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SUPER-COMPUTERS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESEARCH SOLD TO CHINA BY BILL CLINTON

 

SUPER-COMPUTERS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESEARCH


CLICK HERE TO READ THE STORY AT NEWSMAX.COM

 

H-BOMBS BROUGHT TO YOU BY THOSE FINE FOLKS AT THE


SOURCE – OFFICIAL CSPP DOCUMENT


THANKS RON BROWN FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER TO SELL SUPER-COMPUTERS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS




CSPP HAS A SECRET MEETING IN THE WHITE HOUSE







BOB RUBIN MEETS THE CSPP





BOB RUBIN BRINGS THE DNC CASH


TREYBIG SELLS COMPUTERS TO CHINA GREAT WALL


SOURCE – PRESIDENTIAL TRADE MISSION TO CHINA – COMMERCE DEPT.

 



CPU235 – EXPORT OF SUPER COMPUTERS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS



CPU235

Attorney General Reno says she has not seen any evidence of China trying to influence the Clinton administration to export military technology. The problem is she is not looking…

In November 1993, on the eve of the first Sino/American summit since the Tienneman square massacre, NSA Director Adm. McConnell approved approved China’s long standing request to buy a super high technology computer, supposedly for exclusively non military use. Since then the PRC has taken possession of at least 46 super computers.


  "Our recent agreement to a relaxation of export controls on
  telecommunications and supercomputers should enable U.S.
  industry to expand markets for these goods and retain its
  competitive edge in these critical technologies for the
  future."
  
  - 11/15/93 NSA Director Adm. McConnell to Commerce Secretary
    Ron Brown.  FOIA by SOFTWAR

Please note this letter was addressed to RON BROWN of the Commerce Department. It is clear that the Justice Department has skipped over the Commerce Department in their investigations. Ironically, NSA Director McConnell would endorse exporting US super computers the day before Bill Clinton would meet the President of China to announce… The export of super computers to China. Gee, what a co-incidence.

Furthermore, China was not the only one to benefit from these new super computers for sale. The export of a super computer directly to the Russian nuclear agency MINATOM (Ministry of Atomics) was also clearly spelled out in a recent GAO report:


  "MINATOM told one of the companies that sold them a computer
  without a license that the computer would be used for modeling
  of earth water pollution caused by radioactive substances.
  However, MINATOM officials have stated that the computers will
  be used to maintain the Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles and
  the Minister of Atomic Energy indicated that the computer
  would be used to confirm the reliability of Russia's nuclear
  arsenal and ensure its proper working order under the terms of
  the CTBT."

  - (Testimony, 04/15/97,  GAO/T-NSIAD-97-128).

In response, SOFTWAR issued a Freedom of Information Request (FOIA) to determine the documented facts and sources that authorized the export of these systems to develop nuclear weapons. Was the Clinton administration aware that super computers were being sold to develop nuclear weapons? Did the Clinton administration have any legislation, plans, documents, notes or meetings on EXPORT CONTROL ON SALES OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS FOR USE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES? The answer comes from the Department of Energy:


  "A search was conducted of the files in the Office of Arms
  Control and Nonproliferation and responsive documents
  originated with the Department of Commerce (DOC) were
  located."

  - Sept. 30, 1997 reply to SOFTWAR FOIA by the Energy
    Department, Michael V. McClary, Executive Officer, Office of
    Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

Once again, the COMMERCE Department. The documents are hidden in the closed world of Ron Brown, John Huang, Ginger Lew and Ira Sockowitz. The DNC, CIA and NSA filled Commerce Department that seems to have been a bit careless with US secrets lately. The details of the intentional export of super computers to hostile nations for nuclear weapons research are now being withheld by the Commerce Department.

Will Janet Reno care to look? Does she care that she may be in the crosshairs of a nuclear weapon developed with the help of her boss? She can see the many documents about the export of advanced technology to China already denied to the US public on “national security” and “lawyer client privilege” grounds. She could view the inter-agency memos that the rest of us cannot. One only need wonder why STONEWALL Reno does not look. Could it be because her name might be on some of those memos?


SOFTWAR

May 21, 1997

Public Information Officer
Energy Dept.
FOIA/PA Division HR – 78
1000 Independence Ave. S.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20585

Dear Sir/Madam:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC 552, and to the regulations of the Department of Energy, CDR (citation to departmental regulations, obtainable from committee print index), I hereby request access to:

Date Range:
From 1/1/93 to Present

Policy:
Legislation, proposed legislation, plans, documents, notes or meetings on Export Controls on Sales of High Performance Computers for use in Nuclear Weapons Laboratories.

Please provide government solutions in reference to super-computer export policy, efforts to nationalize using covert actions, transfer of nuclear weapons computer research to foreign nations or other means to control the export of the super-computer software/hardware for use in Nuclear Weapons Laboratories.

Please specify date, time, and persons involved in any discovery.

example:
(Testimony, 04/15/97, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-128). “MINATOM told one of the companies that sold them a computer without a license that the computer would be used for modeling of earth water pollution caused by radioactive substances. However, MINATOM officials have stated that the computers will be used to maintain the Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles and the Minister of Atomic Energy indicated that the computer would be used to confirm the reliability of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and ensure its proper working order under the terms of the CTBT.”

If there is a charge for locating and copying the requested material, please notify me in advance of the estimated amount.

Please reply by June 21, 1997. If the request is denied, please specify the section of the Freedom of Information Act which is being relied on as a legal basis for the denial.

Thank you.

Charles R. Smith



CPU235 – EXPORT OF SUPER COMPUTERS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS



CPU235

Attorney General Reno says she has not seen any evidence of China trying to influence the Clinton administration to export military technology. The problem is she is not looking…

In November 1993, on the eve of the first Sino/American summit since the Tienneman square massacre, NSA Director Adm. McConnell approved approved China’s long standing request to buy a super high technology computer, supposedly for exclusively non military use. Since then the PRC has taken possession of at least 46 super computers.


  "Our recent agreement to a relaxation of export controls on
  telecommunications and supercomputers should enable U.S.
  industry to expand markets for these goods and retain its
  competitive edge in these critical technologies for the
  future."
  
  - 11/15/93 NSA Director Adm. McConnell to Commerce Secretary
    Ron Brown.  FOIA by SOFTWAR

Please note this letter was addressed to RON BROWN of the Commerce Department. It is clear that the Justice Department has skipped over the Commerce Department in their investigations. Ironically, NSA Director McConnell would endorse exporting US super computers the day before Bill Clinton would meet the President of China to announce… The export of super computers to China. Gee, what a co-incidence.

Furthermore, China was not the only one to benefit from these new super computers for sale. The export of a super computer directly to the Russian nuclear agency MINATOM (Ministry of Atomics) was also clearly spelled out in a recent GAO report:


  "MINATOM told one of the companies that sold them a computer
  without a license that the computer would be used for modeling
  of earth water pollution caused by radioactive substances.
  However, MINATOM officials have stated that the computers will
  be used to maintain the Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles and
  the Minister of Atomic Energy indicated that the computer
  would be used to confirm the reliability of Russia's nuclear
  arsenal and ensure its proper working order under the terms of
  the CTBT."

  - (Testimony, 04/15/97,  GAO/T-NSIAD-97-128).

In response, SOFTWAR issued a Freedom of Information Request (FOIA) to determine the documented facts and sources that authorized the export of these systems to develop nuclear weapons. Was the Clinton administration aware that super computers were being sold to develop nuclear weapons? Did the Clinton administration have any legislation, plans, documents, notes or meetings on EXPORT CONTROL ON SALES OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS FOR USE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES? The answer comes from the Department of Energy:


  "A search was conducted of the files in the Office of Arms
  Control and Nonproliferation and responsive documents
  originated with the Department of Commerce (DOC) were
  located."

  - Sept. 30, 1997 reply to SOFTWAR FOIA by the Energy
    Department, Michael V. McClary, Executive Officer, Office of
    Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

Once again, the COMMERCE Department. The documents are hidden in the closed world of Ron Brown, John Huang, Ginger Lew and Ira Sockowitz. The DNC, CIA and NSA filled Commerce Department that seems to have been a bit careless with US secrets lately. The details of the intentional export of super computers to hostile nations for nuclear weapons research are now being withheld by the Commerce Department.

Will Janet Reno care to look? Does she care that she may be in the crosshairs of a nuclear weapon developed with the help of her boss? She can see the many documents about the export of advanced technology to China already denied to the US public on “national security” and “lawyer client privilege” grounds. She could view the inter-agency memos that the rest of us cannot. One only need wonder why STONEWALL Reno does not look. Could it be because her name might be on some of those memos?


SOFTWAR

May 21, 1997

Public Information Officer
Energy Dept.
FOIA/PA Division HR – 78
1000 Independence Ave. S.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20585

Dear Sir/Madam:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC 552, and to the regulations of the Department of Energy, CDR (citation to departmental regulations, obtainable from committee print index), I hereby request access to:

Date Range:
From 1/1/93 to Present

Policy:
Legislation, proposed legislation, plans, documents, notes or meetings on Export Controls on Sales of High Performance Computers for use in Nuclear Weapons Laboratories.

Please provide government solutions in reference to super-computer export policy, efforts to nationalize using covert actions, transfer of nuclear weapons computer research to foreign nations or other means to control the export of the super-computer software/hardware for use in Nuclear Weapons Laboratories.

Please specify date, time, and persons involved in any discovery.

example:
(Testimony, 04/15/97, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-128). “MINATOM told one of the companies that sold them a computer without a license that the computer would be used for modeling of earth water pollution caused by radioactive substances. However, MINATOM officials have stated that the computers will be used to maintain the Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles and the Minister of Atomic Energy indicated that the computer would be used to confirm the reliability of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and ensure its proper working order under the terms of the CTBT.”

If there is a charge for locating and copying the requested material, please notify me in advance of the estimated amount.

Please reply by June 21, 1997. If the request is denied, please specify the section of the Freedom of Information Act which is being relied on as a legal basis for the denial.

Thank you.

Charles R. Smith

CHINESE ARMY BUYS U.S. COMPUTERS THANKS TO BILL CLINTON

Chinese Army Buys U.S. Computers, Helping PLA Modernize Info-Warfare

Charles R. Smith
Wednesday, Apr. 28, 2004

The Chinese Army has just completed a series of Information Warfare combat exercises and the results do not bode well for America.The Info-warfare Group Army, attached to the Beijing Military Area Command, launched a series of “Red Force v. Blue Force” exercises during April that showed that China could indeed score a success against a superior western Army.

According to the PLA Daily, the official media outlet for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, “the group army joined hands with the research institutes to develop a simulated communication confrontation training system by using computer network, multimedia and virtual technology.”

“The “Red Army” launched several waves of attack by adopting different offensive tactics. “Electromagnetic killers” directed precision strikes at its adversary’s (the “Blue Army”) “soft” and “hard” targets, as a result, its adversary’s communication systems were soon paralyzed,” states the April 27th, 2004 issue of PLA Daily.

The Chinese Army has made it clear in its recent publications that western computer technology is critical for its modernization program.

“The symbol of the transformation will be a qualitative change of PLA’s fighting power. The level of IT (Information Technology) application in armaments is the key factor in the transformation. The transformation of armaments, from scale production at the stage of mechanization to conceptual research, small serial production and keeping in reserve the capability of production at the stage of IT application, must be based on modern technologies, particularly on information technology,” states a recent high level publication from the PLA Central Military Command.

Despite the growing clouds of war coming from Beijing, Washington appears to be unconcerned about the PLA use of American computer technology.

MADAM WU – QUEEN OF PLA SPY NETWORK

President Bush and Commerce Secretary Donald Evans met with Chinese Vice Premier Madam Wu Yi last week on trade issues such as advanced U.S. computer technology. Commerce Secretary Evans promised to ease curbs on exporting computers and other technology that could be used in Chinese weapons development.

Madam Wu later spoke at a dinner sponsored by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-China Business Council. Wu stated that Vice President Dick Cheney raised the possibility of helping China construct nuclear power stations, during his recent visit to Beijing.

According to Wu, America has very advanced nuclear technologies and China “absolutely welcomes” a U.S. role in helping with development in that sector so long as the United States sticks to its commitments.

Wu also stated that China suffered big losses years ago when the U.S. government terminated satellite launch contracts that had been reached between American companies and the Chinese government.

MADAM WU AND COMPUTERS FOR WAR

Madam Wu should know about “big losses” because her rise to power inside the communist government is based on espionage and lies. Madam Wu, in her former post as minister of MOFTEC – (Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation) oversaw the export of advanced U.S. computers directly to PLA weapons labs.

In December 1997, U.S. Commerce officials sought permission to inspect Xian Jiatong University prior to the export of a high performance computer made by Digital Corp. (DEC). Commerce inspectors wanted to verify the Chinese university was not in violation of U.S. export control laws but were denied access by MOFTEC.

In a letter written to Liu Hu, Director General for Science and Technology of MOFTEC, U.S. Commerce Department officials noted that they were not given permission to perform the license check.

“We were disappointed at MOFTEC’s decision not to allow an on-site end use check and refusal to permit an Embassy representative to travel to Xian Jiatong University at the university’s invitation…. Because we were unable to work through MOFTEC, we gathered information on the end-user through other sources and have approved the license.”

It remains undisclosed what the officials meant by “other sources,” but it appears the Department of Commerce is only too willing to help Beijing save face rather than comply with a congressionally mandated law requiring inspections be performed.

In addition, the December 1997 letter to MOFTEC’s Liu Hu reminded the Chinese government of the requirements that U.S. representatives do a “post” export follow-up inspection.

However, U.S. Commerce officials were reduced to seeking “help” from the Chinese communist government in performing the post export inspections and sought another meeting to discuss the issue.

U.S. intelligence sources confirmed that the computer exported to Xian is being used by the PLA to perform biological and chemical weapons research.

MADAM WU VIOLATED TRADE TREATIES

In January 1998 the Commerce Department again contacted the Chinese government, seeking approval for verification inspections. The Commerce Department arranged for Bureau of Export Administration Chief Counsel, Hoyt Zia, to meet with China’s MOFTEC to discuss the denied pre and post export checks on U.S. super-computers.

Commerce counsel Hoyt Zia’s meeting in January 1998 with China’s MOFTEC official, Zhou Ruojun, failed to obtain Chinese permission for the inspections. Commerce documentation of the meeting noted that the Chinese denied all end use inspection checks. Chinese MOFTEC officials argued that there “was no formal agreement between the two governments on conducting these checks.”

The Chinese delegation also claimed that a 1983 U.S. trade letter agreeing to the checks “was unsigned” in the Commerce December 1997 complaint letter. MOFTEC’s Zhou considered the matter “inappropriate” because the letter was unsigned.

Things have not changed since 1998. A Feb. 2004 report from the General Accounting Office (GAO) stated that China still does not adhere to treaties it has signed and continues to violate agreements it promised to uphold.

According to the GAO report, China is still refusing to allow inspections of exported “dual use” equipment to verify that they are not being used for military purposes. Dual use items require a license for export and verification inspections by U.S. law because they can be used for military purposes.

MADAM WU AND NUCLEAR ESPIONAGE

The Xian computer is not the only time the Madam Wu led MOFTEC in successfully acquiring advanced U.S. computers. In 1996, American computer maker SUN Computer Corp. exported a super-computer directly to a Chinese Army nuclear weapons lab with the help of MOFTEC and Madam Wu.

According to the Cox report, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) explained that the actual buyer of the computer was the “Yuanwang Corporation” and that Sun was aware of “this corporation’s PRC military ties.”

Sun would later pay a record fine for knowingly exporting the super-computer to a PLA nuclear weapons lab.

Madam Wu made sure that MOFTEC was directly in business with the Chinese military. A 1999 special congressional report states that MOFTEC assisted Chinese military espionage operations by erecting front companies owned by the People’s Liberation Army MID or Military Intelligence Department.

“China Resources Enterprise [CRE]… is the commercial arm of China’s Ministry of Trade and Economic Co-operation [MOFTEC],” note the Congressional report. “In its investigation into China’s attempts to influence the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign, the U.S. Senate Government Affairs Committee identified CRE as a conduit for ‘espionage – economic, political and military – for China.’ Committee Chairman, Senator Fred Thompson said that CRE has ‘geopolitical purposes. Kind of like a smiling tiger; it might look friendly, but it’s very dangerous.'”

MADAM WU PROMOTED

Madam Wu obtained a promotion for her success and the smiling tiger that is the Chinese Army continues to import U.S. made computers for war. Madam Wu is now Vice Premier and the PLA is hosting an arms trade show with U.S. companies in attendance.

The exhibition of “China Military Logistics 2004” recently opened in the Beijing Exhibition Center. The exhibition involves products of over 170 manufacturers from 25 countries and 140-plus domestic producers.

General Liao Xilong, member of the Central Military Commission, director of the General Logistics Department of the PLA attended the opening ceremony and visited the exhibition.

“The exhibits cover all kinds of logistics equipment and involve several technical fields. The logistics equipment exhibited by the domestic participants are mainly new backbone equipment of the PLA, reflecting the features of systematic, matching, high-tech and suitable for field war. Exhibits from the US, UK, Germany and Russia are also rather modern and systematic, and suitable for field war,” states the PLA Daily.

“For example, the visible logistics information technology equipment from the U.S. and the beach POL supply system represent the advanced level of the world’s military logistics equipment technology.”

CLINTON’S COMMERCE DEPT. FUMBLES EXPORTS TO CHINA

CHINESE ARMY BUYS U.S. COMPUTERS

MADAM WU – QUEEN OF SPIES

CLICK HERE TO READ THE 4/28/04 ARTICLE ON NEWSMAX.COM


ALL DOCUMENTS FORCED FROM THE U.S. COMMERCE DEPT.


PLA MAJOR GENERAL DENG’S BUSINESS CARD

CLICK HERE TO READ THE STORY AT NEWSMAX.COM


CLICK HERE TO READ ABOUT SUPERCOMPUTERS FOR THE CHINESE ARMY


MOFTEC MINISTER MADAM WU YI


CHINESE ARMY GENERALS AT DEPT. OF ENERGY






GENERAL DING INVITES U.S. BUSINESSES TO WORK WITH THE PLA



SUN SELLS A SUPER-COMPUTER TO THE CHINESE ARMY


GENERAL DING & SUPER-COMPUTERS FOR CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPON LABS

 

“As a matter of public policy, the Clinton administration is dedicated to defense conversion in China just as in Russia and in the United States. Indeed, Defense Secretary William Perry helped establish a joint Sino-American commission on defense conversion, and during his October 1994 visit to Peking, he promised his Chinese partners extensive U.S. aid — including a Cray supercomputer to be used directly by the Chinese nuclear weapons establishment to help design newer and safer nukes. Perry’s Chinese co-chair is none other than Lt. Gen. Ding”

 


GREAT WALL BANNED BECAUSE OF NUKE TRANSFER TO PAKISTAN


U.S. SELLS COMPUTERS TO GREAT WALL



MORE INFORMATION –

COMPUTER EXECS VISIT CLINTON ON SUPER-COMPUTER EXPORTS.


Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls Over Transfers of Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement. GAO-02-972, September 6 2002.
PDF FORMAT


 

John Podesta aboard 'Hill Force One', the nickname for Clinton's campaign plane

Dear John: Fake Facts from a Clinton Pro

Charles R. Smith
Wednesday, Oct. 19, 2005

Former Clinton Chief of Staff John Podesta recently wrote a scathing article about former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh. Freeh made some harsh comments about his life at the FBI during the Clinton scandal years, and Podesta simply could not resist the knee-jerk urge to defend his ex-boss.

Those who know me well also know that I have little love for the former FBI Director. His tenure at the helm of the bureau was a disaster. Freeh can best be described as a “Luddite” in terms of his understanding of modern technology. I am almost certain that his new book was hand-written with a sharp quill and a bottle of ink.

However, my opinion of John Podesta and his former boss sinks to depths well below that of the former FBI Director. Thus, when John Podesta accused Freeh of playing fast and loose with the facts, I simply could not resist the urge to test his skill with the truth.

Podesta’s article may be written on a modern word processor, but it is inaccurate on one critical issue. Podesta claims, “Freeh’s account of the unfolding of the Khobar Towers investigation is also riddled with distortions and inaccuracies. For example, Freeh writes as if no acknowledgment of Iranian involvement in the bombing was made until after George W. Bush came into office,” noted Podesta in his Washington Post op-ed.

“This is false: The Clinton administration publicly and unequivocally placed blame on senior Iranian officials. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder made this point at a press conference on October 4, 1999,” said Podesta.

Unfortunately for Podesta, his assertion that Eric Holder placed the blame on Iran on October 4, 1999, just does not hold water. According to the official release from the Department of Justice for October 4, 1999, Holder avoided any accusations directed at Tehran: “The U.S. investigation of the attack at Khobar is ongoing. We are investigating information concerning the involvement of Saudi nationals, Iranian government officials and others. And we have not reached a conclusion regarding whether the attack was directed by the government of Iran.”

Just to make sure that I was not the only one to pick up on this little point, Fox News reported on October 17, 1999, that “U.S. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder said earlier this month that his department was investigating a possible Iranian role, but had not reached a conclusion.”

And to cover the issue from the Saudi perspective, the Arabian-based Gulf Wire reported the same thing: “Meanwhile, the issue of Iranian involvement in the case was addressed by U.S. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder last week. ‘We are investigating information concerning the involvement of Saudi nationals, Iranian government officials and others.’ He added, ‘We have not reached a conclusion regarding whether the attack was directed by the government of Iran.'”

Brother John

Of course, this is not the first time I have written about Mr. Podesta and his fantastic ability to obscure reality. I have had dealings with Mr. Podesta before over his conflict of interest with his brother Tony Podesta.

While writing an article on supercomputer exports, I found that John had given a donation to the DNC that he said occurred while employed by his brother Tony, a powerful D.C. lobbyist. However, this donation took place when John was actually employed at the White House for Bill Clinton.

John took great pains to quickly change the donation record at the FEC to reflect the fact that he was indeed employed at the White House. It is the only such donation he made while working for Clinton.

Yet, the donation record opened a whole new world of documentation hidden inside the Clinton White House. John Podesta ran the Clinton policy for high-tech computer exports at the same time his brother – and former employer – ran the lobby effort for high-tech U.S. computer companies.

Supercomputers for China and Russia

In the early 1990s, several U.S. computer CEOs formed a joint lobby organization called the CSPP, or Computer Systems Policy Project. By 1994 Tony Podesta, the brother of John Podesta, ran the multimillion-dollar corporate lobby effort through his firm, Podesta Associates, using an employee, Ken Kay, as the CSPP executive director.

In 1994, the CSPP association with Tony Podesta quickly paid off. Several CSPP members won exclusive trade deals through Clinton and Ron Brown. CEO James Treybig of Tandem went with Ron Brown on a trade trip to China in August 1994. Treybig concluded an exclusive $150 million export of mission-control computers for the Chinese Army Long March space rocket.

In June 1995, Ken Kay led the delegation of CSPP CEOs into a closed meeting inside the White House. In this closed meeting, the CEOs from AT&T;, Apple, Compaq, Digital, HP, Unisys, Cray, Silicon Graphics, Tandem and others were sworn to secrecy. The CEOs could not talk under penalty of law.

The Clinton administration made top-secret designs and top-secret contracts available to the CSPP computer companies. In exchange for their cooperation and silence, the companies would be given lucrative export deals and access to even more advanced technology left over from the cold war.

Yet, while it is true that CSPP members thrived on high-tech exports authorized by the Clinton administration, it is also true that Clinton and Gore thrived on the millions of dollars in donations and soft money made available from CSPP members such as Apple, AT&T;, Digital and Silicon Graphics.

For example, once inside the White House the CSPP CEOs were given a detailed briefing by a State Department expert on supercomputers and nuclear weapons. Shortly after the meeting, CSPP member Silicon Graphics sold several supercomputers to a Russian nuclear weapons lab under the pretense of “civilian” uses.

Waiver or Pardon?

Nor is the Clinton cronyism hard to find. In response to a request for an interview, White House lawyers acknowledged that John Podesta did indeed have a conflict of interest problem with his brother Tony and the CSPP. According to White House counsel, in 1997 President Clinton solved the Podesta problem by signing a legal waiver absolving John Podesta of any conflict of interest. Clinton has to date refused to show the legal waiver obtained by John Podesta. Nor did Clinton’s attorneys explain why John Podesta felt it necessary to obtain a waiver in 1997 for actions he took in 1994 and 1995.

Of course, a legal waiver for possible criminal actions committed in the past is not a waiver but a pardon.

It is just this kind of activity that FBI Director Freeh missed inside the White House. Freeh had so many scandals coming at him on a daily basis, it was hard to decide which to investigate – so he elected to investigate none.

As a reward for his inept leadership, Clinton took space in his book to blame Freeh for the China-Gate scandal.

Of course, the Clinton pardon or waiver – whichever you prefer to call it – removed any fear of prosecution or investigation. Thus, John Podesta can rest easy with a fat bank account and a cushy job heading a fake think-tank inside Washington, D.C.

Dear John – I know you have no conscience but next time – check your facts.

China’s Force Of 1000 Nuclear Tipped Missiles Aimed At America Thanks To Bill Clinton!

UPDATED WITH MORE INFORMATION BELOW…..

Once upon a time…I interviewed Charles Smith on my radio program. What he shared and what you read below and on my blogs concerning Bill Clinton’s acts of TREASON is what has been then up to this day hidden by the Synagogue of Satan Jew owned media and the Sodom and Gomorrah Party AKA Democratic Party. I also realized that there was a coming Judgement on this country as revealed by God in 1988 to Elder Tom Beem and what was allowed to happen was the preparation of that Judgement to take place.

 

https://richardboydenreport.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/df-15a.jpg

New Red Missile Armed With U.S. Technology

Charles R. Smith
Wednesday, Aug. 13, 2003

The Pentagon reports that China has improved its missile force with U.S technology. The improvements enable Chinese missiles to now accurately strike the U.S. base at Okinawa with “satellite-aided guidance” navigation technology obtained from America during the Clinton administration.

The Chinese army has (People’s Liberation Army, or PLA) developed a new version of its DF-15 missile – also known as the CSS-6. The new version is reported to be guided by advanced satellite navigation systems. The upgrade will allow the missile to accurately strike targets in Okinawa and Taiwan.

The new Chinese missiles were developed as a result of exports from the U.S. during the Clinton years. President Clinton was warned in 1997 by a Rand Corporation report that selling satellite navigation technology to the Chinese military was clearly a threat to U.S. national security.

“The most troubling potential transfer to China is Rockwell’s proposed joint venture deal with the Shanghai Broadcast Equipment Factory and the Shanghai Avionics Corporation, the latter of which is a key enterprise of the Aviation Industries of China,” states the 1997 Rand report.

“Rockwell Collins Navigation and Communications Equipment Company, Ltd. will design, develop, and build Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation receivers systems for the Chinese market. These components have serious dual-use applications, since the acquisition of reliable GPS data can enhance, to varying degrees, the capacity of militaries to field highly accurate cruise and ballistic missiles, such as those used to intimidate Taiwan during March 1996.

“More accurate GPS systems would enhance the PLA’s ability to carry out attacks against Taiwan’s military and industrial facilities, potentially reducing the ability of the Taiwanese military to defend itself against PRC coercive diplomacy. The use of GPS to enhance the accuracy of long-range Chinese cruise missiles, coupled with long-range sensors, would raise serious concerns for the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, and possibly circumscribe their ability to provide an effective deterrent in a crisis over Taiwan,” states the Rand Corporation report.

Clinton Legacy in Action

Despite the warning from the Rand Corporation, Clinton personally approved the transfer of satellite navigation technology directly to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

The transfer also included several guided tours for Chinese army officers of U.S. manufacturing facilities. In 1997, the PLAAF was given a demonstration in Sunnyvale Calif., by Ashtech, a maker of GPS receivers.

The briefing for the PLAAF and Chinese navy officers stated that “Ashtech produces a receiver that uses both the U.S. GPS signals and the Russian GLONASS signals resulting in significantly greater availability and integrity.”

In 1999, the Clinton administration offered the PLAAF the latest in advanced “mobile radars,” command and control systems, GPS navigation and “Surveillance Avionics” such as “Air to Air,” “Air to Ground” and “Surface Area Movement” surveillance radars.

1,000 New Red Missiles

According to the 2003 Pentagon report, China is well on its way toward deploying an estimated 1,000 advanced ballistic missiles by the end of the decade.

The People’s Liberation Army has over 450 missiles pointed at Taiwan and is currently adding new missiles at a rate of over 75 a year. Instead of slowing or halting missile production, China has in fact increased its production. Defense intelligence sources expect China to increase the rate of missile production to 100 a year by 2005.

The Pentagon noted that the ballistic missile trend poses “a growing and significant challenge” to the U.S., Taiwan and our Pacific allies.

“Within the next several years, the size of China’s SRBM force is expected to grow substantially. An expanded arsenal of conventional SRBMs (Short Range Ballistic Missiles) and LACMs (Land Attack Cruise Missiles) targeted against critical facilities, such as key airfields and C4I nodes, will complicate Taiwan’s ability to conduct military operations. By 2005, China will have deployed both the CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBM,” states the Pentagon report.

The 2003 Pentagon report also outlines exactly how China intends to make use of its new missile technology.

“Should Beijing choose escalation, a rapid transition from relatively low-intensity blockade operations to massive missile strikes would be a likely step, particularly as a pretext to an invasion,” states the Pentagon report.

“These missile attacks most likely would be high-volume, precision strikes against priority military and political targets, including air defense facilities, airfields, Taiwan’s C2 infrastructure, and naval facilities,” notes the Pentagon report.

“Exclusive Taiwan reliance on active missile defenses and associated BM/C3I, however, will not sufficiently offset the overwhelming advantage in offensive missiles which Beijing is projected to possess in 2005,” warns the Pentagon report.

Russian and Israeli Weapons

The Pentagon also outlined where China is currently spending its weapons money. According to the 2003 report, China has purchased over $2 billion worth of Russian weapons per year for the last four years.

The primary benefactor of the Chinese arms buys is the Chinese air force. The PLAAF has acquired Russian Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 supersonic strike fighter jets. The Pentagon also believes that China has acquired a limited number of naval-strike versions of the Su-30 fighter.

The report also mentions the newly developed J-10 strike fighter. Chinese sources indicate that a small number of the advanced fighters are in service, but the Pentagon report noted that it expects the supersonic jet to enter service in 2005.

China has also added to its EW (Electronic Warfare) arsenal with both new hardware and information warfare weaponry. China has purchased several Israeli made Harpy weapons. The Israeli Harpy can loiter over a battlefield for extended periods of time, searching for radars or communications radios, and then strike when it finds a target.

Information Warfare

“The Chinese currently are focusing on eliminating specific deficiencies they have in both areas of IO/IW (Information Operations/Information Warfare) technology and training. The PLA is engaged in efforts to improve the staff planning process by applying joint forces concepts learned from studying foreign IO/IW doctrine,” states the Pentagon report.

“Recent IO/IW military exercises claim to have included computer network attack and defend exercises. Public disclosure of these IO/IW exercises serves as an informational tool for the PLA to the future importance of IO/IW in Chinese military doctrine and reaffirms China’s intent to continue developing and improving its IO/IW capability,” notes the Pentagon report.

The new missiles and increased production rate comes as a shock to China apologists, who contend that China will halt its weapons buildup. The facts surrounding the massive increase in the Chinese military, however, clearly show that there is no end to the buildup increase in sight.

“The PLA will field large numbers of increasingly accurate SRBMs (Short Range Ballistic Missiles) and introduce LACMs (Land Attack Cruise Missiles) into its inventory. China’s naval forces will continue their transition from a large coastal defense force to a smaller, more modern force able to conduct limited sea control operations against regional opponents in the East and South China Seas. China’s air force will continue to assimilate greater numbers of fourth generation aircraft into its inventory, upgrade its regional IADS (Integrated Air Defense Systems), and expand its airborne refueling and AEW (Airborne Early Warning) capabilities. China will retain a numerical advantage over Taiwan in terms of both personnel and weapons,” concludes the 2003 Pentagon report.

 

China is expected to field a total force of about 1,000 nuclear tipped missiles, including a large number of strategic mobile missiles capable of striking anywhere in America. The new Chinese DF-41 mobile ICBM is based on the Russian SS-27 Topol M. thanks to Loral CEO and Jew Bernard Schwartz and President Bill Clinton

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCES
SECOND ARTILLERY CORPSThe Second Artillery Corps is comprised of approximately 120,000 personnel and maintains control of over 300 nuclear warheads. According to the Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) the Second Artillery Corps is given priority funding over all other PLA units. Although it only makes up about 4 percent of the PLA, it receives 12 to 15 percent of the defense budget and about 20 percent of the total procurement budget. When the PLA cut 1 million personnel in the 1980s, Second Artillery Corps ranks increased in total size.

The Second Artillery Corps is headquartered in Qinghe, a suburb of Beijing and maintains at least seven missile bases each with one to three missile brigades and regiment-level special departments responsible for chemical defense, communications, training, security and four launch battalions. Each base also has training and nuclear warhead maintenance units and reports directly to the Second Artillery Corps commander. Each missile brigade commands a number of permanent launch sites. For ease of maintenance, each missile brigade is responsible for only one type of missile.

80301 Unit. The 80301 Unit is headquartered in Shenyang, Liaoning Province. Its complement of DF-3A and DF-21 cover the Korean peninsula and Japan, including Okinawa.

80302 Unit. The 80302 Unit is headquartered in Huangshan, Anhui Province and is the Second Artillery’s most important unit for conducting strikes against Taiwan. The 815th brigade in Leping took part in the March 1996 missile exercises off the coast of Taiwan. During a wartime situation the 815th brigade would disperse to prearranged sites in Fujian Province in to order to be able to strike the entire island of Taiwan. Missiles are usually transported by rail for field deployments.

80303 Unit. The 80303 Unit is headquartered in Kunming, Yunnan province. Its complement of DF-3A and DF-21 can strike targets in India and Southeast Asia.

80304 Unit. The 80304 Unit is headquartered in Luoyang, Henan province. Its DF-5 missiles can strike targets throughout the United States and Europe.

80305 Unit. The 80305 Unit is headquartered in Huaihua, Hunan province. Its DF-4 missiles can strike Guam.

80306 Unit. The 80306 Unit is headquartered in Xining, Qinghai province. Its DF-4 missiles can strike targets in India and Russia. This unit may also have an experimental unit assigned to it.


RED MISSILE POWER



DF-15 Chinese Tactical Missile

The Pentagon – Virginia.

The Defense Dept. has upped their estimate on the number of intermediate and short range Chinese ballistic missile facing Taiwan. According to the Defense Dept., satellite photos now show over 200 DF-11 and DF-15 mobile units are in position to fire their missiles at the tiny island Republic. The red missiles are reported to be armed with nuclear and chemical warheads.

According to the little red book (Chairman Mao) the nuclear and chemical warheads are under the control of Communist party Politburo officers. The warheads are carried separately under Politburo guard and only attached to the mobile missiles under the direct command from Beijing party headquarters.

DOD satellite photos also show that China has already begun their new nuclear missile program. DOD has quietly reported that China is scheduled to deploy an estimated 600 new mobile short and medium range tactical missiles over the next 24 months. The DOD total force estimates are based on known production and new storage/basing facilities built for the Chinese 2nd Artillery Corps.

The tactical DF-15 mobile missiles are currently being produced at their highest rate ever recorded. China previously manufactured no more than one DF-15 missile per month. DOD analysts say that satellite photos show that China has increased mobile missile production to as many as 20 brand new nuclear tipped units per month.

China is expected to field a total force of about 1,000 nuclear tipped missiles, including a large number of strategic mobile missiles capable of striking anywhere in America. The new Chinese DF-41 mobile ICBM is based on the Russian SS-27 Topol M.

CHINESE TACTICAL MISSILE


DONG FENG (EAST WIND) 15 – EXPORT VERSION M9

CLICK HERE TO READ THE STORY ON NEWSMAX.COM


WARHEAD   -  1,100 LB. (500 KG) CHEMICAL, NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL
             20 KT. NEUTRON (ENHANCED RADIATION) WEAPON
             350 KT. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEAD
RANGE     -  370 MILES (600 KM)
DIAMETER  -  3.3 FEET (1 METER)
LENGTH    -  30 FEET (9.1 METERS)
WEIGHT    -  13,700 POUNDS (6,200 KG)
ENGINE    -  SOLID PROPELLENT
GUIDANCE  -  STRAP DOWN INERTIAL
             GPS SUPPLIED BY ROCKWELL
             POSSIBLE FOLLOW ON SAR RADAR ACTIVE TARGETING
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 100 METERS

DONG FENG means “East Wind” in Chinese and is a Maoist slogan. The DF-15 is a short range, mobile, tactical missile, normallly deployed on a eight wheeled mobile launcher/erector. The launcher is a specially adapted version of a German made commercial truck and offers good cross-country capability.


DONG FENG MARV WARHEAD IS DESIGNED TO EVADE PATRIOT AND STANDARD DEFENSE MISSILESThe DF-15 warhead separates after main engine burnout and uses onboard thrusters to correct its course to target. Recent reports show that DF-15 units may be equipped with ROCKWELL GPS navigation systems and a follow on version will have active SAR radar targeting.

DF-15 warheads shot at Taiwan during the February 1996 PLA exercises also displayed MARV or MAneuverable Re-entry Vehicle tactics by changing course and speed in an effort to avoid defensive missiles.



2003 U.S. DEFENSE DEPT. REPORT ON THE CHINESE MILITARY

China – Other Factors.

Military Leadership. The PLA does not approach leadership in the same way as Western military forces, placing greater emphasis on technical skills than on leadership development. The PLA’s leadership culture is also risk averse, favoring the status quo over change. Historical experiences and decades of Communist propaganda have made the majority of Chinese military leaders suspicious of the outside world and its attitudes toward China’s increasing power and influence. Relatively few senior officers have travelled abroad, although the military has undertaken a significant military diplomatic effort since the early 1990s that is overcoming this deficiency. The result of this physical and intellectual isolation has been the development of a strongly nationalistic outlook among the officer corps that could color negatively the leadership’s approach to international developments seen impacting China’s sovereignty or security.

China’s military leadership is united on its desire to acquire or improve selected military capabilities in the near term. In the longer term, military leaders want to overhaul significantly the entire armed forces to create a smaller, technically more advanced instrument to fight in the immediate vicinity of China’s borders. There also is a corresponding emphasis on military professionalism in China. While the political commissar system still exists and political officers share joint command with their operational brethren, the military now emphasizes operational training over political indoctrination. This trend will create a less politicized officer corps, especially among junior and mid-grade officers. It also will move the military leadership toward forming a more corporate military identity.

Senior Chinese officers are studying modern technological advances and how these can best be incorporated into the current and projected military doctrine and structure. These officers are still generally more familiar and comfortable with an operational level of conflict that relies primarily on ground forces to achieve objectives. Below the most senior level, an increasing number of officers in command positions are conversant in, and somewhat experienced with, modern technological and operational concepts like joint operations. Nevertheless, the military has recently renewed its emphasis on upgrading scientific and technical education in order to overcome perceived deficiencies in the officer corps in this respect.

Training. In recent years, China has shown a growing willingness to experiment with new aspects of training. Training has become more realistic and challenging, with an increased participation by opposition force units and greater emphasis on combined arms. Although intraservice training at the tactical level is improving, joint exercises are still tightly controlled and indicative of the difficulty the PLA likely would have in executing operational-level battle plans. While this past year’s summer floods disrupted training for a large percentage of the PLA, certain exercises were not cancelled, particularly those emphasizing Beijing’s commitment to improve joint training.

Professional Military Education. Professional military education for both officers and NCOs in the PLA is a high priority for Beijing. Institutional structures designed to instill a high degree of professionalism throughout the force were conspicuously absent in China until 1978, when the PLA began to address educational shortfalls. Since that time, Beijing has established a number of educational institutions throughout the military, although the emphasis remains on the officer corps.

The key organization shaping the professional development of the senior PLA officer corps is the National Defense University (NDU). It instructs senior officers in areas such as strategic studies, operational art, organizational command and management, combined arms and joint service operations, foreign military studies, and logistics. The NDU also provides information and advice on military modernization and broad strategic issues to national-level organizations; it also performs research on various strategic and operational military issues. The second tier in the PLA’s officer education system consists of military colleges and academies which prepare field grade officers for regimental-level command and address the fundamentals of joint and combined arms operations. The curriculum concentrates on company, battalion, and regimental tactics. In addition, the schools teach basic joint operations. A small number of schools also trains students in specialty staff duties, such as engineering and communications. The lowest tier of officer education is provided by military colleges and academies for junior officers and mid-rank officers; they provide multiple avenues for undergraduate and general military education. The curriculum consists of three and four year undergraduate programs and a two year vocational program. The majority of the cadets are upper middle school graduates.

The PLA’s NCO Corps is in its infancy, having been established only in the late 1980s. Chinese NCOs–former conscripts who are allowed to remain on active duty following their initial enlistment –are classified as either “master sergeants” or “technical sergeants.” Newly selected NCOs attend a six month training program at the MR academies. Training is limited to tactics for the master sergeants and technical subjects for the technical sergeants. Beijing has not yet established formal education programs for NCOs beyond their initial training.

Joint/Integrated Operations. The PLA conducts interservice exercises at the tactical level, but the services are not fully integrated into a cohesive combat force. Disparate elements train simultaneously and in proximity, but do not appear to be controlled at the operational level by a joint commander and staff. Ground and air components exercise together with regularity and are improving their interoperability. Integration of ground and naval forces, however, is rarely exercised, particularly at the operational level, where synchronization and command and control are of greatest importance in the conduct of complex operations. The navy is beginning to conduct more combined operations between ships and naval aircraft. The PLA also is looking into the possibility of instituting a “joint command” structure at the operational or theater level, similar to that of the U.S. military. Accordingly, a commander would exercise operational control over all military forces assigned to and deployed in a particular area. These “joint commands” likely would be given specifically assigned missions in response to particular threats or security requirements.

Morale. Morale within the PLA, particularly among enlisted personnel, is assessed as generally low. Problems of desertion, declining relations between officers and troops, reluctance to train with obsolete equipment, high consumption spending by officers, anti-corruption audits which restrict outside earnings, and food shortages have been reported in the Chinese press. Low pay in comparison to other segments of Chinese society is a key factor. The PLA’s involvement in business–at least until just recently when it was directed to divest itself of its commercial interests–also distracted many of its more competent officers from their military duties. Some Chinese military leaders believe that many of the morale problems can be solved by increased pay and allowances, further professionalization of the force, and improved quality of life.

Logistics and Sustainability. The PLA’s logistics structure and doctrine still reflect, for the most part, the decades-long focus on fighting a large-scale ground conflict, wherein a MR commander would conduct autonomous combat operations over an extended period. The logistics infrastructure developed to support such regional operations is highly decentralized, based on interior lines of communication, and optimized to depend on local depots and stockpiles for resupply. MR commanders apparently were given broad leeway to develop region-specific logistics management procedures. These practices have inhibited the implementation of PLA-wide standards, since the separate management systems made interregional operations virtually impossible. In recent years, the PLA has devoted attention to improving its logistics support to military operations in a Taiwan scenario–operations which would include a higher tempo of operations and use of high technology weapons and equipment. It reportedly has automated many inventory control processes, streamlined procurement, and improved mechanisms for getting supplies to deployed troops. While these developments appear to offer a modest capability to support some types of military operations in the region, the PLA has made only incremental improvements in its ability to support a large-scale, long-term, high optempo engagement.

Taiwan – Other Factors

Military Leadership. Overall, Taiwan’s military leadership is competent and capable. Taiwan officers of all services and ranks exhibit a relatively high degree of professionalism. They generally are well educated, operationally proficient, and technically sophisticated–especially when contrasted with their PLA counterparts–and pro-U.S. in their outlook. Balanced against these attributes, the officer corps functions within a culture that values caution over innovation and initiative. Junior officers are familiar with technological improvements but recent modernization efforts will challenge their management skills and may require adjustments to unit training and operational tempos. The Taiwan military will face an ongoing challenge in retaining qualified junior officers as employment opportunities in the civilian sector remain enticing. The increased importance of technology in modern warfare has led to an increased emphasis in Taiwan on modernizing the technology-intensive services, namely the Air Force and Navy. While Army officers continue to dominate the senior leadership positions within the defense hierarchy–the Army comprises more than 50 percent of the armed forces– the emphasis on the Air Force and Navy may lead to a corresponding rise in the influence of air and naval officers over matters such as defense procurement priorities and employment doctrine. Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui strongly supports the promotion of native Taiwanese officers to senior military positions. Currently, the Chief of General Staff and commanders of the air force and marines are ethnic Taiwanese. This trend will continue and probably will have a positive effect on the morale and cohesion of the lower ranks of the armed forces, who themselves are overwhelmingly native Taiwanese.

Training. Taiwan’s large-scale training normally takes place quarterly with the major training centers hosting limited maneuver and live-fire exercises. HAN KUANG 14, conducted in mid-May 1998, was one of Taipei’s more typical joint exercises to date. Primarily a C4I exercise, the training was of very short duration and the scenario allowed for only limited exercise play. Taipei scheduled another “joint exercise” on 12 October 1998, but then cancelled it as a “goodwill gesture” toward Beijing in the run-up to the resumption of high level cross-Strait talks on 14 October. A dress rehearsal on 7 October also was cancelled, although a “preliminary dress rehearsal” was held on 2 October. It consisted of a series of live-fire demonstrations showcasing some of Taiwan’s most modern military equipment.

Professional Military Education. Professional military education of Taiwan’s officer corps is conducted along two developmental lines: the universal track for regular career officers and the professional track for officers in specialized fields like political affairs, medicine, and engineering. The universal track is the general military education for officers provided at the three service academies. Graduates receive a bachelor’s degree after completing 130 university-level credit hours. The Naval Academy concentrates on science and engineering, while the Air Force Academy curriculum focuses on aerospace-related courses and includes supervised flight training beginning in the second year. Newly commissioned Army officers go on to branch schools, i.e., infantry, army, and artillery. Education in the professional track is conducted at such specialized schools like the Fu Hsing Kang College, the Defense Medical College, the Defense Management College, and the Chung Cheng Institute of Technology. Mid-career and senior career professional military education is conducted at the Armed Forces University (AFU). Tracing its roots back to 1906, AFU is the highest level institution in the Taiwan military education system. It is responsible for training strategic-level command and staff officers, as well as specialists in defense administration and military intelligence. It also conducts research into the development of war strategies and political warfare. AFU includes four colleges: the War College for senior field grade and general officers and the Command and Staff Colleges of the Army, Navy, and Air Force for junior field grade officers.

Morale. Morale, especially among the enlisted ranks, is generally assessed as poor, amidst efforts to retain competent, educated service members in the face of stiff private sector competition. The military competes poorly with the civilian economy in attracting Taiwan’s youth, especially those who are technically-oriented. Continued personnel shortages stemming from low retention rates– especially among NCOs–will remain a serious problem affecting morale. The military also is hampered by systemic problems of poor, antiquated management and a traditional military culture with very rigid command structures which discourages lower-level risk-taking, decisionmaking, and innovation. The Taiwan Army especially is facing morale problems stemming from the ongoing restructuring and downsizing. While the operational outlook and overall morale of TAF pilots is significantly better than that of PLAAF pilots– largely due to better training opportunities and exposure to and hands on experience with more modern Western equipment–there exists a disparity between the military and civil aviators in pay and benefits, which inevitably affects morale.

Logistics and Sustainability. Taiwan’s logistics capability will support some defensive operations on Taiwan, but its probability of success is highly dependent on the tempo of operations. The military reportedly is trying to make the logistics system more efficient to better support combined or joint force operations. In the interim, logistics support will remain cumbersome–but effective–for localized engagements. Taiwan’s defenses rely heavily on air and naval forces, both requiring an extensive maintenance and repair infrastructure to support weapons systems and equipment. The critical requirements are major equipment end items like engines and transmissions, ammunition, fuel and especially obsolete spare parts which no longer are being manufactured.

IV. THE DYNAMIC BALANCE

Currently, China’s more than 2.5-million-man PLA dwarfs Taiwan’s defense force of about 400,000. In most cases, equipment totals also are lopsided. Only a portion of this overall strength, however, could be brought to bear against Taiwan at one time. China has nearly 4,500 combat aircraft, as compared with some 400 on Taiwan. The Chinese Navy has about 65 attack submarines–five of which are nuclear powered–as compared with four diesel attack submarines for Taiwan. China has over 60 major surface combatants while Taiwan has no more than 40. China has nuclear weapons and a ballistic missile force that can deliver nuclear or conventionally-armed warheads against Taiwan. In terms of the quality of their military equipment, however, Taipei possesses an edge over Beijing, as new weapons systems–particularly fighter aircraft and naval frigates–are entering the inventory.

Should China decide to use military force against Taiwan, there are several options or courses of action available to Beijing, including–but not limited to–an interdiction of Taiwan’s SLOCs and a blockade of Taiwan’s ports, a large-scale missile attack, and an all-out invasion.

Blockade. The primary intent behind a blockade of the island would be to cripple Taiwan economically and isolate it internationally. China’s leaders apparently believe that this option would be less likely to provoke outside intervention than others. Beijing probably would choose successively more stringent quarantine-blockade actions, beginning with declaring maritime exercise closure areas and stopping Taiwan-flagged merchant vessels operating in the Taiwan Strait. Operations likely would include mine laying and deploying submarines and surface ships to enforce the blockade. Barring third party intervention, the PLAN’s quantitative advantage over Taiwan’s Navy in surface and sub-surface assets would probably prove overwhelming over time. Taiwan’s military forces probably would not be able keep the island’s key ports and SLOCs open in the face of concerted Chinese military action. Taiwan’s small surface fleet and four submarines are numerically insufficient to counter China’s major surface combatant force and its ASW assets likely would have difficulty defeating a blockade supported by China’s large submarine force. The PLANAF’s B-6D bombers armed with C-601 ASCMs would place Taipei’s merchant ships and combatants at serious risk.

Missile Strikes. Within the next several years, the size of China’s SRBM force is expected to grow substantially. An expanded arsenal of conventional SRBMs and LACMs targeted against critical facilities, such as key airfields and C4I nodes, will complicate Taiwan’s ability to conduct military operations. By 2005, China will have deployed both the CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBM. In addition, the PLA could have a first generation, air-launched LACM in its inventory. Should Beijing choose escalation, a rapid transition from relatively low-intensity blockade operations to massive missile strikes would be a likely step, particularly as a pretext to an invasion. These missile attacks most likely would be high-volume, precision strikes against priority military and political targets, including air defense facilities, airfields, Taiwan’s C2 infrastructure, and naval facilities. China, however, could encounter problems coordinating missile firings with other concurrent military operations, such as air and maritime engagements. Exclusive Taiwan reliance on active missile defenses and associated BM/C3I, however, will not sufficiently offset the overwhelming advantage in offensive missiles which Beijing is projected to possess in 2005.

Air Superiority. Maintaining air superiority over the Taiwan Strait would be an essential part of any Chinese effort to mount a military operation against Taiwan. China currently has an overwhelming quantitative advantage over Taiwan in military aircraft and will retain that advantage beyond 2005. On the other hand, Taiwan’s more modern aircraft will provide it with a qualitative advantage that should be retained at least through that period. PLA electronic warfare operations against air defense radars, disruption of command and control networks, and/or large scale conventional SRBM and LACM strikes against airfields and SAM sites would reduce the effectiveness of Taiwan’s air defenses.

The future effectiveness of the TAF will depend on the implementation of sound pilot training, sufficient logistic and maintenance support, and the ability of the TAF to integrate satisfactorily several disparate airframes into a cohesive, operational fighting force.

For its part, Beijing is faced with similar training, maintenance, and logistics challenges, complicated further by a still questionable capability on the part of its aerospace industry to keep pace with rapidly evolving technologies. Nevertheless, while the majority of the mainland’s air fleet will still be composed of second and third generation aircraft, the sheer numerical advantage of older platforms augmented by some fourth generation aircraft could attrit Taiwan’s air defenses sufficiently over time to achieve air superiority.

Amphibious Invasion. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan by China would be a highly risky and most unlikely option for the PLA, chosen only as a last resort to force the total surrender of the island. It most likely would be preceded by a variety of preparatory operations to include a blockade, conventional missile strikes, and special operations on Taiwan. These operations would play a critical role in determining how China would pursue the coup de grace, with an amphibious assault only one facet of a multi-pronged invasion plan. Beijing’s amphibious lift capability is extremely limited at present and there are no indications that China is devoting resources to improve significantly its amphibious assault capability. As a result, success only would be achieved with a massive commitment of military and civilian assets over a long period of time and without third party intervention; furthermore, an invasion would bring almost certain damage to China’s economy and its diplomatic interests, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

The first move in an invasion plan likely would be a SLOC/blockade interdiction operation. The PLAAF and PLANAF would try to establish an air defense umbrella over the Taiwan Strait in preparation for local air superiority operations. Ground-based air defense assets would deploy forward and be integrated into the umbrella. Naval surface actions groups would begin operations near Taiwan’s major ports. Announced missile closure areas and port mining by submarines would be designed to canalize traffic and force Taiwan naval vessels into engagement areas. Ground force mobilization likely would begin and PLA combat air patrols over the Taiwan Strait would intensify. Invasion operations would follow sufficiently close on the heels of conventional missile attacks to prevent Taipei from repairing and reconstituting damaged facilities. As the PLA’s amphibious lift capacity in 2005 would still be limited, an amphibious over-the-beach assault would be extremely problematic. Rather, airborne, airmobile, and special operations forces likely would conduct simultaneous attacks to the rear of Taiwan’s coastal defenses to seize a port, preferably in close proximity to an airfield. Seizing a beach-head likely would constitute a supporting attack. An airborne envelopment would facilitate amphibious operations by cutting off Taiwan’s coastal defenders from supply lines and forcing them to fight in two directions.

Beijing’s suppression of Taiwan’s air defenses would be followed rapidly by a “second-wave” air attack which would attempt to establish air superiority over an invasion corridor in the Taiwan Strait. Priority for air defense protection and fighter escort operations would shift from bombers carrying ASCMs to fixed- and rotary-wing transports ferrying additional airborne and airmobile assault forces. Both China’s amphibious fleet and a large portion of its huge merchant fleet would complete rapid reaction unit upload operations and depart from ports along the central coast. China also likely would saturate the Taiwan Strait with a huge number of noncombatant merchant and fishing vessels, with the aim of confusing and overwhelming Taipei’s surveillance and target acquisition systems. The PLA’s success in establishing and maintaining a foothold on the island would rest on a variety of intangibles to include personnel and equipment attrition rates on both sides of the Strait; the interoperability of PLA forces; and the ability of China’s logistic system to support adequately optempo operations.

In order for an invasion to succeed, in other words, Beijing would have to possess the capability to conduct a multi-faceted campaign, involving air assault, airborne insertion, special operations raids, amphibious landings, maritime area denial operations, air superiority operations and conventional missile strikes. The PLA likely would encounter great difficulty conducting such a sophisticated campaign by 2005. Nevertheless, the campaign likely would succeed–barring third party intervention–if Beijing were willing to accept the almost certain political, economic, diplomatic, and military costs that such a course of action would produce.

Information Dominance. The Chinese currently are focusing on eliminating specific deficiencies they have in both areas of IO/IW technology and training. The PLA is engaged in efforts to improve the staff planning process by applying joint forces concepts learned from studying foreign IO/IW doctrine. Recent IO/IW military exercises claim to have included computer network attack and defend exercises. Public disclosure of these IO/IW exercises serves as an informational tool for the PLA to the future importance of IO/IW in Chinese military doctrine and reaffirms China’s intent to continue developing and improving its IO/IW capability. In spite of these activities, the Chinese have many challenges to overcome and Beijing’s ability to paralyze Taiwan’s command and control appears limited at best.

On the other side of Taiwan Strait, IO may be an attractive–but untested tool–in multiplying the effectiveness of Taiwan’s military forces. As one of the world’s largest producers of computer components, Taiwan has all of the basic capabilities needed to carry out offensive IO-related activities, particularly computer network attacks and the introduction of malicious code. Formal doctrine development to guide future employment of these capabilities already may be in progress. As Taiwan increases its role in the manufacture of new computer warfighting systems, Taipei’s capability to exploit its position for IO activities can be expected to increase substantially.

V. CONCLUSIONS

During the twenty-year period from 1979 to 1999, the security situation in the Taiwan Strait has exhibited simultaneously both significant change in some respects and remarkable constancy in others. The greatest change has occurred in the political and diplomatic arenas, a reflection of the political changes which have taken place in both Beijing and Taipei, and between Beijing and Taipei. On the other hand, despite the modest qualitative improvement in the military forces of both China and Taiwan, the dynamic equilibrium of those forces in the Taiwan Strait has not changed dramatically over the last two decades, except in a few niche areas like China’s deployment of SRBMs.

Despite anticipated improvements to Taiwan’s missile and air defense systems, by 2005, the PLA will possess the capability to attack Taiwan with air and missile strikes which would degrade key military facilities and damage the island’s economic infrastructure. China will continue to give priority to long-range precision-strike programs. Similarly, despite improvements in Taiwan’s ability to conduct ASW operations, China will retain the capability to interdict Taiwan’s SLOCs and blockade the island’s principal maritime ports. Should China invade Taiwan, such an operation would require a major commitment of civilian air and maritime transport assets, would be prolonged in duration, and would not be automatically guaranteed to succeed. In the end, any of these options would prove to be costly to Beijing–politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily.

Beyond 2005, development of a modern military force capable of exerting military influence within the region, achieving deterrence against potential enemies, preserving independence of action in domestic and foreign affairs, protecting the nation’s economic resources and maritime areas, and defending the sovereignty of the nation’s territory will remain one of China’s national priorities. Beijing will strive to create a smaller, more modern, better trained, more professional, and better logistically supported force, with an emphasis on air, naval and missile forces. China will continue to improve its regional force projection capabilities, but will not possess the conventional military capabilities to exert global influence.

The PLA will field large numbers of increasingly accurate SRBMs and introduce LACMs into its inventory. China’s naval forces will continue their transition from a large coastal defense force to a smaller, more modern force able to conduct limited sea control operations against regional opponents in the East and South China Seas. China’s air force will continue to assimilate greater numbers of fourth generation aircraft into its inventory, upgrade its regional IADS, and expand its airborne refueling and AEW capabilities. China will retain a numerical advantage over Taiwan in terms of both personnel and weapons.

On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, by 2005, Taipei will possess a qualitative edge over Beijing in terms of significant weapons and equipment. The TAF will have over 300 fourth generation fighters. Six French- built Lafayette-class frigates, eight U.S. Knox-class frigates, and eight Perry-class frigates will form the nucleus of Taiwan’s naval force. Taiwan will possess an advanced air defense network, comprising an AEW capability, an automated C2 system, and several modern SAM systems, which will provide Taiwan with an enhanced defensive capability against both aircraft and missiles. The mobility and firepower of Taiwan’s ground forces will have been improved with the acquisition of additional tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery and attack helicopters.

Taiwan’s primary security goal beyond 2005 will be to maintain the status quo, while retaining its long-term objective of eventual peaceful reunification with China on terms favorable to Taipei. Taiwan will seek to advance its international status, maintain a strong economy, modernize its military forces, and further democratize the island’s political system. At the same time, Taipei will endeavor to expand political, cultural, and economic ties with Beijing, thereby reducing tensions with China and lessening the prospects of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s military strategy will remain defensive. Its success in deterring potential Chinese aggression will be dependent on its continued acquisition of modern arms, technology and equipment and its ability to deal with a number of systemic problems — primarily the recruitment and retention of technically-qualified personnel and the maintenance of an effective logistics system–lest Taipei once again risk losing its qualitative edge.

HUGHES SUPPLIES THE PLA WITH A SATELLITE “WORLD CLASS” REMOTE SENSING CENTER

SOURCE – U.S. COMMERCE DEPT. DOCUMENT RELEASED BY COURT ACTION 398CV716

ROCKWELL SUPPLIES PLAAF WITH GPS


SOURCE – U.S. COMMERCE DEPT. DOCUMENT RELEASED BY COURT ACTION 398CV716

CHINESE SARDINE ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILE


LORAL SAR RADAR FOR A PLA MISSILE UNIT

SOURCE – U.S. COMMERCE DEPT. DOCUMENT FROM FOIA ON LORAL

TEXT VERSION OF LORAL LETTER TO RON BROWN


CHINESE HONG-7 SUPER-SONIC BOMBER


1. (UNCLASSIFIED) CITING THE SPEED OF LIGHT OPERATION OF HIGH-ENERGY LASER WEAPONS, LI HUI, DIRECTOR OF THE BEIJING INSTITUTE OF REMOTE SENSING EQUIPMENT, A DEVELOPER OF OPTICAL PRECISION AND PHOTOELECTRONIC GUIDANCE SYSTEMS FOR SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES, HAS CITED LASER TECHNOLOGY AS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE MEANS TO COUNTER CRUISE MISSILES.

SOURCE – U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE REPORT ON CHINESE LASER DEVELOPMENT

 

 

President Bill Clinton Gave China The Military Technology To Destroy The United States

 

AIDS Bill Clinton / Terminally Bill | Know Your Meme

https://web.archive.org/web/20080115065552/http://www.softwar.net/comint8.html

I find it interesting that this information has been “scrubbed” from the world wide web…Google etc… Bill Clinton…besides being a rapist, murderer, drug dealer and pedophile…is also a traitor guilty of TREASON as proven and documented in the below information  (and my other blogs) showing what China is now capable of because of him!

DONG FENG/JULANG SERIES MISSILES


CHINA AT WAR WITH AMERICA
U.S. REPORTS CITE CHINA AS NO. 1 THREAT

CLICK HERE TO READ THE STORY ON NEWSMAX.COM


PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCES
SECOND ARTILLERY CORPS The Second Artillery Corps is comprised of approximately 120,000 personnel and maintains control of over 300 nuclear warheads. According to the Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) the Second Artillery Corps is given priority funding over all other PLA units. Although it only makes up about 4 percent of the PLA, it receives 12 to 15 percent of the defense budget and about 20 percent of the total procurement budget. When the PLA cut 1 million personnel in the 1980s, Second Artillery Corps ranks increased in total size.

The Second Artillery Corps is headquartered in Qinghe, a suburb of Beijing and maintains at least seven missile bases each with one to three missile brigades and regiment-level special departments responsible for chemical defense, communications, training, security and four launch battalions. Each base also has training and nuclear warhead maintenance units and reports directly to the Second Artillery Corps commander. Each missile brigade commands a number of permanent launch sites. For ease of maintenance, each missile brigade is responsible for only one type of missile.

80301 Unit. The 80301 Unit is headquartered in Shenyang, Liaoning Province. Its complement of DF-3A and DF-21 cover the Korean peninsula and Japan, including Okinawa.

80302 Unit. The 80302 Unit is headquartered in Huangshan, Anhui Province and is the Second Artillery’s most important unit for conducting strikes against Taiwan. The 815th brigade in Leping took part in the March 1996 missile exercises off the coast of Taiwan. During a wartime situation the 815th brigade would disperse to prearranged sites in Fujian Province in to order to be able to strike the entire island of Taiwan. Missiles are usually transported by rail for field deployments.

80303 Unit. The 80303 Unit is headquartered in Kunming, Yunnan province. Its complement of DF-3A and DF-21 can strike targets in India and Southeast Asia.

80304 Unit. The 80304 Unit is headquartered in Luoyang, Henan province. Its DF-5 missiles can strike targets throughout the United States and Europe.

80305 Unit. The 80305 Unit is headquartered in Huaihua, Hunan province. Its DF-4 missiles can strike Guam.

80306 Unit. The 80306 Unit is headquartered in Xining, Qinghai province. Its DF-4 missiles can strike targets in India and Russia. This unit may also have an experimental unit assigned to it.



DONG FENG 11 TACTICAL MISSILE

CLICK HERE TO READ THE ARTICLE “WAR WITH CHINA” AT NEWSMAX.COM

RANGE     -  186 MILES 1993 VERSION
             510 MILES 2002 ADVANCED VERSION
WARHEAD   -  50 or 350 KILOTON TACTICAL NUCLEAR
             (1000 KG) 2,200 POUND CONVENTIONAL
ENGINE    -  SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  STRAP DOWN INERTIAL
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 200 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 400
    PAKISTAN = 70






CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFO

DONG FENG 15 TACTICAL MISSILE

WARHEAD   -  1,100 LB. (500 KG) CHEMICAL, NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL
             20 KT. NEUTRON (ENHANCED RADIATION) WEAPON
             350 KT. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEAD
RANGE     -  370 MILES (600 KM)
DIAMETER  -  3.3 FEET (1 METER)
LENGTH    -  30 FEET (9.1 METERS)
WEIGHT    -  13,700 POUNDS (6,200 KG)
ENGINE    -  SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  STRAP DOWN INERTIAL
             GPS SUPPLIED BY ROCKWELL
             POSSIBLE FOLLOW ON SAR RADAR ACTIVE TARGETING
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 100 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 400 
    SYRIA    = 20


DONG FENG 21 IRBM

RANGE     -  1,200 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 300 KILOTON THERMONUCLEAR
             NEW X VERSION WITH 250 KILOTON NUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  TWO STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC/GPS
             NEW X VERSION ACTIVE RADAR IMAGING MARV
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 200 METERS
             NEW X VERSION ACCURACY RATED AT 10 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 90 


NEW DONG FENG 21 X WITH ACTIVE RADAR IMAGING GUIDED WARHEAD


JULANG 1 GREAT WAVE 1 SLBM

RANGE     -  1,200 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 300 KILOTON THERMONUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  TWO STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC/GPS
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 200 METERS
NUMBER DEPLOYED
    CHINA    = 16 




DONG FENG 25 IRBM

RANGE     -  1,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  THREE 250 KILOTON NUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  TWO STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 10 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED - 

    CHINA    = 10


CUT-AWAY VIEW OF THREE WARHEAD DONG FENG 25 POST BOOST VEHICLE



CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFO

JULANG 2 GREAT WAVE 2 SLBM

RANGE     -  7,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 2.5 MEGATON THERMONUCLEAR OR 
             THREE 90 KILOTON NUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  THREE STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 300 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = (DEVELOPMENT)

The Julang 2 missile was successfully tested by the PLA Navy in Jan. 2001 and a successful test of the undersea launch system was conducted in October 2001. This system is planned for installation on the Type 94 SLBM submarine at Huludao. Each PLA Navy “boomer” is designed to carry 12 JL-2 missiles in a sail like configuration similar to Russian designed Delta class boats. The first JL-2 armed Type 94 is expected to be operational in 2008.



DONG FENG 31 ICBM

RANGE     -  7,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 2.5 MEGATON THERMONUCLEAR OR
             THREE 90 KILOTON NUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  THREE STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 300 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 12


NEW CHINESE MISSILE THREATENS U.S.A.


CLICK HERE TO READ THE STORY ON NEWSMAX.COM


NOTE – Chinese test of DF-31 in 2002

The new Dong Feng 31 (DF-31) missiles are attached to the 80304 Unit of the Second Artillery Corps. The 80304 Unit is headquartered in Luoyang, Henan province. The new Dong Feng (EAST WIND) 31 missile performed flawlessly during its test flights. The DF-31 can reach any city in America and is armed with three nuclear warheads. The DF-31 has Clinton-supplied guidance, nuclear warhead, nose cone and solid rocket engine technologies.

During the visit to China of General Henry Shelton, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and just a few days prior to the American presidential election, Beijing successfully flight tested its new DF-31 inter-continental ballistic missile, reports Bill Gertz in the Washington Times. Defense analysts say the timing of the test was a deliberate political signal to the United States and its allies. During Shelton’s visit, Chinese officials repeated Beijing’s opposition to US defensive arms sales to Taiwan. The DF-31 test missile utilized several decoy warheads, intended to defeat US missile defenses.


DONG FENG 31 CAN STRIKE THREE TARGETS WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS


The DF-31 is equipped with many technologies stolen or bought from America during Clinton’s term. The DF-31 success was so spectacular that the the PLA 2nd Artillery will deploy 24 missiles by the end of 2004.

The Chinese DF-31 is a road mobile, nuclear tipped SCUD like missile, that is nearly impossible to find, much less destroy. It is intended to counter the USAF B-2 bomber in a “limited” nuclear war scenario where China and the U.S. would only kill a few million people on each side. If deployed in large numbers, the DF-31 could pose a significant first strike threat against stationary military targets inside the U.S. homeland, such as the MX missile fields and the single B-2 bomber base.



CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFO

DONG FENG 41 ICBM

RANGE     -  7,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 500 KILOTON MARV EVADER WARHEAD
ENGINE    -  THREE STAGE SOLID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  INERTIAL/FIBER OPTIC
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 100 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = (DEVELOPMENT) 


DONG FENG 5 (CSS-4) ICBM

RANGE     -  7,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 3 MEGATON THERMONUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  TWO STAGE LIQUID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  STRAP DOWN INERTIAL
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 300 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 20


DONG FENG 4 ICBM

RANGE     -  4,500 MILES
WARHEAD   -  SINGLE 3 MEGATON THERMONUCLEAR
ENGINE    -  TWO STAGE LIQUID PROPELLANT
GUIDANCE  -  STRAP DOWN INERTIAL
C.E.P.    -  LESS THAN 300 METERS

NUMBER DEPLOYED

    CHINA    = 20

 

Psychotropic connection to suicide and murder-suicide

https://richardboydenreport.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/sacred-buffalo.jpg

Information I shared on my radio program and in Indian Country where the highest rate of suicides take place. Wrote a God inspired paper focusing on suicide among the Lakota….did a radio program which was nixed by the pedophile infested church and pedo enabler John Hatcher on the Rosebud Reservation. The recording was snuffed by a KKK Free Mason named Scott Prentice…a two faced liar and hacker.

Psychotropic connection to suicide and murder-suicides

Prozac, Zoloft, Paxell, Luvox, and others

Listing of Information Links for Your Examination and Evaluation

A Front Group for the Psycho-Pharmaceutical Industrial Complex – http://www.psychsearch.net/teenscreen.html

School Shootings Linked to Psychotropic Drugs Such as Prozac, Ritalin, Luvox, and Paxil – http://www.antidepressantsfacts.com/2000-05-16-School-Shootings-Psychotropic-Drugs.htm

50,000 Prozac Suicides Covered Up  News/Current Events News Keywords: PROZAC, PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, SUICIDE, VIOLENCE, ELI LILLY
Source:
Boston Globe
Published:
May 7, 2000 Author: Leah R. Garnett
Posted on
05/07/2000 10:17:22 PDT by Al B. http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3915a522538e.htm  

Psychotropics and suicide prevention. Implications from toxicological screening of 5281 suicides in Sweden 1992-1994http://bjp.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/abstract/174/3/259 

FDA Covers Up Report – Mosholder: ‘Antidepressants Double Suicides in Children’http://www.newmediaexplorer.org/sepp/2004/08/12/fda_covers_up_report_mosholder_antidepressants_double_suicides_in_children.htm 

Eli Lilly Knew Prozac Causes Suicides, Violence – FDA Closed Both Eyes

http://www.findyourhope.com/External.aspx?q=http://www.newmediaexplorer.org/sepp/2005/01/01/eli_lilly_knew_prozac_causes_suicides_violence_fda_closed_both_eyes.htm

The Drugging of Our Children http://www.garynull.com/Documents/ADHD/DruggingOurChildren2.htm

End Of Antidepressants? – 68
Times Greater Suicide Risk Shown!
http://www.rense.com/general29/ei.htm

Experts Say Antidepressant Drugs Cause Suicides Instead of Preventing Them –  http://organicconsumers.org/school/antidepressants060413.cfm

Psychiatric Drug Facts http://www.breggin.com/

Drug Awareness Information – Psychotropic Information Site with data and case histories – www.drugawareness.org

THE DANGERS OF PROZAC: Part 1 http://www.garynull.com/Documents/prozac1.htm 

THE DANGERS OF PROZAC: Part 2 – http://www.garynull.com/Documents/prozac2.htm

Prozac Information Sheet #2 – Prozac Causes Violence – Originally Issued 4 June 1990 – http://www.sntp.net/prozac/prozac_info_2.htm

Let them eat Prozac – http://www.healyprozac.com/

Suppressed Paxil Suicide Data Released – http://www.paxilprotest.com/

A MUST READ LETTER by a WHISTLEBLOWER http://psychrights.org/Drugs/AllenJonesTMAPJanuary20.pdf

Bush launches controversial mental health plan – http://narpa.org/screening.htm

ADHD AND ADD FRAUD INFORMATION SITE www.adhdfraud.org/

Death From Ritalin – The Truth Behind ADHD – http://www.ritalindeath.com/

THE ADD AND ADHD FRAUD – http://www.drugsandyourmind.com/ADDFraud.html

History of the Fraud of Biological Psychiatryhttp://www.oikos.org/biopsychiatry.htm 

http://www.prozactruth.com/

Lisa Marie Presley Takes a Stand for Children’s Rights click HERE

Psychiatric Drugs (articles and resources) http://www.wildestcolts.com/index.htm

Suicides and Homicides in Patients Taking Paxil, Prozac, and Zoloft: Why They Keep Happening — And Why They Will Continue – http://www.medicationsense.com/articles/oct_dec_03/suicides_homicides.html

A Couple of Possible Sources for Possible Legal Help www.justiceseekers.com and http://www.ssri-suicide.com/children.html

 

USAF TRAINS THE CHINESE AIR FORCE FOR “COMBAT READINESS” PLAAF AT EDWARDS AFB MAY 1999

THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE HELPING THE CHINESE AIR FORCE

Newly declassified documents from the Clinton administration reveal that a civil airline modernization program for China was actually a program to train and equip the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

The new documents, forced from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), are official USAF, Commerce and FAA reports on Chinese military contacts.

According to the documents, PLAAF officers toured Edwards Air Force Base in May 1999 for military purposes.

Here is documentation of when and where and who! https://web.archive.org/web/20080115065752/http://www.softwar.net/edwards.html

The PLAAF officers were given training on USAF combat missions, including “bombing and strafing” and “combat readiness.”

In 1994, then Secretary of Defense William Perry began a “Joint Defense” conversion project with Chinese General Ding Henggao. General Ding was the commander of the Chinese Army Unit “COSTIND” (Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense). One part of the U.S./China project was to modernize the communist civil “Air Traffic Control” (ATC) system.

The documented meetings shows that the Clinton administration attempted to conceal the military background of the Chinese representatives from everyone, including FAA officials. In 1993, a Chinese military delegation visited America. Yet, according the FAA, which sponsored the visit, the entire delegation was civilian.

The 1993 FAA delegation list includes a “Mr. Kui Fulin” who toured FAA Headquarters in Washington, Andrews AFB in Maryland, and Boeing aircraft Corporation in Washington state. “Mr. Kui Fulin” was actually General Kui Fulin, Chinese Army Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

The 1993 FAA list states “Mr. Li Yongtai” was the Commissioner of the Air Traffic Control Commission of China. According to hand written notes taken by the FAA, Mr. Li Yongtai was actually “Lt. General” Li Yongtai of the Chinese Air Force.

In fact, FAA officials who attending the meeting wrote “military” next to the names of seven members of the 1993 “China Air Traffic Control” delegation in an apparent effort to track the Chinese Army officers. Another example shows that a “Mr. Li Zhongli” was part of a Chinese civilian delegation visit in 1997 to San Francisco that was sponsored by Stanford University. “Mr. Li Zhongli” was actually Colonel Li Zhongli of the PLAAF.

In 1997, the PLAAF was given a demonstration in Sunnyvale California by Ashtech, a maker of GPS (Global Positioning Satellite) receivers. The briefing for the PLAAF and Chinese Navy officers states, “Ashtech produces a receiver that uses both the U.S. GPS signals and the Russian GLONASS signals resulting in significantly greater availability and integrity.”

According to a 1997 Rand Corp. report on the Chinese Defense Industry, “More accurate GPS systems would enhance the PLA’s ability to carry out attacks against Taiwan’s military and industrial facilities, potentially reducing the ability of the Taiwanese military to defend itself against PRC coercive diplomacy. The use of GPS to enhance the accuracy of long-range Chinese cruise missiles, coupled with long-range sensors, would raise serious concerns for the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, and possibly circumscribe their ability to provide an effective deterrent in a crisis over Taiwan.”

In 1999, the Clinton administration offered the PLAAF the latest in advanced “mobile radars”, command and control systems, GPS navigation, and “Surveillance Avionics” such as “Air to Air”, “Air to Ground” and “surface Area Movement” surveillance radars.

According to a U.S. Air Force May 1999 report, the PLAAF was given details on USAF “Special Airspace” areas inside America used for military training, research and national security zones. The details include Edwards Air Force base and a mapped tour of the facility. Edwards AFB is a test center for USAF, and NASA research aircraft, including the space shuttle.

The newly released materials also include training manuals from the USAF 334th Training Squadron in both english and Chinese. The documents show Clinton administration officials proposed to train PLAAF military air controllers.

The USAF documents show PLAAF officers were given a “simulated” training mission. The training included a “two ship formation of F-16s from Luke AFB, Arizona” on a “bombing” and overflight mission in a training area, code-named “Baghdad”, northwest of Prescott Arizona. The simulated exercise also included “in-flight refueling” with a tanker aircraft under control of a USAF AWACs plane.

The USAF “AWACS” (airborne warning and control system) is a flying radar plane manned by Air Force radar controllers. The Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft provided cover and control for thousands of allied aircraft during the Gulf war and again during the operation in Kosovo. AWACs aircraft are expensive and only a few Boeing E-3 Sentry aircraft have been exported to Saudi Arabia and NATO.

The PLAAF is not currently equipped with an airborne radar control plane nor an airborne refueling tanker aircraft. The Chinese Air Force did recently purchase thirty Sukhoi twin seat SU-27 variant super-sonic bombers, which are equipped with a retractable air refueling probe, giving them virtually unlimited range. The Sukhoi bombers are nuclear-strike capable.

The Chinese Air Force has also paid Israel to supply the Phalcon airborne radar system. However, the PLAAF radar plane deal from Israel was delayed when it was revealed the aircraft was actually a former U.S. made Boeing 707 airliner refitted with the airborne electronics, violating U.S. export laws. The Israelis are reported to be working with Russian airframe maker Antonov to fit the Phalcon radar system into a large transport for the PLAAF sale.

One 1995 meeting document from the Commerce Dept. also includes several names familiar to China-Gate and found in the Cox Report. In 1995, FAA, Commerce and USAF officials met with officers from the Chinese Army Unit COSTIND (Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense). COSTIND was represented by an all star cast including Lt. General Huai Guomo, Maj. General Deng Yousheng, and Major General Wang Shouyun.

In 1999, Softwar obtained the full bio, in Chinese and English, of COSTIND Lt. General Huai after winning a Freedom of Information lawsuit against the Commerce Dept. The official White House spin is that COSTIND was not a Chinese military unit but a “civilian” agency. According to a November, 1997 report, written for the Commerce Dept. by “think-tank” company SAIC, COSTIND was neither civilian nor engaged in purely commercial activities:

  "COSTIND supervises virtually all of China's military
   research, development and production.  It is a military
   organization, staffed largely by active duty officers...
   COSTIND also coordinates certain activities with the China
   National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), which produces, stores,
   and controls all fissile material for civilian as well as
   military applications.  COSTIND approves licenses for the use
   of nuclear materials for military purposes."

The Commerce Dept. claimed in August 1999 that it had complied with the orders of Federal Judge Robert Payne and turned over all documents on the Chinese Army unit COSTIND.

However, the newly released Commerce Dept. documents dealing with COSTIND were found by the FAA, not the Commerce Dept. The documents were turned over by the FAA in response to a FOIA request for Chinese military contacts. None of the newly released Commerce documents were given to Judge Payne in response to his Court order. Thus, the new documents show the Commerce Dept. did not fully comply with Federal Judge Payne’s order.

The Chinese Army unit COSTIND and the Chinese Air Force control “civilian” assets inside China. According to the Clinton administration, the PLAAF controls all air traffic in China, civil and military. PLAAF officers and enlisted personnel man all air control (ATC) facilities in red China. The ATC system and the PLAAF controllers are directly connected to the Chinese integrated air defense network of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and fighter-interceptors.

The PLAAF also owns several businesses. According to a 1994 report by the U.S. Army defense attache in Beijing, “the major enterprise subordinate to the PLA Air Force is the China Lantian (Blue Sky) Industrial Corp. Also affiliated to Lantian is the Tian Ma (Sky Horse) Brand of vehicles and vehicle repair parts and facilities. China United Airlines (CUA) is a commercial entity of the PLA Air Force.”

According to the 1997 Rand report on the Chinese Defense Industry, “for those who oppose any subsidization of the PLA, there is thus ample evidence that profits from PLA-affiliated enterprises directly benefit the main-line forces of the Chinese military.” https://web.archive.org/web/20080208112323/http://www.softwar.net/plaafaa.html

Defector Confirms Chinese Army Spying on U.S.

Charles R. Smith
Tuesday, March 27, 2001

Armed with information from a high-ranking defector, President Bush is reported to be on the verge of shutting down Chinese military espionage in America. The defector, identified by the BBC as Lt. Col. Xu Junping, is said to be singing like a bird about Chinese army intelligence operations inside the United States.

According to Taiwanese news sources, Xu is a senior colonel in charge of North American affairs for the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department. Xu’s reported expertise is arms control and U.S. military-to-military contacts.

Xu’s information on Chinese army spy operation has led several high-ranking members of the Bush administration to press for the suspension of major military-to-military contacts with Beijing. Under the proposed ban, Chinese military officials will no longer be allowed the exclusive access to sensitive U.S. facilities that they previously enjoyed under the Clinton administration, which considered China a “strategic partner” in Asian military affairs.

Although not as dramatic as the expulsion of dozens of Russian spies, the move will cripple People’s Liberation Army intelligence operations inside America. The Bush-led effort is expected to allow high-level Chinese army officers to attend only official military functions.

Why Did Clinton Abet Chinese Spying on U.S.?

The information obtained from Xu has led U.S. intelligence officials to question the previous free access given to Chinese army officers during the 1990s. The Clinton strategic partnership with the People’s Liberation Army included military training, computers, encrypted communications equipment, satellites and exclusive access to U.S. military facilities inside America. Xu confirmed that Chinese army intelligence officers frequently abused civilian programs to mask their military and economic espionage.

According to documents previously obtained from the U.S. government using the Freedom of Information Act, China abused a civil air traffic control program to obtain important military information such as “Combat Readiness.” The documents also show that the Chinese attempted to conceal the military background of the representatives.

For example, in 1993 a Chinese military delegation visited America under the Federal Aviation Administration civil exchange program using civilian titles. One FAA official noted that many of the Chinese delegation actually held rank in the People’s Liberation Army.

The anonymous FAA official who attending the meeting wrote “military” next to the names of seven members of the 1993 “China Air Traffic Control” delegation in an apparent effort to track the Chinese army officers.

The 1993 FAA delegation list included “Mr. Kui Fulin,” who toured Federal Aviation Administration headquarters in Washington, Andrews AFB in Maryland, and Boeing Corp. in Washington state. Mr. Kui Fulin was actually Gen. Kui Fulin, Chinese army deputy chief of the general staff. Fulin is known as the man who planned the brutal 1989 army attack on unarmed student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

The Chinese army access to the America continued throughout the Clinton years under the so-called Federal Aviation Administration civilian air program with exclusive tours backed by U.S. industry giants such as United Airlines and Lockheed Martin.

In May 1999 Chinese air force and navy officers visited Edwards Air Force Base for the Federal Aviation Administration civil program under a tour sponsored by Lockheed Martin. Edwards AFB is a test center for American military and NASA research aircraft, including the F-22, Joint Strike Fighter and space shuttle.

U.S. Air Force documents show that Sr. Col. Li Zhongli, Sr. Col. Wang Changzheng and Maj. Wang Shouxing gained entry to Edwards Air Force Base. The documents noted that the Chinese officers were given detailed information on military operations at Edwards AFB.

The Chinese air force officers were also given details on U.S. Air Force “Special Airspace” areas inside America that are used for military training, research and national security zones. The Chinese military officers were given the latest information on advanced “mobile radars,” command and control systems, GPS navigation and “Surveillance Avionics” such as “Air to Air,” “Air to Ground” and “Surface Area Movement” surveillance radars.

Chinese military officers were also given training on U.S. Air Force combat missions, including “bombing and strafing” and “combat readiness.” The U.S. Air Force documents show Chinese Air Force officers were given a “simulated” F-16 training mission under the FAA civil program.

The training included a “two ship formation of F-16s from Luke AFB, Arizona” on a “bombing” and overflight mission in a training area, code-named “Baghdad,” northwest of Prescott, Ariz. The simulated exercise also included “in-flight refueling” with a tanker aircraft under control of a U.S. Air Force AWACs plane.

Defense and State Department officials, backed by the espionage details provided by Xu, have reportedly recommended the new freeze in military exchanges amid heightened security concerns. The new concern in Washington is reflected in the recent decision by President Bush to order air strikes against a Chinese-built air defense system outside Baghdad.

The U.S. and U.K. air attacks were timed to strike when Chinese engineers were not working on the Iraqi fiber-optic command network, NATO code-named “Tiger Song.” In the following war of words, Secretary of State Colin Powell reported conservations with Beijing clearly noted the U.N. embargo on weapons for Baghdad is still in effect. Powell stated that the public and private protests over Beijing’s illegal supply of weaponry to Iraq would continue.


 

 

Military Technology for Sale, Dangerous Exports to the Chinese Army Per Bill And Hillary Clinton

Information ‘links” off of my Operation Morning Star web page…back in the day. I interviewed Charles Smith many times on my radio program and this is the information he compiled and shared…brilliant American with guts!

Bill and Hillary Clinton represent Satan direct!
“We may soon discover the consequences of our decisions )WWW3 on this land…judgement from God) over the past decade with regard to advanced military exports to China. Those consequences are currently sitting on a runway or clustered in a dark hole, waiting like a giant serpent, coiled and ready to strike”
Military Technology for Sale, Dangerous Exports to the Chinese Army (USAF TRAINS THE CHINESE AIR FORCE FOR “COMBAT READINESS” PLAAF AT EDWARDS AFB MAY 1999…see link below)

Charles R. Smith
Thursday, May. 06, 2004

China is on a buying spree and the 2004 U.S. campaign season is going to be a bonus year for the People’s Liberation Army. Major U.S. companies, eager to sell military technology, are lobbying Congress and the White House to sell.. sell.. sell.

For example, Cincinnati Lamb is slated to deliver its first HyperMach ultra-high speed, 5-axis linear motor profiler to Brek Manufacturing of California. Brek plans to use the HyperMach to produce structural bulkhead sections of the U.S. military air lifter – the Boeing C-17.

Cincinnati Lamb plans to sell $20 million worth of the HyperMach machines with one slated to go to Lockheed to drill holes in the wings and fuselage of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and another scheduled to be delivered to Xian Aircraft Co. in China – maker of the PLA Navy FB-7 supersonic strike fighter.

China has obtained 5 axis machines before. In Nov. 2001, the Bush administration imposed one of the largest civil penalties ever in an export-control case over a 5-axis machine sent to China. The Commerce Department fined McDonnell Douglas Corp. $2.1 million for selling China aerospace equipment that wound up inside a military jet fighter manufacturing plant.

The fine ended a six-year investigation into McDonnell Douglas, which deceived the government and broke federal export-control laws when it sold an array of sophisticated machining tools to China in 1994.

The tools were diverted by the Chinese Army to military manufacturing plants at the Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation. The Generals of the PLA directly control Nanchang.

Confirmed Violation

U.S. spy satellite photos confirmed the machines sold to China for “civilian” use were diverted to the Nanchang facility for making jet fighters and missiles. A giant, 5 axis, stretch press for aircraft manufacture, was sold in 1994 to CATIC, a Chinese state owned corporation, controlled by Generals of the People’s Liberation Army.

The Clinton administration approved the sale of the press to CATIC through the Commerce Department then under Ron Brown. The approval came just before Mr. Brown left on his whirlwind tour of China in August 1994. Federal investigators charged the Chinese company never had any intention of purchasing the equipment for civilian use because the facility constructed to house the giant machine was put inside the Nanchang military aircraft plant.

The Nanchang Aircraft Corp. military site was being built even as Chinese officials told U.S. Commerce officials that the press was bound for a civilian airliner plant just outside of Beijing. In addition, Nanchang officials inspected some of the equipment just before McDonnell Douglas shipped it in late 1993.

Nanchang is China’s main producer of advanced warplanes and missiles capable of nuclear or chemical attack. For example, Nanchang has produced over 1,000 advanced Q-5/A-5 jet fighter bombers.

More Jets for China’s Air Force

The U.S. made 5-axis stretch press is reported to be making the J-11 – China’s copy of the Russian Sukhoi SU-27 (Nato Codename “FLANKER”) jet fighter. The PLAAF already flies 76 of the advanced Russian built Su-27s. The aircraft have been used repeatedly by the PLAAF to intimidate Taiwan and intercept U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.

As of Jan. 2004, Nanchang rolled out at least 50 more Chinese made J-11 Flanker jets using the U.S. 5-axis machines and is in the process of building a total of at least four hundred. Nanchang also produces the FL-1, FL-2, FL-3A and the popular C.802 anti-ship cruise missiles, exported to Iran.

The Cincinnati Lamb 5-axis machine is not the only U.S. technology to suddenly play a key role in Chinese life. Chinese space officials recently stated that they are adding anti-jam capability to their advanced Sinosat II satcom scheduled for launch in 2005. The Chinese acquired anti-jamming technology from the Clinton administration in the 1990s.

The Chinese said the anti-jam feature is not so much to thwart any scrambling of the spacecraft by other countries, but rather to counter the Falungong that opposes communist Chinese policies.

The Falungong stunned the Chinese government during the last two years by penetrating the communications links to PRC satellites. In at least one case, a Chinese spacecraft suddenly started transmitting Falungong programming, in another the signal was blocked totally.

U.S. satellite communications security experts doubt the Chinese pledge to use advanced American anti-jamming features to protect against Falungong attacks.

Despite the vicious crack down on the Falungong – the spiritual group hardly qualifies as a terrorist organization. The PRC has jailed thousands of Falungong members and killed hundreds inside its prison system. Falungong, however, has launched no bomb attacks, made no suicide hijackings nor killed any PRC citizen.

Clear Red Satellite Channel

The addition of special anti-jamming to Sinosat II is to ensure that the PLA has a clear channel of space communications during time of war.

The export of advanced satellite communications technology was de-controlled by President Clinton in 1996 when he removed the State and Defense Department oversight of high-tech “dual use” items. The CEO’s of Lockheed, Loral and Hughes supported the Clinton executive order, and it allowed China to purchase sophisticated anti-jamming and encryption for its military satellite systems.

According to a Hughes document sent in March 1995 to Clinton national security advisor Anthony Lake, satellite encryption “has no military significance.” The 1995 Hughes document concluded control over the export of a wide range of advanced U.S. satellite technology should be moved to the Commerce Department.

The U.S. technology sent by Clinton to China included the entire list of items sought by Hughes; anti-jam capability, advanced antennas, crosslinks, baseband processing, encryption devices, radiation hardening, and perigee kick motors.

In fact, the CEOs of Hughes, Loral and Lockheed, all co-wrote a letter to Bill Clinton in October 1995, expressing their desire that the President “transfer all responsibility for commercial satellite export licensing to the Commerce Department.”

The 1995 letter, signed by C. Michael Armstrong of Hughes, Bernard Schwartz of Loral and Daniel Tellep of Lockheed, states that “we understand you many soon be issuing an Executive Order intended to make further improvements to the process for reviewing export license applications.”

“During a recent meeting involving Vice President Gore and representatives of the satellite industry discussing national/global information infrastructure, this was one of several issues raised. We clearly appreciate your administration’s strong commitment to reforming the U.S. export control system, but we respectfully request your personal support for establishing the Commerce Department’s jurisdiction over the export of all commercial communications satellites,” states the letter from the three CEOs.

Military and Significant

Yet, in 1998 Hughes offered an advanced satellite, with all of the anti-jam features, previously sold to China to the U.S. military for wartime communications. C. Michael Armstrong, former CEO of Hughes, never explained how the satellite, which had “no military significance,” could suddenly become militarily significant.

Asiasat-3 was placed into an incorrect orbit by a Russian Proton booster rocket launched from Baikonur in 1997. In 1998, space insurance companies paid off the satellite loss and transferred ownership to Hughes.

AsiaSat-3, a commercial satellite sold to China was more than just a $220 million piece of orbiting junk. Hughes recovered Asiasat-3, using a special lunar orbit technique to bring it back into a useable position around the earth.

Hughes then offered the recovered satellite to the U.S. Navy for military purposes. Mark J. Schwene, Hughes Global Services Vice President, was quoted in Aviation Week and Space Technology making the offer.

“Possible markets for the satellite (AsiaSat-3) include providing capacity over ocean regions for the Navy as well as providing sufficient communications services in times of crisis to meet military communications surge requirements,” stated the Hughes VP.

The very same Hughes “commercial” satellite sold to China was offered to the U.S. Navy to serve in times of crisis to meet American military requirements. Of course, it never occurred to C. Michael Armstrong that the Chinese Army might use Hughes satellites for “military communications”.

The wholesale peddling of advanced U.S. military technology to China led the U.S. congress to transfer all satellite export controls back to the State Department and the Defense Department. The China-Gate scandal left Loral, Hughes and Lockheed in shambles and ended with prosecutions.

Hughes was charged with no less than 123 violations of national security and Loral paid a record fine for its violations. These violations played a major role in the upgrade of Chinese nuclear missile technology pointed at the U.S. The fact is that the Commerce Dept. failed to protect U.S. national security.

The move of satellite exports from Commerce to State was due to the massive national security violations made by U.S. aerospace companies such as Hughes and Loral. Today, the aerospace industry is pushing hard to end the ban on satellite sales to China. The pressure on Congress and the both presidential candidates is to move satellite export control back to the Commerce Department.

Chinese Flip-Flop

Despite the recent sales approved by the Bush administration, do not expect John Kerry to swiftly take a stand against advanced military trade with China.

John Kerry recently criticized the Bush administration’s decision not to pursue allegations of human rights abuses and trade with China. Kerry stated that when it comes to China “the administration is all talk and no action.”

Kerry pledged that if elected president, “I am going to fight to keep U.S. jobs in America and I’m not going to sit idly by when China or any other country pursues policies that hurt our economy.”

However, Kerry – true to form – is doing a flip-flop on China.

In a March 2000 speech on China at the Wilson Center, Kerry praised the Clinton administration for de-linking human rights and trade, claiming opponents of this policy were pushing America to war with China over trade, human rights and military issues.

“Proponents of containment see China only as an enemy, intent on expanding its power in Asia, repressing its people and amassing sufficient power to challenge the United States as a superpower. For them, engagement is a naive approach, driven principally by economic interests. They believe we should link trade to human rights and have less direct interaction with China – not more – by eliminating military and scientific contacts and further restricting technology sales,” stated Kerry.

“On some initiatives, the (Clinton) Administration has had success in dealing with China. It moved quickly to abandon the counterproductive MFN-human rights linkage,” noted Kerry in the March 2000 speech.

More importantly, Kerry also voted to kill a bill for trade sanctions if China sells weapons of mass destruction. Kerry voted to table an amendment that would require sanctions against China or other countries if they were found to be selling illicit weapons of mass destruction (Bill HR.4444 ; vote number 2000-242 on Sept. 13, 2000).

Red Fingers Crossed

The recent sales of advanced U.S. machine tools and computers are based on the promise from Beijing to adhere to trade agreements and inspection rights to ensure they are not being used for military purposes.

Today’s promises from Beijing are hollow words that will not be honored. Beijing has broken its trade and arms control treaties with the U.S. on an annual basis since 1990. Each year it promises again to adhere to the pledges made and each year we discover that China has flagrantly violated the same pledges.

We may soon discover the consequences of our decisions over the past decade with regard to advanced military exports to China. Those consequences are currently sitting on a runway or clustered in a dark hole, waiting like a giant serpent, coiled and ready to strike.

https://web.archive.org/web/20080115065450/http://www.softwar.net/caac.html

USAF TRAINS THE CHINESE AIR FORCE FOR “COMBAT READINESS” PLAAF AT EDWARDS AFB MAY 1999 https://web.archive.org/web/20080208112323/http://www.softwar.net/plaafaa.html

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