.S.
expertise in modeling, calculations and methodologies in order
to affirm or critique pre-flight modeling conducted by the
Chinese, alone, and to demonstrate, in particular, deficiencies
in china’s pre-flight CLA with respect to its failure to account
for high winds aloft and buffeting and the Long March 2E's
guidance system failure to compensate for upper level winds.

----------------------------------------------------------------
29  CLA simulates and assesses interplay of the loads on the SLV
during flight, including interaction of the SLV and the
satellite.  The Respondents concluded that the Chinese had not
performed an analysis of the cantilevered loads from the payload
stack to the fairing and, hence, had no real idea of the true
loads on the fairing arising from wind shear and buffeting.
Respondents have maintained as at December 3, 2002, that they
did not "jointly conduct" a CLA and that all they did "was check
to be sure chat it (Hughes) had properly prepared the Hughes
data for the CLA" and did not overlook anything.  (See December
3, 2002 letter from Turk to Lowell.)  However, according to
information in Respondents' own files, the coupled loads team
"reviewed all of the coupled loads analysis information that was
available...  - They compared the flight data from the
spacecraft accelerometers that have flown on the Long March, the
Atlas, and the Ariane.  They traveled to Beijing to work beside
the CALT engineers to review and participate in the Coupled
Loads Analysis methodology. (emphasis added)  They expanded the
standard spacecraft dynamic model (normally good to 75 Hz) to be
valid up to 100 Hz."  See HSC 002803.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              22

Charges 37-38

(50)     Respondent ESS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about March 8, 1995, without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC, it
compared and contrasted for Chinese authorities China's CLA with
Western expert analysis related to the U.S. Atlas and French
Ariane SLVs.

Charge 39

(51)     Respondent BSS violated S l27.l(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about June 14, 1995, without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC,
Respondent's consultant furnished to Chinese authorities in a
letter dated June 14, 1995, addressed to Liu Zhixiong (CGWIC
Vice President) and Donald Cromer (HSC Vice President)
conclusions with respect to the APSTAR II launch failure, as
well as its likely cause and suggestions for further evaluation
by China.30

Charges 40-41

(52)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about March 15, 1995,31 without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC, it
provided to Chinese authorities the results of an analysis of
China's payload fairing and identified flaws in the rivets used
to secure the zipper area of the fairing.32

Charges 42-43

----------------------------------------------------------------
30  Respondents assert that the characterization of the IOT team
member as "Respondents' consultant" is a mischaracterization and
chat in sending the referenced letter, the person was acting as
an independent member of the lOT and not as Hughes' agent.
However, information available to ODTC confirms that Respondents
in fact, arranged this person's participation in the IOT and
that Respondents viewed him as their "consultant."

31  See Apstar 2 Failure Investigation Report Structure's Group
Status Report of March 15, 1995.

32  A "zipper" holds the fairing’s two halves together.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              23

(53)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (l) of the
Regulations when, without the required license or other written
approval from ODTC, it identified for Chinese authorities
possible design flaws and improper installation associated with
the launch vehicle clamp band.33

Charges 44-45

(54)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.l(a)(1) of the
Regulations when, without the required license or other written
approval from ODTC, it identified material and design faults
with the Chinese-manufactured interface adapter and recommended
to China more detailed analyses and development tests on
specific interface hardware and integrated spacecraft, third
stage and adapters for the future.34

Charge 46

(55) Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the Regulations
when, on or about April 21, 1995, without the required license
or other written approval from ODTC, it provided to Sun Jiadong
copies of the APSTAR II failure review charts and the APSTAR II
failure review status report.

Charge 47

(56)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about April 24, 1995, without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC it
provided to a third country foreign national 35 copies of the
same (as in Charge 45. above) APSTAR II failure review charts
and the APSTAR II failure review status report.

Charges 48-55

(57)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about May 22, May 23 and June 5, 1995.
without the required license or other written approval

----------------------------------------------------------------
33  See Apstar 2 Failure Review Management Splinter Meeting of
April 12, 1995.

34  See Structure's Group Status Report of April 12, 1995.

35  Pierre Madon, a foreign national member of the APSTAR II
launch failure international oversight team.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              24


from ODTC, it provided briefings to Sun Jiadong and the same
third country foreign national (as in Charge 47, above)
concerning LM-2E failure conclusions; telemetry information;
response to CALT video; and, interstage conclusions.

Charges 56-60

(58)     Respondent BSS violated S 1271(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about October 25, 1995, at a meeting in
Beijing, without the required license or other written approval
from ODTC, it provided detailed briefings to Chinese authorities
and APT (as well as other foreign persons) concerning the APSTAR
II failure investigative process, its summary conclusions,
failure scenarios, fishbone diagram and corrective actions.

Charge 61

(59)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about October 31, 1995, at a meeting in
Munich, without the required license or other written approval
from ODTC, it provided similar briefings (as in Charges 56-60,
above) to fifty-one foreign persons representing insurance
underwriters.

Charge 62

(60)     The Respondents violated S 126.1(e) of the Regulations
when they tailed, until directed to do so in writing by ODTC in
May 1996, to inform ODTC of the actual transfer of defense
services they had made, or knew or had reason to know of, as
outlined above, to a country prohibited by S 126.1(a).


INTELSAT 708

Charges 63-64

(61)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.l(a) (1) at the
Regulations when, on or about March 9, 1996, it conducted a
survey of the crash site of the INTELSAT 708 spacecraft and
China's Xichang space launch facility and on or about March 10,
1996, it described for Chinese authorities twenty-five (25)
corrective actions chat China needed to implement at the Xichanq
space launch facility in order to ensure

________________________________________________________________
                                                              25


Respondents' commitment to the launch of APSTAR lA on the Long
March 3 SLV.36

Charge 65

(62)     Respondent BSS violated S 121.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about April 15-16, 1996, without a
license or other written approval from ODTC it participated in a
briefing hosted by Chinese authorities on the Long March 3B
failure and outlined its (Respondent's) findings for the benefit
of insurance brokers from the aforesaid launch site survey of
the crash.

Charge 66-67

(63)     Respondent BSS (formerly HSC violated S 126.1(e) of the
Regulations when on or about April 16, 1996, it agreed to the
charter for an Independent Review Committee (IRC) proposed by
Chinese authorities for the INTELSAT 708 launch failure
investigation which charter itself contemplated the transfer of
defense services to a country referred to in S 126.1, without a
license or other written approval from ODTC and Respondent HE
also violated S 126.1(e) when it failed to immediately inform
ODTC of the proposed transfer, HE having known of the proposed
investigation as a result of its senior management's visit to
the PRC on the proposal after April 9, 1996.

----------------------------------------------------------------
36 Respondents have maintained as of December 3, 2002 (ID) that the
25 action items were authorized under the Commerce license
pursuant to "Go/No Go Criteria Exchange" and "Safety Plans."
However, Respondents own tiles indicate that they, themselves,
did not consider the 25 action items to be covered under the
rubric of range safety; certainly there is no basis in practice
to support any such interpretation by Respondents.  See HSC's
June 27, 1996 Report to ODTC on Alleged Violations of the ITAR
(p. 4).  More fundamentally, it is clear that the 25 action items
related principally to the repair of the launch facility (i.e.,
"items to be fixed or replaced"; e.g., windows, electrical
supply, etc.), that repair of a space launch facility is
quintessentially a defense service, and that assistance in the
repair of the launch facility is expressly prohibited by the
U.S.-PRC bilateral agreement.

37 Respondents maintain that the general prohibition on
proposals to furnish defense services to countries

________________________________________________________________
                                                              26

Charge 68

(64)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, oh or about April 26, 1996, without a license
or other written approval from ODTC its chief scientist, one of
two expert representatives in the IRC, discussed thoroughly with
GW Aerospace 38 possible failure causes other than the control
and guidance, including engine performance and structural issues
associated with Long March 3B.39

----------------------------------------------------------------
proscribed at S 126.1 does not apply in this instance because
the agreement of their experts to the defense services envisaged
in the IRC charter proposed by Chinese authorities does not meet
what they consider to be a limiting definition of "proposals" in
S 126.8.  However, that latter provision merely details the
procedures to be followed for prior notification and prior
approval (which Respondents did not follow in any case) when
proposals are made to sell or transfer significant military
equipment; it does not provide a limiting definition of the term
“proposal” as used in S 126.1(e).  In fact, the term "proposal"
as used in S 126.1(e) appropriately covers the acceptance of
proposals made to U.S. persons by senior military authorities of
proscribed destinations, as well as proposals initiated by U.S.
persons.  In the case of the IRC charter, each member, including
Respondents' personnel, agreed to the terms of the charter.
Regardless of how "proposals" with regard to proscribed
countries may be initiated, S 126.1(e) makes abundantly clear
that it is the policy of the Department of State to deny such
proposals.

38  GW Aerospace is a U.S. based consulting firm owned by CGWIC.

39  Respondents have contended as of December 3, 2002, that the
purpose of the meeting was simply for Steinhauer to be brought
up to date on the results of the recent IRC meeting in Palo Alto
and that information flow in this meeting was from GW Aerospace
to their chief scientist Steinhauer - not the other way around.
However, Mr. Steinhauer’s own report of the meeting with GW
Aerospace is at odds with this contention as he describes
detailed technical discussions between himself and Huang Zuoyi,
the former chief designer of the Long March 2C while at CALT:
"Thoroughly discussed the possibility of any other than control
& guidance system failure causes, specifically including the
eight-engine

________________________________________________________________
                                                              27


Charges 69-77

(65)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about April 10, 1996, without a license
or other written approval from ODTC, its chief scientist
transmitted nine questions concerning the launch failure
investigation by facsimile to GW Aerospace for forwarding, in
turn, to the Long March program office in Beijing, which
questions were provided "in order to ensure that the anticipated
Chinese failure report considered specific Concerns related to
the LM-3B failure and impact the cause of the failure may have
on Hughes decision to launch APSTAR lA satellite."40

----------------------------------------------------------------
performance and structural issues."  Also, "discussed the
eight-engine versus four-engine lift-off vibration and acoustic
environment at the IMU" and that "unusual acoustic reflections
could be involved" which "CALT will look at...."  In addition,
Huang and Steinhauer discussed the details of the specific area
where CALT believes the failure site to be located, leading
Steinhauer to conclude that the Chinese probably have a very
poor design with respect to manufacturability, particularly in
respect to the soldering procedures in the LM3B IMU final
assembly.

40  Facsimile transmission from Steinhauer to Tian Guodang of GW
Aerospace.  Again, Respondents have asserted as of December 3,
2002, that these questions were about the LM 3B and concerned
tests that were performed prior to flight.  which cannot qualify
as defense services.  Even had these questions generally
concerned prior tests (which they did not).  Respondents'
conclusion would still be wrong as such questions would
nonetheless serve to direct Chinese authorities in their
investigations to help explain the launch failure. However, in
this instance the questions, themselves, were clearly,
designed to lead to the identification of the root cause of the
failure for purposes of assuaging insurance underwriters and do
not generally concern prior tests.  For example, question no. 4)
was:  "Did problem occur in flight after lift-off, or was it
pre­existing?"  Question no. 7) was: "Explain three oscillations
during 22's flight?"  Question no. 9) was:  "Understand that launch
vehicle platform at pad was rotated in order to correct for
laser alignment of launch azimuth very close to lift-off of the
LM 3B.  Describe this activity and its implications on the launch
performance." 

________________________________________________________________
                                                              28


Charges 78-101

(66)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.l(a)(l) of the
Regulations when, without a license or other written approval
from 0DTC, during the first IRC meeting (April 22-24, 1996, Palo
Alto), together with other international experts who comprised
the IRC, it delineated for Chinese authorities twenty-four areas
41 for further technical investigation and/or analysis upon
concluding that simulation tests and other analysis presented to
the IRC by CGWIC and CALT could not fully explain why, where or
when the Long March rocket's inertial measurement unit (IMU)
failed.  Delineation of the twenty-tour areas was for the
purpose of identifying critical details of the failure mode then
unanswered and of identifying corrective action by Chinese
authorities based on the most likely cause(s) of the LM-3B
failure and the isolation of these causes from the PRC's LM-3
rocket to be used for the, then, upcoming launch of APSTAR lA
manufactured by Respondent.

Charges 102-112

(67)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations during the second IRC meeting (April 30-May 1, 1996,
Beijing), when, without a license or other approval from ODTC,
after reviewing extensive documentation provided by Chinese
authorities and interviewing or hearing presentations from over
one hundred Chinese engineers and technical personnel, together
with other international experts, it joined other IRC members in
furnishing unauthorized defense services in eleven areas.42

----------------------------------------------------------------
41  These 24 areas set forth in the form of detailed technical
questions and/or guidance or recommendations for specific
follow-up analysis covered a range of potential factors
associated with design, operation, manufacturing, testing and
performance of PRC rockets, including the LM-3B, LM-3 and
LM-2E.

42  Specifically, the IRC; (1) concurred that the most likely
failure mode was the inertial platform; (2) urged the Chinese to
perform additional hardware in the loop testing or (3) computer
analysis to simulate the complete failure cycle; recommended (4)
additional acceptance test procedure, (5) design for
producibility, (6) reliability operation, and (7) better IMU
assembly procedure; (8) validated that the

________________________________________________________________
                                                              29

Charge 113-114

(68)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, without a license or other written approval
from ODTC, on or about May 1, 1996, it suggested to other IRC
members, some of whom were foreign persons within the meaning of
the Regulations, that the Beijing Control Institute should set
up a way to incorporate an intermittent wire into their control
simulation test and demonstrate the exact proposed failure
scenario responses, such that China could confirm or refute its
prior conclusion as to the cause of the failure 43 and when it
suggested that a higher fidelity failure scenario test be
performed in the CALT Control Institute laboratory.

Charge 115

(69)     Respondent BSS violated S 126.1(e) of the Regulations
when it tailed to inform ODTC of the planned export of the IRC
report to Chinese authorities.


APMT and Sino-Canada

Charges 116-117

(70)     Respondents violated S 130.9 of the Regulations when
they failed to make timely disclosure of $5 million in
commissions paid and promised to Sino-Canada in connection with
the procurement of the APMT satellite and also violated S
127.1(d) when they willfully caused, aided, abetted, counseled,
demanded1 induced, procured or permitted the

----------------------------------------------------------------
LM-3 and LM-3B inertial platforms are separate and distinct
owing to the LM-3's different inner gimbals drive circuit and
redundancy by design; and specified additional test/analysis
verification in three areas (9-11) continued study by the
Chinese of the telemetered 15 Hz resonant frequency (to include
interviews of technical personnel who installed the IMU); and
drawing up of a detailed list of IMUs of the LM 3A, 3B and 3C
(to include their production, assembly, test locations and
mission assignments).

43  May 1, 1996, Steinhauer email to Herron regarding Smay test.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              30


omission of an act required by a regulation issued pursuant to
22 U.S.C. S 2779.

APMT and Shen Jun

Charge 118

(71)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.2 of the Regulations
concerning misrepresentation and omission of material facts when
it failed to disclose in connection with the submission of
munitions license application no. 678638 on or about July 9,
1996, that Shen Jun was, in fact, the son of General Shen
Rongjun whose interest and influence Respondents were
cultivating in connection with the APMT procurement and in other
matters concerning satellite-related exports to China more
generally.44

ASIASAT 3

Charges 119-121

(72)     Respondent BSS violated the provisions of S 127.1(a)
(1) when in 1996 its employees provided ASIASAT personnel with
detailed design technical data that exceeded the scope of its
Department of Commerce license (and which was subject to State
Department jurisdiction), without the required license or other
written approval from ODTC, concerning unit-level FECMA, worst
case circuit analysis, and the Xenon Ion propulsion system.

ASTRA 1G/1H

Charges 122-123

(73)     Respondent BSS violated the provisions of S 127.1(a)
(1) when in 1995 its employees improperly

----------------------------------------------------------------
44  As noted at footnote 26, page 11 of this draft charging
letter, Respondents contend that the fact of the son-father
relationship between their employee on the APMT project and the
PLA general officer overseeing the APMT project was not material
to the license application because there is no place on the
license application for disclosing such familial relationships
of their employees with senior military officers of the PRC.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              31


transferred detailed design technical data to SES during a
1995 critical design review for the ASTRA 1G satellite and a
1995 preliminary design review for the ASTRA 1H satellite,
without the required license or other written approval from
ODTC.

* * *

PART III - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

(74)     Pursuant to 22 C.F.R. S 128 administrative proceedings
are instituted against Hughes Electronics Corp., including
Hughes Network Systems, and The Boeing Company Boeing Satellite
Systems (formerly Hughes Space and Communications) for the
purpose of obtaining an Order imposing civil administrative
sanctions that may include the imposition of debarment or civil
penalties.  The Assistant Secretary for Political Military
Affairs shall determine the appropriate period of debarment,
which shall generally be for a period of three years in
accordance with S 127.7 of the Regulations.  Civil penalties,
not to exceed $500,000 per violation, may be imposed in
accordance with S 127.10.

(75)     A Respondent has certain rights in such proceedings as
described in S 128, a copy of which I am enclosing.  You are
required to answer the charging letter within 30 days after
service.  A failure to answer will be taken as an admission of
the truth of the charges.  You are entitled to an oral hearing
if a written demand for one is filed with the answer or within
seven (7) days after service of the answer.  The answer, written
demand for oral hearing (if any) and supporting evidence
required by S 128.5(b) shall be in duplicate and mailed or
delivered to ALJ Docketing Center, U.S. Coast Guard, 40 south
Gay Street, Room 412, Baltimore, MD 21202-4022.  A copy shall be
simultaneously mailed to the Director, Office of Defense trade
Controls. Department of state, 2401 £ Street, NW, Washington,
D.C.  If you do not demand an oral hearing, you must transmit
within seven (7) days after the service of your answer, the
original or photocopies of all correspondence, papers, records,
affidavits, and other documentary or written evidence having any
bearing upon or connection with the matters in issue.  Please he
advised also that charging letters may be amended from time to
time, upon reasonable notice. Furthermore, cases may be settled

________________________________________________________________
                                                              32


through consent agreements, including after service of a
charging letter.

(76)     Please be advised that the U.S. Government is free to
pursue Civil, administrative, and/or criminal enforcement for
violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations.  The Department of State's decision
to pursue one type of enforcement action does not preclude it or
any other department or agency of the United States from
pursuing another type of enforcement action.

(77)     In this regard, please permit me to recall that I have
previously provided you with a copy of a letter dated November
13, 2002, addressed to me by the Assistant Commissioner for
Investigations, U.S. Customs Service, informing me that U.S.
Customs is considering bringing civil forfeiture proceedings
against property owned by you.  Under federal law, property
involved in violations of the AECA and certain other statutes
(e.g., Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 1956) is subject
to civil forfeiture.  This includes real estate that is used to
facilitate these violations.

Sincerely,


William J. Lowell
Director

Enclosures

cc: Artis N. Noel
Counsel
General Motors Corp.

Robert Catania
Chief Counsel
Boeing Satellite Systems, Inc.

Richard Hoglund (Acting)
Assistant Commissioner
(Investigations)
U.S. Customs Service

 

Chinese Space Espionage By Bill Clinton And The Democrats

China At War With The USA

Military Technology for Sale

Dangerous Exports to the Chinese Army

1998 DEFENSE DEPT. REPORT ON HUGHES

HUGHES SATELLITE IMAGE FACILITY FOR THE PLA

CHINESE MISSILE PAGE

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 5/6/03 ARTICLE ON U.S. HIGH-TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA

Read and Learn! As I have said before, this country is been overthrown by those who are owned by the devil with Clinton, John Kerry among others who have sold us out.

All documented with news articles and FOI act papers etc. etc. etc. including a STATE DEPT. CHARGE LETTER TO HUGHES AND BOEING CONCERNING TRANSFER OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA

This is what I used to put on radio in Kansas City and why the Communist wife of the owner got terminated because KCXL1140 owner Pete Schartel is a emasculated form of a man who did not have the courage to stand up for God and the Truth concerning what was being done to this country and by who.

Now you know why the Chinese and Russians were able to catch up with us militarily and now are able to and are preparing to take us off the map. Now you know who is responsible.

And most importantly is the timing…because God allowed this in preparation for this His judgment on we the United States of Sodom and Gomorrah who have rejected Jesus Christ. Those involved in this treason…I can assure you have rejected him too and been in the forefront of that rejection in one form or another and they shall burn in hell.

HUGHES FORMER CEO C. MICHAEL ARMSTRONG
Military Technology for Sale


Dangerous Exports to the Chinese Army

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 5/6/03 ARTICLE ON U.S. HIGH-TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA

CHINESE FSW RECON SATELLITE

KERRY’S SECRET TIES TO BEIJING
SENATOR WON’T TALK ABOUT SPACE TECH TO CHINA

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 5/6/03 ARTICLE ON U.S. HIGH-TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA

HUGHES CEO C. MICHAEL ARMSTRONG

 

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 5/6/03 ARTICLE ON U.S. HIGH-TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA


LONG MARCH 2D PUTS PLA RECON SATELLITE INTO ORBIT

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 11/13/03 ARTICLE ON THE PLA MILITARY SPACE PROJECTS

HUGHES CEO C. MICHAEL ARMSTRONG

NUKES AND SATELLITES FOR CHINA

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 10/09/03 ARTICLE ON NEWSMAX.COM

DOCUMENTS OBTAINED USING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT




SENT BY: HUGHES A/C  3-14-95  ; 1:13PM ;WASHINGTON DC OFFICE   12026475713

WHITE PAPER ON COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITES:
ISSUES AND ANSWERS

Commercial communications satellites have been a powerful force
in promoting democratic change round the world. The sale of
US-manufactured communications satellites has contributed
positively to US balance of payments. The US continues to lead
the world in production and sale of commercial communications
satellites, but this lead is being threatened not only by
foreign competition, but also by unresponsive US export
procedures and practices.

Statement of the Problem

For more than 30 years, the US has led the world in building and
exporting commercial communications satellites. It enjoyed a
virtual monopoly for many years, and up to the late 1970's, all
operating commercial communications satellites were of US
manufacture. Competition was an entirely US affair.

This situation changed dramatically in the last decade.
Japanese, European, and Canadian firms began an aggressive
campaign to surpass the US in the sale and manufacture of
commercial communications satellites and supporting systems.
European firms competed head-to-head with the US satellite
industry, closely matching US companies in quality and often
bettering them in price. Throughout, European industry enjoyed
the aggressive support of their governments. This support was a
vital element, for example, in Aerospatiale's Turksat, Thaisat,
and Arabsat awards. In their marketing discussions with
potential foreign customers, the Europeans consistently promoted
the view that the US satellite manufacturers increasingly were
uncertain and unreliable suppliers because of the US
Government's restrictive export policies.

The US commercial communications satellite industry, the USG,
and the Congress must act now to reverse this situation and
ensure that it does not recur. An appropriate remedy is to
complete the transition of commercial (i.e. non-military)
communications satellites from the United States Munitions List
(USML) which is under State Department jurisdiction to the
Commerce Control List (CCL), which is under Commerce Department
jurisdiction. This jurisdictional change is appropriate since
the national security considerations that initially put
communications satellites on the USML are no longer valid; and
keeping commercial communications satellites on the USML puts US
industry at a competitive disadvantage in the international
telecommunications marketplace.

A Simple Solution

Under current law, many commercial communications satellites are
placed on the USML, rather than the CCL, because they have
characteristics that in the past were unique to military
satellites. Keeping commercial communications satellites on the
USML is no longer warranted. The characteristics, listed below,
now are routinely employed on commercial communications
satellites, many of which are of non-US manufacture:

- Anti-jam Capability (ie. antennas and/or antenna systems with
the ability to respond to incoming interference by adaptively
reducing antenna gain in the direction of the interference). In
today's exploding telecommunications environment, many
commercial customers wish to ensure the veracity and quality of
their signals and protect their systems from spurious commands
and interference. This capability meets a legitimate commercial
need, and is not unique to military use.

- Antennas: (with aperture greater than 30 feet; or with all
sidelobes less than or equal to -35dB; or designed. modified, or
configured to provide coverage area on the surface of the earth
less than 200nm). Commercial mobile services require large
aperture antennas with sensitive receivers. Hughes already is
employing designs for its geosynchronous mobile satellite
systems that include antennas exceeding 30 feet in diameter
commercial use. Control of sidelobe levels for today's
commercial applications is a major antenna design factor
resulting from requirements to control the antenna’s footprint
on the earth, satisfy constraints on orbital location, and meet
efficient communications payload design criteria. The current
and emerging market demand for frequency reuse, antenna spot
beams, and the commercial availability of inespensive ground
terminals are driving antenna footprints to sizes under 200 nm.
This characteristic is no longer a realistic discriminator
between military and commercial systems.

- Crosslinks (ie. intersatellite data relay communication links
that do not involve a ground relay terminal). The use of
crosslinks is another example of readily available technology
that has led to new commercial applications, such as Motorola's
IRIDIUM and Hughes' SPACEWAY. Similar systems are being
developed in Europe and Japan and will have wide spread
commercial applications.

- Baseband Processing (ie. spaceborne baseband processing that
uses any technique other than frequency translation and which
can be changed several times a day on a cbannel-by-channel basis
among previously assigned fixed frequencies). The uses of
on-board processing for commercial applicalions are many,
particularly for the rapidly-emerging mobile commercial
communications marketplace. Its applications range from routine
sorting and routing of incoming calls to maintaining compliance
with prescribed frequency spectrum management.

- Encryption deviecs. Satellites traditionally have been used
for the transmission of sensitive financial and business data
that require absolute integrity and privacy. The encryption
device is a relatively sophisticated equipment item, but is
manufactured for commercial use and, in the case of commercial
communications satellites, it generally is employed to
scramble/unscranibling video and audio programming in order to
protect this data. Once it is embedded in the satellite, the
enctyption device has no military significance.

- Radiation Hardening. Commercial communications satellites
daily operate in a natural radiation environment harmful to
electronic circuits. Hence, they need protection from the
environment in which they operate. This protection comes from
radiation hardened devices embedded in the satellite.

- Perigee Kick Motors. The perigee kick motor is of a type
routinely used to deliver commercial communications satellites
to their proper orbital slots. Using foreign manufactured
perigee kick motors on US-manufactured satellites might work and
alleviate problems associated with the USML, but it would
unnecessarily reduce US content and forfeit revenues to foreign
competition.

The above characteristics arc no longer unique to military
satellites. They are becoming increasingly common to fixed and
mobile communications systems. Hence, they should no longer
serve as the basis for keeping commercial communications
satellites on the USML and off the CCL.

In real terms, bureaucratic change simply has not kept abreast
with technological and economic realities. As a result, many
commercial communications satellites remain on the USML, and
their export is subject to the USML's many restrictions.
Removing commercial communications satellites from the USML and
placing them on the CCL largely would rectify this problem.
Commerce licenses do not require Congressional approval; they
are routinely issued in a more timely fashion; and, relative to
State Depanmcnt licenses, their issuance is less frequently
delayed by sanctions that may be imposed by the State Department
upon customer countries. Moreover, the Department of Commerce
sees promotion of exports as one of its prime roles.

US Export Policy Discriminates Against the Satellite Industry

Cunrent US export policy is applied to commercal communication
satellites in a manner inconsistent with other high-tech,
high-added-value US exports, such as the Boeing 747. The overall
technology content of a Boeing 747-400 is greater than that of
any contemporary commercial communications satellite.

The 747's inertial reference system and avionics exceed in cost,
complexity and sensitivity the satellite’s anti-jam capability,
crosslinks, and antennas. Its on-board computers provide
capability greater than the satellite's baseband processing. The
747's powerful turbofan engines are more sophisticated than any
existing perigee kick motor. Its radars surpass the technology
of the satellite's encryption and radiation hardening devices.

Nonetheless, the Boeing 747, with its state-of-the-art radar,
inertial reference system, fuel management systems, on-board
processors, and antennas, is on the CCL. With but few
exceptions, it can be exported worldwide on a pre-approved
general license.

Moreover, the 747 is delivered intact to customers. This is in
marked contrast to the delivery of a U.S. manufactured
commercial communications satellite which is delivered on orbit
and not examined or touched by the customer.

Like Boeing and other US aircraft manufacturers, the US
satellite industry believes that the new investment by emerging
nations in transportation, telecommunications, and power
generation could total $1 trillion by the end of the decade.
This will help the satellite industry boost exports and create
jobs but only if US policy allows it the freedom to effectively
compete in the global market.

Unnecessary controls adversely affect America's ability to
compete. Tight controls stifle our access to new markets. Tight
controls also serve to discourage customers from buying US, and
ultimately motivate them to accelerate the development of
indigenous capabilities, thus giving them the potential to
compete with US industry.

Conclusion

The global arena in which the US satellite industry once reigned
supreme has irrevocably changed. Foreign competition is keen and
it is abetted by a US export policy that not only discriminates
against satellite manufacturers, but also imposes delays that
call into question their reliability as suppliers. Moving US
manufactured satellites off the TJSML to the CCL will alleviate
this problem, .and should contribute directly to the
competitiveness and growth of the US satellite indusuy.

Recommendation

Remove commercial communications satellites and related data
from the USML and put them on the CCL!

8 March 1995



STATE DEPT. CHARGE LETTER TO HUGHES AND BOEING CONCERNING TRANSFER OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA

CHINESE LONG MARCH & CSS ICBM
CLICK HERE TO READ THE 1/14/3 ARTICLE ON NEWSMAX.COM

United States Department of State

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Office of Defense Trade Controls

Washington, D.C 20037

December 26, 2002

Larry D Hunter
General Counsel
Hughes Electronics Corporation
200 North Sepulveda Boulevard
El Segundo, California 90245-0956

Douglas G. Bain
Senior Vice President & General Counsel
The Boeing Company
100 North Riverside
Chicago, Illinois 60606


Re:      Investigation of Hughes Electronics Corporation and
Boeing satellite Systems (formerly Hughes Space and
Communications) Concerning the Long March 2E and Long March BE
failure investigations, and other satellite-related matters
involving the People's Republic of China

Dear Messrs. Hunter and Bain:

(1)      The Department of State ("Department") charges that
HUGHES ELECTRONICS CORPORATION (hereinafter "Respondent HE",
which includes Hughes Network Systems, Inc.) and BOEING
SATELLITE SYSTEMS (hereinafter "Respondent BSS") formerly HUGHES
SPACE AND COMMUNICATIONS ("HSC") (hereinafter, "Respondents"
when referred to jointly) violated the Arms Export Control Act
("Act") and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
("ITAR" or "Regulation" in connection with their misconduct
related to the January 1995 failed launch of the Long March 2E
rocket carrying the APSTAR II spacecraft1 the February 1996
failed launch of the Long March 3E rocket carrying the INTELSAT
708 spacecraft, and

----------------------------------------------------------------
1 The Boeing Company purchased Hughes Space and Communications
from Hughes Electronics on January 13, 2000

________________________________________________________________
                                                               2

other matters set forth herein concerning their business
activities with China.  One hundred twenty-three (123)
violations are alleged at this time.  The essential facts
constituting the alleged violations and the regulatory or other
provisions involved are described herein.  The Department
reserves the right to amend this charging letter (See 22 C.F.R.
S 128.3(a)), including through a revision to incorporate
additional charges stemming from the same misconduct of the
Respondents in these matters.  Please be advised that this is a
charging letter to impose debarment or civil penalties pursuant
to 22 C.F.R. S 128.3.

* * *

PART I - RELEVANT FACTS


Jurisdictional Requirements

(2)      Respondents HE and BSS are corporations organized under
the laws of the State of Delaware.

(3)      Respondents are -- and were during the period covered
by the offenses set forth herein - - engaged in the manufacture
and export of defense articles and defense services and so
registered with the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade
Controls ("ODTC") in accordance with Section 38 of the Act and S
122.1 of the Regulations.

(4)      Respondents are U.S. persons within the meaning of S
120.15 and, as such, are subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, in particular with regard to the Act and the
Regulations.

(5)      China Academy of Launch Technology ("CALT"), China
Great - Wall Industry Corporation ("CGWIC"), China Satellite
Launch and Tracking Control ("CLTV"), China Aerospace
Corporation ("CASC"), China International Trust & Investment
Company ("CITIC"), China United Telecommunications Satellite
Company, China Overseas Space Development & Investment Company,
Commission for Science, Technology & Industry for National
Defense ("COSTIND"), Sino-Canada Telecommunications and
Investment Management Company, Ltd, Asia Pacific Satellite
Telecommunications Company ("APT" formerly "APSAT"), Asia
Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Company ("APMT") Asian
Satellite Telecommunications Company, Ltd ("ASIASAT"), Societe
Europeene des Satellites ("SES") and

________________________________________________________________
                                                               3

other persons so identified below all are foreign persons within
the meaning of S 120.16 of the Regulations.


US-PRC International Agreements on Space Launch

(6)      on December 17, 1988, the United States and the
People's Republic of China ("PRC") signed an international
agreement in Washington, DC. entitled "Memorandum of Agreement
on Satellite Technology safeguards Between the Governments of
the United States and the People's Republic of China," which
entered into force upon signature. This agreement specifies the
security procedures to be followed for launch of
U.S.-manufactured satellites from the territory of the PRC and
also expressly prohibits U.S. persons from providing "any
assistance" to the PRC relating to the design, development,
operation, maintenance, modification, or repair of the launch
facility or launch vehicle.2


OPTUS B2

(7)      On December 21, 1992, a PRC Long March 2E space launch
vehicle ("SLV") carrying the OPTUS B2 satellite manufactured by
Respondents exploded shortly after liftoff from China’s space
launch facility (Xichanq Launch Center). The satellite was
exported to the PRC for launch pursuant to a State Department
munitions license issued by ODTC, which provided for U.S.
Government (i.e., through Department of Defense personnel)
monitoring of all phases of the launch

----------------------------------------------------------------
2 The 1988 Agreement was superceded upon entry into force by a
similar U.S.-PRC agreement done at Beijing on February 11, 1993,
containing the same prohibition.  The agreement also bars the
PRC from seeking such assistance and, together with the
prohibition on the provision by U.S. persons of such assistance,
provides the fundamental conditions sine qua non the United
States has licensed the export of commercial satellites to the
PRC for launch into outer space.  The requirement to comply with
these bilateral agreements has been routinely incorporated as a
condition of the export license authorizations provided by ODTC
to U.S. satellite manufacturers.  See para. (7) above.  In a
letter dated December 3, 2002, Respondent's stated their view
that the agreement (rather than reflecting a ban on the
provision of assistance by U.S. persons) is more accurately
described as reflecting a mutual understanding of the PRC and
the USC.

________________________________________________________________
                                                               4

and which required that all of Respondents' employees and agents
conform strictly to the aforesaid Satellite Technology
Safeguards Agreement, specifically by prohibiting "any  ..
technical assistance whatsoever to its (Respondents') Chinese
counterparts which might assist China to design, develop or
enhance the performance of any of its contemplated or existing
Long March launch vehicles or missiles."

(8)      Following the OPTUS B2 failed launch, the Respondents
concluded that the PRC's SLV nose cone (or fairing) was a
principal cause of the failure and sought advice from ODTC on
whether a license would be granted to hold discussions with the
PRC on this matter, following which consultation with ODIC the
Respondents concluded that "a license request would almost
certainly be denied (by ODTC) if even the slightest possibility
or inference, real or perceived, remained undispelled (sic)
that the technical data could directly or indirectly impact PRC
ballistic missile interests."3  In the event, the Respondents
decided not to seek a license from ODTC, but did proceed to
conduct a launch failure investigation into the causes of the
OPTUS B2 SLV failure, which would inform their approach in
subsequent matters, described below.4

----------------------------------------------------------------
3  April 9, 1993, memorandum from Majors (Hughes Washington
Director for International Affairs) to Leedle (Hughes Technology
Export Control Coordinator).

4  While there is information available to ODTC indicating that
violations of the Act and the Regulations occurred in the OPTUS
B2 matter, it has decided not to bring charges owing to the
passage of time and contradictory recollections of persons
involved in these matters, and the further opinion that the
charges detailed herein provide an adequate basis for addressing
the underlying patterns of misconduct.  The Respondents do not
deny their failure to obtain a license, but maintain they
obtained approval from a Department of Defense monitor prior to
making disclosures to the Chinese.  Respondents also assert that
the Department "well knows" that their decision not to seek a
license "coincided with a decision not to furnish any
information that could qualify as technical data or a defense
service."  However, the Department has no such understanding or
knowledge; quite the opposite is true: The Respondents have
repeatedly asserted throughout this investigation that none of
their conduct in any of the matters touched on in this

________________________________________________________________
                                                               5

APSTAR II


(9)      On January 26, 1995, a PRC Long March 2E space launch
vehicle ("SLV") carrying the APSTAR II satellite exploded
shortly after liftoff tram China's space launch facility. The
APSTAR IL satellite was also manufactured by the Respondents
pursuant to a contract with the Asia-Pacific satellite
Telecommunications company ("APT") located in Hong Kong, which
was then and remains today "owned or controlled" (as these terms
are understood in the Regulations at S 122) by various PRC
entities.  The APSTAR II satellite had been exported to the PRC
launch pursuant to an export license issued by the Department of
Commerce.  That export license, while not requiring U.S.
Government monitoring of the launch or other specific
prohibitions on assistance to China's SLV program (unlike the
earlier State Department licenses for OPTUS B2 and the first
APSTAR satellite), also did not --indeed, lawfully could not --
provide -authorization for Respondents to engage in the unlawful
conduct alleged below in violation of the Act and the
Regulations.5

----------------------------------------------------------------
charging letter qualifies as a "defense service" either because
it excluded technical data (in their opinion) or because it is
Constitutionally protected "speech", while ODTC has repeatedly
admonished Respondents and their attorneys that the AECA and
ITAR properly regulate on U.S. security and foreign policy
grounds the conduct of U.S. persons who aid and abet the space
launch and/or intercontinental ballistic missile programs of
foreign powers, that Respondents are improperly conflating the
laws and regulations governing the conduct of their corporations
abroad in respect to foreign space and missile programs with the
laws and regulations governing the exercise of "speech" (which
are in no manner at issue here) and that, because of security
and foreign policy considerations, the United States has long
held by the ITAR (with which regulations Respondents are fully
familiar) that a defense service requiring approval by ODTC of a
technical assistance agreement may occur even when all the
information relied on in furnishing the defense service to a
foreign power is in the public domain.

5 Hughes initially received approval from the State Department
in March 1993 17 or the APSAT (later termed APSTAR) program,
which was then defined to cover two series 376

________________________________________________________________
                                                               6

(10)     Following the APSTAR II launch failure, the
Respondents, APT, CGWIO and the insurance firm, Johnson &
Higgins, signed a memorandum of understanding in which they
agreed "to cooperate with each other in a Spirit of mutual
benefit and cooperation to prepare information concerning the
APSTAR-2 mission failure...  Each of the parties will use their
best efforts to prepare the necessary information as soon as
possible to assist APT’S business operations..- APT, Hughes and
OGWIC agree that they will each cooperate and coordinate all
investigations of the probable cause of

----------------------------------------------------------------
satellites for APT, Ltd. in Hong Kong. However, in August 1993
the State Department imposed missile sanctions (Category 2) and
determined that the export of communications satellites
containing Missile Technology Control Regime ("MTCR") Category 2
items to the sanctioned Chinese entities was prohibited and
suspended access to any MTCR related technology by PRC
nationals.  In January 1994 the State Department terminated the
suspension with respect to all PRC nationals, but continued to
prohibit access to any MTCR related technology by any PRC
national affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace
Industry or any Chinese government activity relating to missile
development or production, electronics, space systems or
equipment, and military aircraft.  Ten such Chinese activities
were enumerated as examples to Hughes, including CGWIO, CASC, et
alia.  Faced with these developments in USC policy, Hughes had
in the interim redefined the second APSTAR satellite based on
its 601 series and, in the interim (November 1993), sought and
received approval for the export of this satellite from the
Department of Commerce.  The Respondents have maintained (most
recently in a letter dated December 3, 2002, that no violation
occurred in this matter because the Department of Commerce was
"well within its authority" to approve release of the launch I
failure material that was given to the Chinese in the APSTAR II
failure investigation through a commodity classification (CCATS
#G000824, dated August 26, 1995).  However, the record indicates
Respondents knew chat the Apstar II launch failure investigation
was properly within the coverage of the ITAR and, hence,
required Department of State approval; in any case, the
Department of Commerce has said it erred in that matter.

________________________________________________________________
                                                               7

failure of the APSTAR-2 mission in a spirit of mutual benefit."6

(11)     By letter dated January 31, 1995, Respondents informed
PRC authorities that "Hughes is prepared to fully cooperate with
you in investigating this failure so that we may quickly resume
launches of the Long March. I have instructed our people to make
available whatever data and resources are required to understand
the cause and fix the problem.  Again, I want to make clear that
I strongly support our mutual cooperation, including meaningful
technology transfer, and I am prepared to bring the full
capability of Hughes to the partnership."7

(12)     Notwithstanding the established prohibitions and
restrictions contained in the US-PRC bilateral agreement, which
formed an essential basis for the launch of all U.S.
manufactured satellites from the PRC, and notwithstanding
Respondents’ careful understanding of these prohibitions and
restrictions (from prior discussions with and licenses approved
by ODTC), Respondents took numerous actions, some of which are
described herein, in violation of the Act and the Regulations.
Notably, Respondents decided to form and direct a launch failure
investigation beginning in January 1995 and continuing
throughout much of that year.  The investigation involved the
formation of several groups of leading technical experts from
China and the U.S., which throughout the investigation engaged
in an extensive exchange of technical data and analysis,
producing a wide range of unauthorized technology transfers and
the violations enumerated in PART II, below.8  Additionally,
both

----------------------------------------------------------------
6  Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Mission Failure,
dated January 26, 1995, between He Kerang, APT Satellite co,.,
Ltd., Yu Pusheng, China Great Wall Industry Corp., Donald
Cromer, Hughes Space and Communications and Paul B. O’Connor,
Johnson & Higgins Insurance Company.  

7  Letter dated January 31, 1995, from Steven Dorfman, Senior
Vice President, GM Hughes Electronics to Minister Liu Jiyuan.
China Aerospace Corporation.

8 An HSC facsimile message dated May 14, 1995, describes the
scope of technical interchange with APT officials; "(W)e of
course briefed APT about everything, including the fairing
concerns.  APT had been present in all of the failure meetings
to date, and has copies of everything from both sides."

________________________________________________________________
                                                               8

parties contracted an independent investigation team of private
consultants and aerospace industry experts.9

(13)     At no time did the Respondents seek or receive a
license or other written approval concerning the conduct of
their APSTAR II failure investigation with PRC authorities or
the experts who participated in that investigation as required
by Section 38 of the Act and relevant provisions of the
Regulations.  Such approval would not, of course, have been
forthcoming in view of the established legally binding
prohibition in the 1993 (and predecessor) US-PRC agreement and
as reflected in the prohibitions and limitations contained in
prior export authorizations related to China that ODTC had
furnished to Respondents.  This said, Respondents HE and BSS
have continued to maintain that the reason no written approval
was sought was because none was required.10

(14)     Instead, a March 21, 1995, internal memorandum of
Respondents summarized the corporate strategy for the APSTAR II
failure investigation:

----------------------------------------------------------------
9  Indeed, the scale and depth of technical assistance furnished
to Chinese authorities in this matter is indicated by the
organizational structure of the failure investigation: a Failure
Investigation Team was formed to examine all aspects of the
failure, including the satellite and rocket and "external
interfaces" with CALT, CGWIC, et al, and produced a 38 page
report based on the work of seven specialized sub-teams
(spacecraft debris, material properties, video analysis,
telemetry, coupled loads, structures and aerodynamics) drawing
on the experiences of members who also worked on the Optus
failure; & Spacecraft Focus Team reviewed the work of the
Failure Investigation Team and produced an 84-page report
assessing whether and how the satellite might have been a
contributing factor in the failure; an Independent Review Team
provided Respondents with an independent assessment of the work
of the other teams; an International Oversight Team reviewed the
work of both sides and included representatives of China and
Respondents, as well as third party foreign nationals.  The IQT
met on three separate occasions between April and June.

10 December 3, 2002, Letter to ODTC Director Lowell from HEC/BSS
Counsel Randall Turk, Esq (Baker Botts).

________________________________________________________________
                                                               9

     "(I)n the 82 (OPTUS 82) investigation, communication
     between companies was limited due to Government Monitor
     oversight from DOS (Department of State) and fear by the
     Chinese that Hughes was trying to prove that the fairing
     was at fault.... (K)eep communication open with the Chinese
     long enough to get the information needed to understand
     the fairing and the rocket - Without Government monitor
     (now under the Department of Commerce license) and without
     the appearance of pointing our finger, the Chinese have
     been much more open to giving data we need."11


(15)     This strategy was further influenced by Respondents'
business interests in securing future contracts with the PRC and
with Asian satellite companies in which PRC influence figured
prominently, and concern that U.S. Government policy constraints
on technology transfer as administered by ODTC were an
impediment to achieving these interests.  A May 2, .1995,
internal memorandum of Respondents regarding a meeting with APT,
summarizes this assessment:

     "ARSTAR 2 and APMT decisions (discussed further below) will
     be within a global context (technology transfer, launch
     vehicle commitments, long term manufacturing partnership
     with China).  Key to that global context is technology
     transfer.  This made it extremely clear that it is time for
     Hughes to either "put up or shut up" in regard to meeting
     their (sic) previously stated commitment of transferring
     technology to China.  If we want to win APT (APMT) Hughes
     must make real commitment to transferring technology to
     China.12

INTELSAT 708 and APSTAR lA

(16)     On June 23, 1995, the Department of Commerce approved
an export license for Respondents to export the APSTAR lA
satellite to China for launch on the Long March 3B 5EV and sale
to APT.  The Commerce license specifically

----------------------------------------------------------------
11  Hughes Space and Communications Company document dated March
21, 1995, Strategy for APSTAR Failure Investigation.

12  Hughes Space and Communications facsimile message dated May
2, 1995, from Steven Dorfman to John Konrad et al., Subject:
Status and Recommendations May 2 Meeting with APT.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              10

provided, in part, that “technical data or assistance related to
the design, development, operation1 maintenance, modification,
or repair of the Chinese launch vehicle is not authorized under
this license.13

(17)     On February 15, 1996, the PRC’s Long March 3B SLV
crashed during a tailed attempt to launch the INTELSAT 708
satellite manufactured by Space Systems/Lora]- ("SS/L") -

(18)     On February 22, 1996, Respondents' Chairman at the
Board wrote to Chinese General Shen Rongjun (then Deputy
Director of the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry
for National Defense "COSTIND") and asked "if there is anything
we at Hughes Space and Communications can do to support your
investigation into the cause of the loss (i.e., LM 3B and
INTELSAT 708)."14  The next day, February 23, 1996, Respondents'
Chairman wrote to Major General Hu Shixiang, Director of the
Xichang Satellite Launch Center, to assure him of his "personal
support and that of my company as you investigate the causes for
the loss."

(19)     On March 9, 1996, Respondents’ personnel met with
Xichang launch center authorities, toured the crash site,
conducted a site survey, and developed a list of twenty-five
items that required resolution before the launch of APSTAR lit
could take place later that year, which launch was slated to
rely on the LM 3 SLV.15

----------------------------------------------------------------
13  Department of Commerce export license no. D-219965.

14  Respondents maintain that the CEO Cromer letters were merely
an expression of condolence for the deaths of Chinese citizens.
It is true that the letter to Major General Hu Shixiang (but not
the letter to General Shen Rongjun) did offer condolences for
the loss of life in its introductory paragraph as follows:
"Please allow me to express my sincere condolences for the loss
of the Long March 3B carrying Intelsat 708.  I was particularly
saddened to learn there may have been a number of lives lost,
including some of your own personnel.  I was gratified to hear,
however that damage to your facilities was relatively light and
I know you will soon be fully operational once again."

15  Respondents suggest their motive for this activity, which
concerned chiefly repairs of the facility, was to ensure the
safety of their own personnel and have continued to assert that
"the site survey was perfectly lawful" (December 3 letter from
Turk to Lowell. However, this assertion also 

________________________________________________________________
                                                              11

(20)     On March 10, 1996, Respondents' personnel presented
CALT, CGWIC, and APT with the results of its survey.

(21)     On March 14, 1996, Respondents' personnel met in
Beijing with APT, CLTC, OMIT, CGWIC and representatives of the
international insurance industry in which Respondents and
Chinese authorities were informed that: (a) a final report on
the root causes of the INTELSAT 708 launch failure would be
required, as well as (b) a review of the report by an
independent oversight team.  These requirements were fully
consistent with the groundwork already laid by Respondents who
had already informed Chinese authorities on March 10, 1996, that
more information would be needed to convince the insurance
underwriters that an adequate investigation had been conducted
to isolate the cause of the LM-3B failure and that a detailed
presentation would be needed to convince the, underwriters that
the LM-3 launch vehicle (slated to launch Respondents' APSTAR lA
satellite) was substantially different from the LM-3B and thus
did not run the risk of experiencing the same failure.

(22)     Chinese authorities initially invited Respondents to
head up the oversight team for INTELSAT 708 (as it had done for
OPTUS B2 and APSTAR II), but in the event, Respondents declined
and opted to participate in an SS/L led investigation.16

----------------------------------------------------------------
ignores the fact that the prohibition on assistance to the PRC
launch program extends explicitly to the PRC launch "facility"
(See para. 6, above), as long stated in the US-PRC bilateral
agreement.  

16 Apparently in order "not to rock the boat" while an export
license application for yet another satellite export involving
China (ie, APMT) was undergoing review in the USG (April 8,
1996, memorandum from Herron to Cromer) and in light of
Respondents' assumption that SS/L's chairmanship would act as a
"buffer" for it (e.g... an April 9, 1996 response to Herron from
Steinhauer opines that "it is in HSC advantage to stay engaged.
An outside consultant may buffer HSC somewhat relative to the
technology transfer issue."  Also, a May 6, 1996, message to
SS/L from Steinhauer referring to "detailed suggestions for
specific testing in the controls laboratory, for specific fixes
to the IMU (inertial measurement unit) single point wire solder
joint

________________________________________________________________
                                                              12

(23)     Notwithstanding the Respondents' decision to opt for a
lower profile in the 1996 SS/L-led failure investigation by the
Independent Review Committee,17 they nevertheless participated
fully in the 1996 launch failure investigation both through the
assignment of two top technical personnel, often playing a
leadership role both within the IRC in troubleshooting problems,
and independent of the IRC, through separate, technical meetings
with Chinese authorities.  For example:

  (a)  On April 10, 1996, Respondents personnel faxed nine
  questions pertaining to the LM 3B failure to GW Aerospace
  Corporation, a U.S.-based consulting company owned by CGWIC,
  which were to be forwarded to the LM 3B program office in
  Beijing "in order to ensure that the anticipated.  Chinese
  failure report considered specific concerns related to the LM
  3B failure ... and impact the cause may have on Hughes
  decision to launch the ABSTAP. lA satellite."18

  (b)  On April 25, 1996, Respondents personnel met with GW
  Aerospace personnel to discuss questions drafted in
  preparation for the second IRC meeting, in which Respondents'
  personnel subsequently reported that they had "thoroughly
  discussed the possibility of any other control and guidance
  system failure causes, specifically including the eight-engine
  performance and structural issues.  We discussed the
  eight-engine (LM 3B) versus four-engine (LM

----------------------------------------------------------------
failure" notes that "the committee could be approaching the
border of technology transfer, i.e., how to improve the launch
vehicle" and asks "will SS/L be the filter for tech transfer
issues?"  (Respondents maintain that, despite appearances to the
contrary, there is no connection between any of the preceding
discussions and "the decision for Loral to take the lead with
respect to oversight of the investigation.")

17  Charges associated with SS/L's conduct related to the IRC
were resolved through a Consent Agreement entered into between
SS/L, Loral Space & Communications and the Department in January
2032.

19  Hughes Space and Communications facsimile transmission dated
April 10, 1996, from R. Steinhauer, Hughes Chief Scientist, to
Tian Guodang, GW Aerospace Corporation, Subject: Questions for
the APSTAR lA Insurance Meeting.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              13

  3A) lift off vibration and acoustic environment at the IMU.
  CALT will have to investigate this further."19

  (c) On April 30 and Pay 1, 1996, Respondents in a "splinter
  group" of IRC experts concerned with attitude control advised
  the Chinese of tests that could be done using equipment
  available at CALT's factory in order to replicate the launch
  failure and confirm the Chinese theory of the IMU in the LM-3B
  failure scenario, as well as differences between the LM 3B and
  LM 3 IMUs.20

APMT and Sino-Canada

(24)     On May 8, 1998, Respondents announced that they had
concluded a contract with Asia Pacific Mobile Telecommunications
Satellite (APMT), a company sponsored by Chinese and Singapore
partners, for a satellite based mobile phone system.  The turnkey
system was to include two satellites to be launched from China
on the Long March 3B SLV, five gateways, one network operations
center, one satellite operations center and an initial purchase
of 70,000 user terminals, with the ground network equipment and
handsets to be provided by HUGHES NETWORK SYSTEMS.21

(25)     APMT's Chinese shareholders and partners included
China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, China
United Telecommunications Satellite Company, China Overseas
Space Development & Investment Company.

(26)     In June 1995 Sino-Canada Telecommunications and
Investment Management Company, Ltd. was incorporated in
Macao, having its principal place of business at the Hotel
Fortuna, in order to explore telecommunications

----------------------------------------------------------------
19  Email message from R. Steinhauer to John Smay et al. dated
April 26, 1996, subject; Discussions with Huang Zuoyi

20  Letter from Wah Lim, Senior VP, SS/L, to Liu Zhixionq, VP
CGWIC regarding Second IRC Meeting in Beijing.

21  The U.S Government ultimately rejected the export license
application for this project when by letter dated February 24,
1999, the Department of Commerce informed Hughes of its
intention to deny several license applications for APMT in light
of concerns expressed by the Department of State regarding the
planned launch services.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              14

opportunities in the PRC related to APMT.22  Sino-Canada's
managing director, Suen Yan Kwong, was the founder of Chung Kiu
Telecommunications (CKT), which had invested in cellular
telecommunications for use under special network by China's
People's Liberation Army (PLA) in military districts along the
coastal provinces.

(27)     On January 2l, 1999, in the course of a meeting with
ODTC it Washington, D.C., Respondents' Vice President and
General Counsel advised that Respondents had become concerned
about a $5 million foreign sales agreement with Sino-Canada
related to APMT entered into by Respondents (which had not been
reported to ODTC at the time of Respondents' technical
assistance agreement submission for APMT on June 1, 1998 as
required by S 124.12(a)(6)), and that Respondents had retained
Kroll Associates to examine this matter ($500,000 had already
been paid to Sino-Canada and an additional $25 million was held
in escrow).  ODTC requested a statement as to whether any of the
payments concerned, in particular, political contributions,
which Respondents subsequently reported negatively, and whether
the Kroll report would be made available to ODIC, which
Respondents have declined to furnish on the grounds of
attorney-client privilege.23


APMT and Shen Jun

(28)     On July 9, 1996, Respondents submitted a munitions
export license application to ODTC seeking authorization for one
of its employees, Shen Jun, described as a dual Canadian Chinese
national, in order to provide Chinese-English language
translation and interpretation support for the

----------------------------------------------------------------
22  Respondents advise that opportunities related to APMT was
not the sole business activity of, or the sole purpose for,
Sino-Canada's incorporation.

23  Respondents now maintain that their prior General Counsel
erred in that meeting and that, while there were preliminary
discussions with Kroll about conducting a background
investigation of Sino-Canada, Respondents ultimately elected to
have the background investigation conducted by outside counsel
other than Kroll (which investigative report has similarly been
withheld from ODTC by Respondents).

________________________________________________________________
                                                              15

preliminary design phase of the APMT satellite project.24  In no
place in that submission nor otherwise did HUGHES SPACE AND
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY inform ODTC that this individual was, in
fact, the son of PLA General and COSTIND Deputy Director Shen
Rongjun, 25  which fact was material to the U.S. Government's
consideration of whether the license application should be
approved or denied.26


(29)     The record indicates that Shen Jun’s role for
Respondents went well beyond that of an interpreter/translator
and more closely resembled that of an intermediary with his
father, General Shen, and other PRC space authorities, in order
to cultivate their support in various matters of interest to
Hughes, including the handling of the APSTAR II launch failure
investigation and the APMT contract.27

----------------------------------------------------------------
24  This license application was initially approved, but
subsequently suspended by ODTC when it became known that Shen
Jun was the son of Shen Rongjun.

25  According to a September 20, 1995 memorandum, Hughes
regarded General Shen Rongjun as "the most important Chinese
space official."

26  Respondents have maintained as of December 3, 2002, that
this information was not material and that its omission was
proper because there is no place in the munitions license
application for them to disclose father-son relationships
between General officers at the People's Liberation Army who are
overseeing a project they are working on and their foreign
national employees working in U.S. facilities on the same
project.

27  An August 8, 1995, memorandum from Bruce Elbert reports on
APMT related activities by Shen Jun:  "in a telephone
conversation last night with Jun he provided the following
information after having talked to important people involved
with APMT ... Lockheed Martin has sweetened their bid with
technology transfers on launch vehicles and changed their
price...  These points were reiterated by the highest official
he interfaced with Jun has the worry that if it goes wrong in
Munich (an apparent reference to an APSTAR II launch failure
briefing to insurance providers) we open the door for Lockheed
Martin and their unique proposal for technology transfer on the
launch vehicle.  This could result in our not getting into the
final round of APMT negotiations."  The memo goes on to report
that Shen Jun has been asked "to make a proposal to CASC and
CGWIC that they describe their

________________________________________________________________
                                                              16

ASIASAT 3


(30)     By letter dated November 12, 1999, Respondent BSS
provided a pre1iminary notification to ODTC of an intended
voluntary disclosure of violations of the Regulations related to
its ASIASAT 3 program, a satellite manufactured for the Asia
Satellite Telecommunications Company in Hong Kong, whose
principal owners are China International Trust & Investment
Company (CITIC) and Societe Europeenne des Satellites (SES, a
company incorporated in Luxembourg).28  By letter dated February
9, 2000, Respondents advised ODTC that its internal audit (now
complete) had concluded its employees had provided ASIASAT
personnel with technical data that exceeded the scope of its
Department of Commerce license (and which was subject to State
Department jurisdiction).

(31)     The unauthorized disclosures concerned two categories
of information.  First, unit-level FECMA (failure modes and
criticality analysis) and worst case circuit analysis for the
ASIASAT 3 satellite, which constitutes detailed design
information subject to control under the Regulations and
generally not releasable to foreign persons, had been made
available to the ASIASAT organization in 1996 in five volumes of
technical data.  ODTC directed Respondent BSS to seek the return
of this data from ASIASAT following the submission of the
voluntary disclosure in February 2000, but Respondent was unable
to effect the return of all the information from ASIASAT.
Second, following abandonment of an ASIASAT field office at
Respondents El Segundo, California premises, Respondent Boeing
discovered additional technical data that had been
(presumptively) accessible to a PRC national employee of ASIASAT
assigned to the El Segundo field office.  This technical data
concerned production information for certain subsystems,
including the Xenon ion propulsion system, which information as
also generally not releasable to foreign persons.

----------------------------------------------------------------
redesign of the LM-2E fairing and that Hughes discuss what it
will do only if we use the LM-2E again."

28  ASIASAT 3 was launched on December 25, 1997, from the
Baikonur Cosmodrone in Kazakhstan, but did not reach its proper
orbit when the upper stage of the Proton rocket failed.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              17

ASTRA 1G/1H


(32)     By letter dated September 17, 2001, Respondent Boeing
voluntarily disclosed to ODTC that its personnel improperly
transferred controlled technical data to SES during a 1995
critical design review for the ASTRA lG satellite and a 1995
preliminary design review for the ASTRA 111 satellite, which
satellites were being exported and sold to SES pursuant to a
Department of Commerce license.  The technical data improperly
disclosed in this instance, as in the ASIASAT 3 matter, above,
exceeded the conditions of the Commerce license (and required a
State Department license, which was not sought) and concerned
electrical power subsystems that contained unit level FECMA and
worst case circuit analysis; such detailed design information is
generally not releasable to foreign persons.


License and Reporting Requirements

(33)     S 126.1(a) of the Regulations provides that it is the
policy of the United States to deny, among other things,
licenses and other approvals) destined for or originating in
certain countries, including china.

(34)     S 126.1(e) of the Regulations provides that no sale or
transfer and no proposal to sell or transfer any defense service
may be made to any country referred to in this section and that
any person who knows or has reason to know of any actual
transfer of such services must immediately inform ODTC.

(35)     S 127.1(a) (1) of the Regulations provides that it is
unlawful to export or attempt to export from the United States
any defense article or technical data or to furnish any defense
service for which a license or written approval is required
without first obtaining the required license or written approval
from the Office of Defense Trade Controls.

(36)     S 127il1a) (3) of the Regulations provides that it is
unlawful to conspire to export, import, reexport or cause to be
exported, imported or reexported, any defense article or to
furnish any defense service for which a license or written
approval is required without first obtaining the

________________________________________________________________
                                                              18

required license or written approval from the Office of Defense
Trade Controls.

(37)     S 127.1(a) (4) of the Regulations provides that it is
unlawful to violate any terms and conditions of licenses or
approvals.

(38)     S 127.1(b) of the Regulations provides that any person
who is granted a license or other approval is responsible for
the acts of employees, agents, and all authorized persons to
whom possession of the licensed defense article or technical
data has been entrusted regarding the operation, use,
possession, transportation, and handling of such defense article
or technical data abroad.

(39)     S 127.1(d) of the Regulations provides that no person
may willfully cause, or aid, abet, counsel, demand, induce,
procure or permit the commission of any act prohibited by, or
the omission of any act required by 22 U.S.C. S 2778, 22 U.S.C.
S 2779, or any regulation, license, approval, or order issued
thereunder.

(40)     S 127.2 of the Regulations provides that it is unlawful
to use any export document containing a false statement or
misrepresenting or omitting a material fact for the purpose of
exporting any defense article or technical data or the
furnishing of any defense service for which a license or
approval is required.

(41)     S 130.9(a) (1) of the Regulations requires that each
applicant must inform the Office of Defense Trade Controls as to
whether it or its vendors have paid, or offered or agreed to
pay, in respect of any sale for which a license or approval is
requested:  (i) political contributions in an aggregate amount
of $5,000 or more or (ii) fees or commissions in an aggregate
amount of $100,000 or more.  If so, an applicant must provide
the detailed information specified in SS 130.10 and 130.11

* * *

PART II - THE CHARGES

APSTAR II
________________________________________________________________
                                                              19

Charges 1-3

(42)     The Respondents violated 22 C.F.R. 5. 127.1(a) (3) when
on or about January 26, 1995, and continuing over the course of
the next eight months, they conspired with Chinese authorities
and other third party foreign nationals to furnish defense
services to China related to the failure and future functioning
of the Long March 2E space launch vehicle (SLV) following the
APSTAR II accident, for which a license or other written
approval was required; violated S 126.1(e) concerning prohibited
exports, when they offered defense services (i.e., "proposed")
in connection with the tailed launch of the Apstar II; and also
violated S 127.1(d) when they willfully caused or aided,
abetted, counseled, demanded, induced, procured or permitted the
commission of an act prohibited by a regulation issued pursuant
to 22 U.S.C. S 2778.

Charges 4-14

(43)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, without the required license or other approval
from ODTC, the Failure Investigation Team provided expert
analysis and advice in spacecraft debris, material properties,
video analysis, telemetry, coupled loads, structures and
aerodynamics1 summarized in a 38-page report; when the
spacecraft Team provided expert analysis and advice in assessing
the work of the Failure Team and whether or how the satellite
contributed to the failure, summarized in an 84-page report;
and, when the international oversight Team provided expert
analysis and advice in three meetings held between April and
June 1995 during which the results of the investigation were
discussed.

Charges 15-17

(44)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a)(1) of the Regulations
when, on or about February 10, 1995, without the required
license or other written approval from ODTC, it identified for
Chinese authorities the incorrect seating during flight of the
LV clamp band; diagnosed that LV clamp band slippage was
possibly caused by vibrations and the choice of lubricant on
the band; and recommended review of this area by Chinese
authorities prior to future flights.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              20

Charges 18-20

(45)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a)(l) at the
Regulations when, on or about February 10,1995, without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC, it
identified for Chinese authorities possible design flaws in the
venting system of the payload fairing (or nose cone at the
rocket); compared it to Western standards; and recommended that
Chinese authorities review this area prior to future
launches.

Charges 21-23

(46)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about February 10, 1995, without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC, it
provided for Chinese authorities expert identification of
possible design flaws in the nose dome of the fairing and of
similarities in the probable failure of the nose dome for both
Apstar II and Optus B2 detected by Respondents' analysis of
payload fairing debris recovered from the two accidents.

Charges 24-25

(47)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about February 9-10, 1995 and May 8,
1995, without the required license or other written approval
from ODTC, it provided for Chinese authorities expert
identification of inaccuracies, omissions and the like
associated with Chinese debris investigation and, further,
provided insights into U.S. analytical techniques concerning
recovered debris1 which Respondent supported with technical
drawings, photographs and modeling where expedient.

Charges 26-31

(48)     Respondent BSS violated S 1271(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about February 13, 1995 and April 12-13,
1995, without the required license or other written approval
from ODTC, it identified for Chinese authorities telemetry data
as an important - - if not that most important - - source of
information regarding the failure; it disclosed to China how
their (i.e., CALT and CGWIC) analysis of telemetry data revealed
deficiencies with respect to four

________________________________________________________________
                                                              21

areas -- trajectory corrections due to wind shear effects,
incorrect interpretations of accelerometer data, a probable
anomaly with the clamp band, and a probable fault with the
payload fairing venting process --; and it outlined for China
the history of the flight compiled from telemetry data,
including seventy-seven individual points that were critical to
the Respondents' analysis.

Charges 32-36

(49)     Respondent ESS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about February 13, 1995 and May 8, 1995,
without the required license or other written approval from
ODTC, it jointly conducted with Chinese authorities a
re-analysis of the coupled load analysis (CLA)29, in which
expert advice was shared by Respondent with respect to U.S.
expertise in modeling, calculations and methodologies in order
to affirm or critique pre-flight modeling conducted by the
Chinese, alone, and to demonstrate, in particular, deficiencies
in china’s pre-flight CLA with respect to its failure to account
for high winds aloft and buffeting and the Long March 2E's
guidance system failure to compensate for upper level winds.

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29  CLA simulates and assesses interplay of the loads on the SLV
during flight, including interaction of the SLV and the
satellite.  The Respondents concluded that the Chinese had not
performed an analysis of the cantilevered loads from the payload
stack to the fairing and, hence, had no real idea of the true
loads on the fairing arising from wind shear and buffeting.
Respondents have maintained as at December 3, 2002, that they
did not "jointly conduct" a CLA and that all they did "was check
to be sure chat it (Hughes) had properly prepared the Hughes
data for the CLA" and did not overlook anything.  (See December
3, 2002 letter from Turk to Lowell.)  However, according to
information in Respondents' own files, the coupled loads team
"reviewed all of the coupled loads analysis information that was
available...  - They compared the flight data from the
spacecraft accelerometers that have flown on the Long March, the
Atlas, and the Ariane.  They traveled to Beijing to work beside
the CALT engineers to review and participate in the Coupled
Loads Analysis methodology. (emphasis added)  They expanded the
standard spacecraft dynamic model (normally good to 75 Hz) to be
valid up to 100 Hz."  See HSC 002803.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              22

Charges 37-38

(50)     Respondent ESS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about March 8, 1995, without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC, it
compared and contrasted for Chinese authorities China's CLA with
Western expert analysis related to the U.S. Atlas and French
Ariane SLVs.

Charge 39

(51)     Respondent BSS violated S l27.l(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about June 14, 1995, without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC,
Respondent's consultant furnished to Chinese authorities in a
letter dated June 14, 1995, addressed to Liu Zhixiong (CGWIC
Vice President) and Donald Cromer (HSC Vice President)
conclusions with respect to the APSTAR II launch failure, as
well as its likely cause and suggestions for further evaluation
by China.30

Charges 40-41

(52)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about March 15, 1995,31 without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC, it
provided to Chinese authorities the results of an analysis of
China's payload fairing and identified flaws in the rivets used
to secure the zipper area of the fairing.32

Charges 42-43

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30  Respondents assert that the characterization of the IOT team
member as "Respondents' consultant" is a mischaracterization and
chat in sending the referenced letter, the person was acting as
an independent member of the lOT and not as Hughes' agent.
However, information available to ODTC confirms that Respondents
in fact, arranged this person's participation in the IOT and
that Respondents viewed him as their "consultant."

31  See Apstar 2 Failure Investigation Report Structure's Group
Status Report of March 15, 1995.

32  A "zipper" holds the fairing’s two halves together.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              23

(53)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (l) of the
Regulations when, without the required license or other written
approval from ODTC, it identified for Chinese authorities
possible design flaws and improper installation associated with
the launch vehicle clamp band.33

Charges 44-45

(54)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.l(a)(1) of the
Regulations when, without the required license or other written
approval from ODTC, it identified material and design faults
with the Chinese-manufactured interface adapter and recommended
to China more detailed analyses and development tests on
specific interface hardware and integrated spacecraft, third
stage and adapters for the future.34

Charge 46

(55) Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the Regulations
when, on or about April 21, 1995, without the required license
or other written approval from ODTC, it provided to Sun Jiadong
copies of the APSTAR II failure review charts and the APSTAR II
failure review status report.

Charge 47

(56)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about April 24, 1995, without the
required license or other written approval from ODTC it
provided to a third country foreign national 35 copies of the
same (as in Charge 45. above) APSTAR II failure review charts
and the APSTAR II failure review status report.

Charges 48-55

(57)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about May 22, May 23 and June 5, 1995.
without the required license or other written approval

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33  See Apstar 2 Failure Review Management Splinter Meeting of
April 12, 1995.

34  See Structure's Group Status Report of April 12, 1995.

35  Pierre Madon, a foreign national member of the APSTAR II
launch failure international oversight team.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              24


from ODTC, it provided briefings to Sun Jiadong and the same
third country foreign national (as in Charge 47, above)
concerning LM-2E failure conclusions; telemetry information;
response to CALT video; and, interstage conclusions.

Charges 56-60

(58)     Respondent BSS violated S 1271(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about October 25, 1995, at a meeting in
Beijing, without the required license or other written approval
from ODTC, it provided detailed briefings to Chinese authorities
and APT (as well as other foreign persons) concerning the APSTAR
II failure investigative process, its summary conclusions,
failure scenarios, fishbone diagram and corrective actions.

Charge 61

(59)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about October 31, 1995, at a meeting in
Munich, without the required license or other written approval
from ODTC, it provided similar briefings (as in Charges 56-60,
above) to fifty-one foreign persons representing insurance
underwriters.

Charge 62

(60)     The Respondents violated S 126.1(e) of the Regulations
when they tailed, until directed to do so in writing by ODTC in
May 1996, to inform ODTC of the actual transfer of defense
services they had made, or knew or had reason to know of, as
outlined above, to a country prohibited by S 126.1(a).


INTELSAT 708

Charges 63-64

(61)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.l(a) (1) at the
Regulations when, on or about March 9, 1996, it conducted a
survey of the crash site of the INTELSAT 708 spacecraft and
China's Xichang space launch facility and on or about March 10,
1996, it described for Chinese authorities twenty-five (25)
corrective actions chat China needed to implement at the Xichanq
space launch facility in order to ensure

________________________________________________________________
                                                              25


Respondents' commitment to the launch of APSTAR lA on the Long
March 3 SLV.36

Charge 65

(62)     Respondent BSS violated S 121.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about April 15-16, 1996, without a
license or other written approval from ODTC it participated in a
briefing hosted by Chinese authorities on the Long March 3B
failure and outlined its (Respondent's) findings for the benefit
of insurance brokers from the aforesaid launch site survey of
the crash.

Charge 66-67

(63)     Respondent BSS (formerly HSC violated S 126.1(e) of the
Regulations when on or about April 16, 1996, it agreed to the
charter for an Independent Review Committee (IRC) proposed by
Chinese authorities for the INTELSAT 708 launch failure
investigation which charter itself contemplated the transfer of
defense services to a country referred to in S 126.1, without a
license or other written approval from ODTC and Respondent HE
also violated S 126.1(e) when it failed to immediately inform
ODTC of the proposed transfer, HE having known of the proposed
investigation as a result of its senior management's visit to
the PRC on the proposal after April 9, 1996.

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36 Respondents have maintained as of December 3, 2002 (ID) that the
25 action items were authorized under the Commerce license
pursuant to "Go/No Go Criteria Exchange" and "Safety Plans."
However, Respondents own tiles indicate that they, themselves,
did not consider the 25 action items to be covered under the
rubric of range safety; certainly there is no basis in practice
to support any such interpretation by Respondents.  See HSC's
June 27, 1996 Report to ODTC on Alleged Violations of the ITAR
(p. 4).  More fundamentally, it is clear that the 25 action items
related principally to the repair of the launch facility (i.e.,
"items to be fixed or replaced"; e.g., windows, electrical
supply, etc.), that repair of a space launch facility is
quintessentially a defense service, and that assistance in the
repair of the launch facility is expressly prohibited by the
U.S.-PRC bilateral agreement.

37 Respondents maintain that the general prohibition on
proposals to furnish defense services to countries

________________________________________________________________
                                                              26

Charge 68

(64)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, oh or about April 26, 1996, without a license
or other written approval from ODTC its chief scientist, one of
two expert representatives in the IRC, discussed thoroughly with
GW Aerospace 38 possible failure causes other than the control
and guidance, including engine performance and structural issues
associated with Long March 3B.39

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proscribed at S 126.1 does not apply in this instance because
the agreement of their experts to the defense services envisaged
in the IRC charter proposed by Chinese authorities does not meet
what they consider to be a limiting definition of "proposals" in
S 126.8.  However, that latter provision merely details the
procedures to be followed for prior notification and prior
approval (which Respondents did not follow in any case) when
proposals are made to sell or transfer significant military
equipment; it does not provide a limiting definition of the term
“proposal” as used in S 126.1(e).  In fact, the term "proposal"
as used in S 126.1(e) appropriately covers the acceptance of
proposals made to U.S. persons by senior military authorities of
proscribed destinations, as well as proposals initiated by U.S.
persons.  In the case of the IRC charter, each member, including
Respondents' personnel, agreed to the terms of the charter.
Regardless of how "proposals" with regard to proscribed
countries may be initiated, S 126.1(e) makes abundantly clear
that it is the policy of the Department of State to deny such
proposals.

38  GW Aerospace is a U.S. based consulting firm owned by CGWIC.

39  Respondents have contended as of December 3, 2002, that the
purpose of the meeting was simply for Steinhauer to be brought
up to date on the results of the recent IRC meeting in Palo Alto
and that information flow in this meeting was from GW Aerospace
to their chief scientist Steinhauer - not the other way around.
However, Mr. Steinhauer’s own report of the meeting with GW
Aerospace is at odds with this contention as he describes
detailed technical discussions between himself and Huang Zuoyi,
the former chief designer of the Long March 2C while at CALT:
"Thoroughly discussed the possibility of any other than control
& guidance system failure causes, specifically including the
eight-engine

________________________________________________________________
                                                              27


Charges 69-77

(65)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, on or about April 10, 1996, without a license
or other written approval from ODTC, its chief scientist
transmitted nine questions concerning the launch failure
investigation by facsimile to GW Aerospace for forwarding, in
turn, to the Long March program office in Beijing, which
questions were provided "in order to ensure that the anticipated
Chinese failure report considered specific Concerns related to
the LM-3B failure and impact the cause of the failure may have
on Hughes decision to launch APSTAR lA satellite."40

----------------------------------------------------------------
performance and structural issues."  Also, "discussed the
eight-engine versus four-engine lift-off vibration and acoustic
environment at the IMU" and that "unusual acoustic reflections
could be involved" which "CALT will look at...."  In addition,
Huang and Steinhauer discussed the details of the specific area
where CALT believes the failure site to be located, leading
Steinhauer to conclude that the Chinese probably have a very
poor design with respect to manufacturability, particularly in
respect to the soldering procedures in the LM3B IMU final
assembly.

40  Facsimile transmission from Steinhauer to Tian Guodang of GW
Aerospace.  Again, Respondents have asserted as of December 3,
2002, that these questions were about the LM 3B and concerned
tests that were performed prior to flight.  which cannot qualify
as defense services.  Even had these questions generally
concerned prior tests (which they did not).  Respondents'
conclusion would still be wrong as such questions would
nonetheless serve to direct Chinese authorities in their
investigations to help explain the launch failure. However, in
this instance the questions, themselves, were clearly,
designed to lead to the identification of the root cause of the
failure for purposes of assuaging insurance underwriters and do
not generally concern prior tests.  For example, question no. 4)
was:  "Did problem occur in flight after lift-off, or was it
pre­existing?"  Question no. 7) was: "Explain three oscillations
during 22's flight?"  Question no. 9) was:  "Understand that launch
vehicle platform at pad was rotated in order to correct for
laser alignment of launch azimuth very close to lift-off of the
LM 3B.  Describe this activity and its implications on the launch
performance." 

________________________________________________________________
                                                              28


Charges 78-101

(66)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.l(a)(l) of the
Regulations when, without a license or other written approval
from 0DTC, during the first IRC meeting (April 22-24, 1996, Palo
Alto), together with other international experts who comprised
the IRC, it delineated for Chinese authorities twenty-four areas
41 for further technical investigation and/or analysis upon
concluding that simulation tests and other analysis presented to
the IRC by CGWIC and CALT could not fully explain why, where or
when the Long March rocket's inertial measurement unit (IMU)
failed.  Delineation of the twenty-tour areas was for the
purpose of identifying critical details of the failure mode then
unanswered and of identifying corrective action by Chinese
authorities based on the most likely cause(s) of the LM-3B
failure and the isolation of these causes from the PRC's LM-3
rocket to be used for the, then, upcoming launch of APSTAR lA
manufactured by Respondent.

Charges 102-112

(67)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations during the second IRC meeting (April 30-May 1, 1996,
Beijing), when, without a license or other approval from ODTC,
after reviewing extensive documentation provided by Chinese
authorities and interviewing or hearing presentations from over
one hundred Chinese engineers and technical personnel, together
with other international experts, it joined other IRC members in
furnishing unauthorized defense services in eleven areas.42

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41  These 24 areas set forth in the form of detailed technical
questions and/or guidance or recommendations for specific
follow-up analysis covered a range of potential factors
associated with design, operation, manufacturing, testing and
performance of PRC rockets, including the LM-3B, LM-3 and
LM-2E.

42  Specifically, the IRC; (1) concurred that the most likely
failure mode was the inertial platform; (2) urged the Chinese to
perform additional hardware in the loop testing or (3) computer
analysis to simulate the complete failure cycle; recommended (4)
additional acceptance test procedure, (5) design for
producibility, (6) reliability operation, and (7) better IMU
assembly procedure; (8) validated that the

________________________________________________________________
                                                              29

Charge 113-114

(68)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.1(a) (1) of the
Regulations when, without a license or other written approval
from ODTC, on or about May 1, 1996, it suggested to other IRC
members, some of whom were foreign persons within the meaning of
the Regulations, that the Beijing Control Institute should set
up a way to incorporate an intermittent wire into their control
simulation test and demonstrate the exact proposed failure
scenario responses, such that China could confirm or refute its
prior conclusion as to the cause of the failure 43 and when it
suggested that a higher fidelity failure scenario test be
performed in the CALT Control Institute laboratory.

Charge 115

(69)     Respondent BSS violated S 126.1(e) of the Regulations
when it tailed to inform ODTC of the planned export of the IRC
report to Chinese authorities.


APMT and Sino-Canada

Charges 116-117

(70)     Respondents violated S 130.9 of the Regulations when
they failed to make timely disclosure of $5 million in
commissions paid and promised to Sino-Canada in connection with
the procurement of the APMT satellite and also violated S
127.1(d) when they willfully caused, aided, abetted, counseled,
demanded1 induced, procured or permitted the

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LM-3 and LM-3B inertial platforms are separate and distinct
owing to the LM-3's different inner gimbals drive circuit and
redundancy by design; and specified additional test/analysis
verification in three areas (9-11) continued study by the
Chinese of the telemetered 15 Hz resonant frequency (to include
interviews of technical personnel who installed the IMU); and
drawing up of a detailed list of IMUs of the LM 3A, 3B and 3C
(to include their production, assembly, test locations and
mission assignments).

43  May 1, 1996, Steinhauer email to Herron regarding Smay test.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              30


omission of an act required by a regulation issued pursuant to
22 U.S.C. S 2779.

APMT and Shen Jun

Charge 118

(71)     Respondent BSS violated S 127.2 of the Regulations
concerning misrepresentation and omission of material facts when
it failed to disclose in connection with the submission of
munitions license application no. 678638 on or about July 9,
1996, that Shen Jun was, in fact, the son of General Shen
Rongjun whose interest and influence Respondents were
cultivating in connection with the APMT procurement and in other
matters concerning satellite-related exports to China more
generally.44

ASIASAT 3

Charges 119-121

(72)     Respondent BSS violated the provisions of S 127.1(a)
(1) when in 1996 its employees provided ASIASAT personnel with
detailed design technical data that exceeded the scope of its
Department of Commerce license (and which was subject to State
Department jurisdiction), without the required license or other
written approval from ODTC, concerning unit-level FECMA, worst
case circuit analysis, and the Xenon Ion propulsion system.

ASTRA 1G/1H

Charges 122-123

(73)     Respondent BSS violated the provisions of S 127.1(a)
(1) when in 1995 its employees improperly

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44  As noted at footnote 26, page 11 of this draft charging
letter, Respondents contend that the fact of the son-father
relationship between their employee on the APMT project and the
PLA general officer overseeing the APMT project was not material
to the license application because there is no place on the
license application for disclosing such familial relationships
of their employees with senior military officers of the PRC.

________________________________________________________________
                                                              31


transferred detailed design technical data to SES during a
1995 critical design review for the ASTRA 1G satellite and a
1995 preliminary design review for the ASTRA 1H satellite,
without the required license or other written approval from
ODTC.

* * *

PART III - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

(74)     Pursuant to 22 C.F.R. S 128 administrative proceedings
are instituted against Hughes Electronics Corp., including
Hughes Network Systems, and The Boeing Company Boeing Satellite
Systems (formerly Hughes Space and Communications) for the
purpose of obtaining an Order imposing civil administrative
sanctions that may include the imposition of debarment or civil
penalties.  The Assistant Secretary for Political Military
Affairs shall determine the appropriate period of debarment,
which shall generally be for a period of three years in
accordance with S 127.7 of the Regulations.  Civil penalties,
not to exceed $500,000 per violation, may be imposed in
accordance with S 127.10.

(75)     A Respondent has certain rights in such proceedings as
described in S 128, a copy of which I am enclosing.  You are
required to answer the charging letter within 30 days after
service.  A failure to answer will be taken as an admission of
the truth of the charges.  You are entitled to an oral hearing
if a written demand for one is filed with the answer or within
seven (7) days after service of the answer.  The answer, written
demand for oral hearing (if any) and supporting evidence
required by S 128.5(b) shall be in duplicate and mailed or
delivered to ALJ Docketing Center, U.S. Coast Guard, 40 south
Gay Street, Room 412, Baltimore, MD 21202-4022.  A copy shall be
simultaneously mailed to the Director, Office of Defense trade
Controls. Department of state, 2401 £ Street, NW, Washington,
D.C.  If you do not demand an oral hearing, you must transmit
within seven (7) days after the service of your answer, the
original or photocopies of all correspondence, papers, records,
affidavits, and other documentary or written evidence having any
bearing upon or connection with the matters in issue.  Please he
advised also that charging letters may be amended from time to
time, upon reasonable notice. Furthermore, cases may be settled

________________________________________________________________
                                                              32


through consent agreements, including after service of a
charging letter.

(76)     Please be advised that the U.S. Government is free to
pursue Civil, administrative, and/or criminal enforcement for
violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations.  The Department of State's decision
to pursue one type of enforcement action does not preclude it or
any other department or agency of the United States from
pursuing another type of enforcement action.

(77)     In this regard, please permit me to recall that I have
previously provided you with a copy of a letter dated November
13, 2002, addressed to me by the Assistant Commissioner for
Investigations, U.S. Customs Service, informing me that U.S.
Customs is considering bringing civil forfeiture proceedings
against property owned by you.  Under federal law, property
involved in violations of the AECA and certain other statutes
(e.g., Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 1956) is subject
to civil forfeiture.  This includes real estate that is used to
facilitate these violations.

Sincerely,


William J. Lowell
Director

Enclosures

cc: Artis N. Noel
Counsel
General Motors Corp.

Robert Catania
Chief Counsel
Boeing Satellite Systems, Inc.

Richard Hoglund (Acting)
Assistant Commissioner
(Investigations)
U.S. Customs Service


 


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